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Errors and adverse events in health care are now recognized to be far more widespread 
and more harmful to patients than was realized previously.   Patients, already vulnerable when ill 
and in need of treatment, are left even more vulnerable when injured by the very system they 
turned to for help.  A significant portion of adverse events are preventable.   Medical error and 
patient injury have become serious concerns worldwide, resulting in numerous domestic 
initiatives and the launch of the World Alliance for Patient Safety by the World Health 
Organization.  The National Audit Office in the United Kingdom observed that patient safety has 
become “the most important common issue in health care internationally”.TP F1FTP  Regardless of 
differences in the organization and delivery of care, health and liability insurance, and legal 
environments among countries, the policy environment for patient safety is becoming 
increasingly globalized, and the need for action to reduce harm is urgent.   
The debate about medical error and patient safety has been reframed to reflect a new 
understanding of how error and injury in health care occur.  Rather than the traditional focus on 
the personal responsibility of health care providers, this new patient safety approach maintains 
that it is the institutional systems within which health care providers operate that cause harm 
more than individual practitioners.  Reconfiguring the system and the way error is treated within 
it, it is contended, will result in safer care.  Underlying systemic factors play a significant causal 
role in most adverse events and near misses in health care; it is thus inappropriate to blame 
individual health care providers when patients are injured.  Analysis cannot be limited to 
occurrences at the “sharp end”, where practitioners interact with patients and each other in the 
process of delivering care, but must also include consideration of the role played by the “blunt” 
or remote end of the system, i.e. regulators, administrators, policy makers and technology 
suppliers, who shape the environment in which practitioners work.   
However, the extent to which this approach to error reduction, and in particular, the de-
emphasis on individual fault-finding, has been or can be incorporated into legal reasoning is not 
clear.  It contrasts starkly with tort law, in which recovery of damages is largely premised on a 
finding of fault.  The intersection of the two affects uptake of the patient safety approach, since 
law shapes the environment for the provision of health care, assessment of risks, and response to 
adverse events by all concerned.  In important ways, law conditions the solutions that can be 
implemented, because people are guided in their conduct by the applicable legal frameworks and 
requirements.   
This project involved a review and comparison of several countries, (1) examining 
incentives and disincentives to reducing medical error and enhancing patient safety inherent in 
existing legal frameworks (tort and procedural law); and (2) evaluating legal reforms undertaken 
or proposed, in order to assess their impact on patient safety initiatives, and distil lessons to be 
learned from these experiences.  Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and 
New Zealand were studied, because they share similar legal systems (with the exception of 
Quebec in Canada), and because the systems-oriented patient safety approach has taken hold in 
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1
P England. National Audit Office, “A Safer Place for Patients:  Learning to Improve Patient Safety”, HC 456Session 
2005-2006 (London: Stationery Office, 2005), Appendix 4,  67. 
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much of the academic and policy literature.  New Zealand’s no-fault system for accident 
compensation offered a useful contrast to fault-based liability. 
Findings 
The study determined that, despite support for systemic analysis, the law has changed 
little in response.  Tort law has been reformed, in some jurisdictions substantially, but the 
primary goal of most reforms has been to limit the risk and size of judgments, not to minimize 
error.  In adopting these reforms, little attention was given to assessing whether they will affect 
the incidence of error, disclosure, or patient injury.  Tort law’s effect on accident prevention 
appears limited.  Underclaiming for negligently caused injury is endemic, not just in jurisdictions 
with tort systems, but where alternative compensation systems exist as well.  The absence of a 
tort system, as in New Zealand, has not been associated with significantly greater disclosure of 
error to patients, suggesting other factors exert a powerful influence in addition to the prospect of 
tort liability.   
Accountability to patients and the public remains a pressing concern in all jurisdictions.  
Different mechanisms have been adopted to address this issue, and in some countries, to divert 
claims from the civil justice system; some of these show promise for consideration for adaptation 
to the Canadian environment.  Wider acceptance of the patient safety movement’s prescriptions 
for change will require patient safety advocates to become more attentive to injured patients’ 
needs, including the need for compensation.  Ensuring accountability and appropriate 
compensation for injury represent challenges to patient safety advocates’ recommendations about 
how errors and injury should be addressed that have not yet been satisfactorily resolved.   
There has been little attention to whether and how the tort reforms adopted in the various 
countries have affected patient safety or disclosure of harm.  Similarly, there has been little 
empirical study of the effectiveness of patient safety initiatives, or at least those reviewed that 
affect the operation of the civil justice system, such as qualified privilege laws that shield reports 
of error from disclosure in legal proceedings. 
Consideration of reform of the medical liability system in Canada must take account of 
two fundamental constraints.  First, although there is scope for concerted action by governments 
in Canada on patient safety, proposals for legal reform must respect the realities of the Canadian 
federation, i.e. that jurisdiction over tort law, the administration of justice, and most aspects of 
health care is provincial.  Second, as a practical matter, there is no evidence of the political or 
public will needed to undertake a program of radical tort reform (such as no-fault compensation) 
in the near future.  Proposals for reform must respond to that reality, looking to the question of 
how best to create synergies between public and private law to achieve desired goals – in patient 
safety terms, gathering more information about errors, facilitating systemic analysis, and 
implementing systemic solutions to reduce future harm.  Recommendations are aimed at making 
litigation count for patient safety. 
 
Making Litigation Count for Patient Safety 
Qualified Privilege, Error Reporting and Disclosure to Patients 
Recommendation 1.1  
Limited qualified privilege legislation that shields information gathered in connection with and 
the activities of quality assurance committees or designated patient safety initiatives from use in 
civil litigation should be adopted, including protection for external reporting and sharing of 
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information for patient safety purposes, but its continuation should be linked to evidence of 
compliance with requirements to report error and also to disclose harm to patients.   
 
Recommendation 1.2  
Effective oversight is required to ensure compliance with error reporting and investigative 
obligations, as well as with requirements for disclosure to patients 
 
Recommendation 1.3 
Patient safety initiatives such as error reporting systems must be monitored and evaluated to 
assess their results in improving care, communication and outcomes.   
 
Reframing Liability to Advance Patient Safety Goals 
Recommendation 2.1 
 Provinces should consider legislation extending hospital liability to include responsibility for the 
negligence of non-employed physicians treating patients on-site.  
  
Recommendation 2.2 
Implications for patient safety should be an important, explicit consideration in decision-making 
about and oversight of care, both in and outside hospitals.    
 
Lawsuits as a Learning Resource 
Recommendation 3 
Provision should be made for systematic identification and dissemination of patient safety lessons to be 
learned from lawsuits, potentially under the aegis of or in conjunction with the Canadian Patient Safety 
Institute, or through external error reporting structures or provincial patient safety organizations where 
these exist.   Possibilities for earlier and more comprehensive access to claims information for patient 
safety purposes should be explored with the affected stakeholders. 
 
Liability Coverage, Government Subsidy and Access to Information 
Recommendation 4 
The substantial funding that governments contribute to the cost of physician and hospital liability 
coverage (thereby indirectly assuming a share of the risk of liability) should be tied to improved 
performance in specified, targeted patient safety initiatives. 
 
Expanded Complaints Mechanisms as an Alternative to Litigation 
Recommendation 5 
More low key, accessible, inexpensive, conciliatory complaints resolution mechanisms, with 
power to consider complaints involving both institutions and different types of health care 
providers, should be made available. 
 
Exploring No-Fault and Administrative Compensation Systems 
Recommendation 6 
Research should be sponsored to evaluate alternative compensation mechanisms, including no-
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CHAPTER 1.  FINAL REPORT  
PATIENT SAFETY, MEDICAL ERROR AND TORT LAW:  AN 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Significance of this Study 
 Errors and adverse events in health care are now recognized to be far more widespread 
than had previously been realized.  Even more importantly, we are better able to determine the 
extent of the harm they cause, and it is substantial.  Many patients are seriously injured and even 
die as a result of adverse events during their care.  A significant portion of those adverse events 
are preventable.  With a problem of this magnitude causing such widespread harm, the need for 
effective response is urgent.   
 The debate about medical error and patient safety has been reframed since the release of 
the influential report, To Err is Human, by the Institute of Medicine in the United States in 
1999.TPF1FPT  That report, which concluded that much of the harm that patients suffer is the result of 
systemic factors, and advocated a systems-oriented approach to error reduction that de-
emphasized individual fault-finding, has had a tremendous influence on policymakers and in 
much academic commentary.  Its findings and recommendations have been repeated in other 
countries as well.  In a very short time, “patient safety”, with its emphasis on the importance of 
systemic analysis in reducing error and injury to patients, has come to dominate discourse on the 
subject, and become a priority worldwide.  
 The extent of both awareness of the problem and the penetration of systemic approaches 
to understanding and responding to it is evident in the adoption of a Resolution by the World 
Health Assembly in 2002, urging members to pay the greatest possible attention to patient safety, 
and requesting the Director General of the World Health Organization (WHO) to carry out a 
series of actions to promote patient safety.TPF2FPT  These included development of global norms and 
standards, promotion of evidence-based policies, promotion of mechanisms to recognize 
excellence in patient safety internationally, encouragement of research, and provision of 
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PT Kohn, L., Corrigan, J., Donaldson, M. (eds), Institute of Medicine, To Err is Human:  Building a Safer Health 
System (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 2000). 
TP
2
PT World Health Ass’n., WHA55.18, online at:  HTUwww.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA55/ewha5518.pdfUTH (last 
accessed May, 2005). 
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assistance to countries in key areas.  In response, WHO launched the World Alliance for Patient 
Safety in 2004, which is committed to raising awareness and political commitment to improve 
the safety of care and facilitate development of patient safety policy and practice in WHO 
Member States.TPF3FPT  It is sponsoring work to understand the nature and causes of adverse outcomes 
and near misses, standardize nomenclature and taxonomy in order to facilitate the development 
and dissemination of solutions, and advance patient safety in specific areas such as blood safety, 
infection control, and medical devices.   
 The National Audit Office (NAO) in England noted in 2005 that the rate of development 
of patient safety initiatives “is increasing to the point that patient safety appears to be the most 
important common issue in health care internationally”.TPF4FPT  As an indication of the rapid expansion 
of interest and work in this area, it recounted that an internet search for “patient safety” in 
February 2004 showed just over 500,000 results, while the same search in March 2005 revealed 
2,680,000 results.TPF5FPT  To update that figure, in March, 2006, entering the term “patient safety” on 
an internet search engine returned 91,500,000 results!  Patient safety agencies and organizations, 
government offices and staff in health care institutions, research programs, articles in scholarly 
and popular publications and general interest in the subject have proliferated.  In a very short 
time, patient safety has become a global issue.  
 
Adverse Events and Patient Injury in Canada 
 Canada is no exception when it comes to patient injury – a significant number of 
Canadian patients are harmed by preventable adverse events while receiving treatment and care 
each year.  In 2004, Baker and Norton et al. identified an incidence rate of adverse events (i.e. 
unintended injuries harming patients and caused by health care management) of 7.5% in acute 
care hospitals.TPF6FPT  Of these, 36.9% were considered highly preventable.TPF7FPT  In most cases (64.4%), 
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PT England.  National Audit Office, “A Safer Place for Patients:  Learning to Improve Patient Safety”,  HC 456 
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learning for patient safety”, at 67 (hereafter NAO 2005); online at:  






PT Baker, R., Norton, P. et al., “The Canadian Adverse Events Study:  the incidence of adverse events among hospital 
patients in Canada”, (2004) CMAJ 170(11) 1678-1689 (hereafter, Canadian Adverse Events Study). 
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7
PT Ibid., at 1683.    
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the adverse event resulted in no or minimal to moderate impairment, with recovery within six 
months.  However, 5.2% of adverse events resulted in permanent disability, and 15.9% in death.TPF8FPT  
In addition to the toll on (and of) patients, adverse events often entailed longer periods of 
hospitalization, with associated increases in costs.  Extrapolating from their study, they estimated 
that in 2000, of the almost 2.5 million annual admissions to similar hospitals in Canada, about 
185,000 were associated with an adverse event, of which close to 70,000 were potentially 
preventable.TPF9FPT  This means that preventable adverse events cause more deaths than breast cancer, 
motor vehicle/transport and HIV combined.TPF10FPT  
Patient Safety and the Law 
The new understanding of how patient injury occurs gained widespread attention 
somewhat later in Canada than elsewhere.  In the United States, the Institute of Medicine’s work 
was preceded by the Harvard Medical Practice Study’s 1991 report highlighting the extent of 
adverse events in hospital care in New York; many of these were preventable.TPF11FPT  Other countries 
also recognized that their health care systems were prone to error and failure, and that solutions 
required a concentration on systemic improvements in the safety and quality of health care, and a 
concomitant move away from “shaming and blaming” the individual practitioners involved 
through civil liability, in-hospital processes and professional discipline.TPF12FPT  The National Steering 
Committee on Patient Safety in Canada released its report, “Building a Safer System:  A 
National Integrated Strategy for Improving Patient Safety in Canadian Health Care”, in 
September, 2002.TPF13FPT  It, too, concluded that underlying systemic factors contribute to most 
adverse events, near misses and critical incidents, and underlined the importance of reporting 
problems without attaching blame.  Pursuant to its recommendations, the Canadian Patient 
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“Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients:  Results of the Harvard Medical Practice 
Study I” (1991) 324 NEJM 370-6. 
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PT See eg. England.  Department of Health, An organization with a memory:  Report of an expert group on learning 
from adverse events in the NHS (Chief Medical Officer, Chair), (London:  Stationery Office, 2000); Wilson, R. et 
al., “The Quality in Australian Health Care Study:  Iatrogenic Injuries or adverse patient events in hospitalised 
patients” (1995) 163(9) Med.J.Aus. 458-71. 
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13
PT National Steering Committee on Patient Safety.  Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada.  Online at:  
HTUhttp://rcpsc.medical.org/publications/index.phpUTH (last accessed October, 2002). 
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Safety Institute (CPSI) was established in December, 2003, with a national mandate to  advance 
safer health systems for Canadians.TPF14FPT    
The extent to which a “systems-oriented” approach, especially its de-emphasis on 
individual fault-finding, has been or can be incorporated into legal reasoning is not clear.  The 
contrast with tort, and negligence law in particular, is stark:  recovery of damages for negligence 
is premised on a finding of fault.  The intersection of the two will affect uptake of the patient 
safety approach, since law forms a pervasive backdrop to decisions and actions of providers and 
patients, and shapes the environment for the provision of health care, assessment of risks, and 
responses to adverse events by all concerned.  In important ways, law conditions the solutions 
that can be implemented, because people are guided in their conduct by the applicable legal 
frameworks and requirements. 
The tension between the patient safety approach to error and injury, and tort law’s  
emphasis on finding fault is evident.  Examining whether and how tort law has been adapted to 
take the new patient safety sensibility into account in jurisdictions with longer experience with 
the two can provide useful information.  While there are important differences in the health care 
systems and social, political, economic and legal environments in the countries studied, there are 
also significant similarities, and a comparative study can be instructive.  In each of the five 
countries (Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand), the 
utility of systemic analysis in addressing the problem of patient injury has been widely, although 
not universally accepted among policy makers and health care practitioners, but less so by the 
public.  Some countries have implemented tort and other law reforms, although often not to 
advance a patient safety agenda.  Analyzing developments elsewhere will assist in assessing how 
Canadian jurisdictions can best respond to the disjunction between tort law and patient safety 
approaches.   
 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT 
Methods: 
  This project is an international comparison that uses synthesis research to examine the 
role of tort law and tort reform in facilitating and inhibiting efforts to reduce medical error and 
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14
PT Canadian Patient Safety Institute, online at: http:// www.hc-sc.gc.ca/english/care/cpsi.html 
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improve patient safety.  It focuses on four countries in addition to Canada:  the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand.  These countries were selected because they are 
common law jurisdictions and so, share similar legal systems,TPF15FPT and because the systems-
oriented patient safety approach has taken hold in much of their policy and academic literature 
on health safety, allowing assessment of whether changes in tort law or in statutory or regulatory 
frameworks governing civil liability have resulted.  New Zealand’s no-fault system for accident 
compensation (which includes injury caused by treatment), although retaining vestiges of a fault-
based inquiry in cases of “medical error” until recently, offers a useful contrast to fault-based 
liability. 
 Despite sharing these characteristics, the countries also differ in important respects.  
Canada, the United States and Australia are federations.  The United Kingdom and New Zealand 
are unitary states.  With the exception of the United States, all the countries surveyed have 
systems of universal access to medically necessary services on the basis of need and not ability 
to pay, although the services covered are not uniform among the various plans.  The legal status 
of physicians working in hospitals varies.  For instance, in the United Kingdom, the National 
Health Service (NHS) employs most physicians providing NHS services in hospitals, while in 
the United States, physicians treating patients in hospitals are typically independent contractors.  
Arrangements for  physicians’ liability insurance differ as well, ranging from practitioner 
responsibility in the United States, through various forms and degrees of governmental 
subvention in Australia and Canada, to government responsibility in the U.K. for physicians 
providing NHS services. 
Data Collection: 
 As synthesis research, the study identifies, reviews and analyzes existing knowledge.  
Site visits were conducted to each jurisdiction to gather additional material and conduct 
interviews with key informants in order to update information and better understand the full 
extent of the literature, the tort / accident compensation and patient safety systems, and their 
interaction in each country.  However, primary research on the effects of various reforms was 
outside the scope of the project. 
 The following steps were taken: 
                                                 
TP
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• Identification and analysis of relevant literature, judicial decisions, statutory regimes and 
law reform initiatives in each of the five jurisdictions; 
• Meetings with academics, policymakers and lawyers practicing in the area of medical 
malpractice in the jurisdictions being reviewed; 
• Analysis of the goals of tort and procedural reforms in each jurisdiction, and assessment 
of congruence with a patient safety sensibility; 
• Assessment of the state of relevant law in each country, including any evidence of the 
effects of reforms undertaken; 
• Update literature reviews; 
• Develop recommendations for consideration by policymakers and lawmakers. 
The literature reviews undertaken were extensive, and included examination of the grey literature 
(policy documents, inquiry reports, position papers and other sources).  Because the study has a 
dual focus on patient safety and tort, the review encompassed both bodies of literature, on patient 
safety and on tort law, with particular attention to their interaction.  The material gathered was 
voluminous, and because the area is the focus of such intense interest and work, new sources and 
developments continued to appear over the course of the project, resulting in the need to update, 
add new material, and re-assess results frequently.  After the various chapters on each country 
were drafted, they were reviewed by experts in those countries for accuracy and completeness.   
Data Presentation: 
 The first chapter of this study contains the final report on this project.  It introduces the 
problem of patient safety, the power of law, and the dissonance between patient safety 
advocates’ understanding of how error occurs and that prevalent in negligence law.  It reviews 
the basic concepts and reasoning employed in the patient safety literature and in tort law.  The 
report focuses on the central issues at the interface of tort law and patient safety initiatives.  It 
analyzes the most influential developments and trends in thinking, with examples from the 
countries reviewed.  It makes recommendations for consideration for future action, reform and 
research.  The chapters that follow examine developments in each of the countries reviewed – 
Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand – describing and 
analyzing tort reforms that have been undertaken, and the relationship among patient safety 
initiatives, tort law and the civil justice system (or, in the case of New Zealand, the accident 
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compensation system).  The final chapter summarizes past and future dissemination activities, 
and identifies gaps remaining. 
Given the volume of material reviewed, it would have been neither possible nor helpful 
to the reader to include reference to all of it in this report.  Rather, I selected the sources that 
were of most assistance in tracking and understanding events, developments and their effects in 
the countries reviewed, and assessing initiatives and directions in law reform, with particular 
reference to the implications for patient safety.  Definitions of key terms in patient safety and tort 
law can be found in the Glossary in Appendix A to this chapter.  In order to increase the report’s 
utility to different audiences, the elements of a negligence claim are explained in greater detail in 
Appendix B to this chapter. 
Concepts in patient safety 
 The extent of adverse events and consequent harm to patients is so significant that, as the 
National Steering Committee on Patient Safety in Canada noted, “… it is no longer appropriate 
to think that previous and current processes to ensure safety are still effective in controlling 
adverse outcomes”.TPF16FPT  Instead, patient safety advocates urge the adoption of a systems approach 
to patient safety, “based on the understanding that the individual practitioner is not a potential 
culprit to be blamed and punished, but rather that he or she is one participant interacting with 
many others in a highly complex environment.  Adverse events are generally viewed as a 
consequence of the system; the goal is to improve the structure and/or process so the event is less 
likely to recur”.TPF17FPT  Systems analysis recognizes that analysis cannot be limited to occurrences at 
the “sharp end”, where practitioners interact with patients and each other in the process of 
delivering care, but must also include consideration of the role played by the “blunt” or remote 
end of the system i.e. regulators, administrators, policy makers and technology suppliers, who 
shape the environment in which practitioners work.  As the National Steering Committee noted, 
“Human-factor engineers have consistently shown that the ability of sharp-end practitioners to 
avoid adverse events or near misses…depends directly or indirectly on a host of blunt-end 
factors, rather than on the isolated ‘error’ of human practitioners”.TPF18FPT  
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The NAO identified five elements that most developed countries have identified in their 
strategies for improving patient safety:TPF19FPT 
• “A ‘just’ or ‘fair’ culture that encourages a reporting and questioning culture; 
• Systems for reporting and analysing incidents both locally and nationally; 
• A good in-depth analysis process to establish root causes for selected individual incidents 
and aggregate incident reviews, thus enabling learning; 
• A process to ensure that actions are implemented and corresponding improvements in 
patient safety and quality of care can be demonstrated; and 
• Effective processes for sharing information at various levels – nationally, 
organizationally and clinically – for learning and improvement.” 
Common themes are that error is inevitable but can be minimized, and that to do so,   
organizations must foster a culture that encourages reporting problems, analyzes incidents to 
determine all contributing causes, does not blame health care providers,  implements effective 
responses, and disseminates lessons learned.  
 
Concepts in Tort Law 
  The focus of this report is on one branch of tort law, the law of negligence, because that 
is the basis for most lawsuits against health care professionals, hospitals and their employees.  As 
background, this section briefly outlines the purposes and uses of tort law, and the structure of 
negligence actions.   
(a) Objectives of Tort Law 
Compensation, corrective justice and deterrence are the three primary objectives of tort 
law.  Many judges and scholars see compensation as tort law’s most important function.  The 
Supreme Court of Canada has observed that “…the essential purpose of tort law…is to restore 
the plaintiff to the position he or she would have enjoyed but for the negligence of the 
defendant”.TPF20FPT  However, liability for negligence is bounded by the requirement that there be an 
initial finding of fault.  As Lewis Klar notes, “The essential characteristic of tort law’s primary 
area of operation is that it is a fault-based system of accident compensation”.TPF21FPT  Once that 
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TP
20
PT Athey v. Leonati (1996), 140 D.L.R. (4PthP) 235 (S.C.C.). 
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condition is satisfied, the damages awarded are meant to fully indemnify a plaintiff for all his or 
her losses, insofar as money can do so.  The requirement to find fault rests on the principle that 
wrongdoers bear personal responsibility for the harm they have caused others, and so should 
restore the victim by paying damages.TPF22FPT  Thus, in addition to compensation, tort law also 
incorporates considerations of corrective justice, which place moral and ethical principles at the 
forefront, rather than instrumental justifications.TPF23FPT  Accident prevention is the third important 
objective of tort law.  A finding of liability and award of compensation are expected to deter 
other similar conduct (and resulting injuries) in the future.  The Supreme Court of Canada 
recognizes that  “One of the primary purposes of negligence law is to enforce reasonable 
standards of conduct so as to prevent the creation of reasonably foreseeable risks.  In this way, 
tort law serves as a disincentive to risk-creating behaviour”.TPF24FPT  Deterrence is meant to operate 
both specifically on the defendant, encouraging precautions to avoid a recurrence, and generally, 
as a guide to future conduct by others, so that they can govern their behaviour to avoid similar 
substandard conduct.   
 While academic criticism of each perspective abounds (and is beyond the scope of this 
paper to address), they co-exist as both objectives and justifications in many judicial decisions.  
Judges do not treat these goals as mutually exclusive or incompatible, nor do they resolve 
contradictions among them.  Rather, they tend to appeal to one after the other, particularly 
compensation and deterrence, to explain policy considerations meant to be advanced by their 
judgments.  Tort law also serves educative, symbolic and political functions.  
(b) Tort Law and Regulatory Scholarship 
Medical liability law has a dual character: it is part of the general tort and civil justice 
systems, and one of the mechanisms for health system governance as well.    Some scholarship 
on patient safety and medical liability law argues that tort law should be understood as a form of 
regulation, defined broadly as the organized and deliberate leveraging of power or authority to 
effect changes in behaviour.TPF25FPT  From that viewpoint, tort law can be considered as simply one 
                                                 
TP
22
PT Cane, P., “Distributive Justice and Tort Law”, [2000] NZLR 401 at 403. 
TP
23
PT In Donoghue v. Stevenson, the decision that marked the beginning of the modern law of negligence, Lord Atkin 
commented:  “The liability for negligence, whether you style it such or treat it as in other systems as a species of 
‘culpa’, is no doubt based on a general public sentiment of wrongdoing for which the offender must pay” – 
M’Alister (or Donoghue) v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.). 
TP
24
PT Stewart v. Pettie, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 131, 150, per Major, J. 
TP
25
PT Mello, M., Brennan, T., “Fostering Rational Regulation of Patient Safety” (2005) 30 J.H.P.P.L. 375-416. 
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component of an overall regulatory strategy.   This approach may be coupled with a preference 
for indirect, or “third party” governance that is subject to performance monitoring and oversight, 
rather than traditional command and control regulation as a governance mechanism.TPF26FPT  While 
this argument has not been fully developed in the health law field, it has attracted some support 
in scholarship on tort law and patient safety, particularly from American commentators.TPF27FPT  In 
many ways, it fits well with a predilection in American tort scholarship generally to focus on the 
deterrent potential in tort law, rather than its functions as a means of compensation / reparation to 
the victim of wrongdoing.TPF28FPT  
Commenting on efforts to theorize tort law as regulation in contexts other than medical 
liability, some Commonwealth scholars caution that analyzing tort law exclusively through a 
regulatory lens distorts understanding.  Analysis is not as simple as concluding that, because 
courts set standards, monitor behaviour, and enforce standards through their decisions about tort 
liability, the tort system is a regulatory tool like any other.  Academic commentary wary of “tort 
law as regulation” accepts that tort law certainly has instrumental and distributional effects, and 
that it is appropriate that these be taken into account by courts in their judgments.  However, 
focusing only on the behaviour-modification potential in tort liability neglects its basic structure.  
As Peter Cane argues, tort law is not just about deterrence; it is  “... a set of rules and principles 
of interpersonal responsibility for harm”, and that shapes what it can and cannot accomplish.TPF29FPT  
The interests that tort law advances, and that judges respond to in their decisions are diverse, and 
are not limited to forward-looking regulatory goals.TPF30FPT  Resolving the larger debate on the 
applicability of regulatory scholarship to areas of private law is beyond the scope of this study.  
However, its existence reinforces arguments that when assessing the medical liability system and 
proposals for reform, it is insufficient to focus on only one of the tort system’s objectives, 
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PT Eliades, P., Hill, M., Howlett, M. (eds), “Introduction”,  Designing Government: From Instruments to Governance 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s U. Press, 2005), 3-20; Braithwaite, J., Healy, J., Dwan, K., “The Governance of Health 
Safety and Quality: A Discussion Paper”, Commonwealth of Australia, 2005, online at:  
HTUhttp://www.safetyandquality.org/governance0705.pdfUTH (last accessed Nov. 2005). 
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PT Sage, W., “Medical liability and patient safety”, (2003) 22 Health Affairs 26-36: modern medical liability is best 
understood as “regulation by litigation”, Mello & Brennan, supra, n.25. 
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PT Cane, P., “Tort Law as Regulation”, (2002) CLW Rev. 
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PT Ibid.  
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30
PT Stapleton, J., “Regulating Torts”, in Parker, C., Scott, C., Lacey, N., Braithwaite, J., Regulating Law (Oxford: 
Oxford U. Press, 2004), 122-143 at 136-7, 142. 
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deterring substandard care.  Reform must include improvement in the ways injured patients are 
compensated as well.   
(c) Analysis of a Negligence Action 
Turning to the structure of a negligence action, a plaintiff must prove on a balance of 
probabilities that: 
1.  The defendant owed him or her a legal duty of care; 
2. The defendant breached the standard of care established by law; 
3.  The defendant’s breach caused injury or loss to the plaintiff; and 
4.  The plaintiff’s damages are not too remote to be recoverable in law. 
Liability in negligence can arise from substandard care or treatment, and also from a failure to 
obtain the patient’s informed consent to treatment.  The elements of a negligence claims are 
explained in greater detail in Appendix B to this chapter. 
(d) Constitutional Jurisdiction  
 Provinces have constitutional jurisdiction over tort law, the administration of justice, and 
most aspects of health care.  That does not mean there is no role for the federal government, or 
for concerted action by all levels of government on issues of patient safety and tort law. TPF31FPT  
However, the realities of the Canadian federation must be taken into account. 
The preceding sketches the basic concepts and premises in patient safety, tort law and 
negligence. Of necessity, it omits or glosses over much of the complexity in these areas.  
However, it will serve as a starting point to inform consideration of developments in the law and 
the intersections with patient safety initiatives that follows, and will be expanded further as 
needed.  
 
III.  FINDINGS 
The Patient Safety Environment 
Patient safety and medical error have become global issues, and the policy environment has 
been globalized. 
  To Err Is Human, with its glaring analogy that the deaths caused by medical error in the 
United States were equivalent to a jumbo jet a day crashing, made patient safety a public issue. 
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The data it presented was not new; it was based on studies that had been completed years 
previously.TPF32FPT  While the earlier studies had not captured public attention, they had spurred 
research examining the extent of medical error elsewhere.  In 1996, the Quality in Australian 
Health Care Study, reported an adverse event rate of 16.6% in hospitalized patients in that 
country (later revised to 10.6%).TPF33FPT  Publication of the IOM Report in 1999 prompted studies in 
other countries, with similarly grim findings about the rate of errors, extent of preventable 
adverse events and patient injury.TPF34FPT 
 Prescriptions for reform from patient safety advocates in all the countries surveyed were 
similar as well.  Not only has patient safety assumed prominence worldwide as a pressing issue 
in need of effective response, but analysis of causes of the problem, and how to respond -- i.e. 
systemic analysis and systemic solutions, rather than individual blame -- has “gone global”.  
Although this study is limited to a small number of developed countries with common law 
systems, inauguration of the WHO World Patient Safety Alliance, and the NAO’s observation 
that patient safety has become “the most important common issue in health care internationally”, 
clearly evidence the globalization of the policy environment, regardless of differences in the 
organization and delivery of care, health and liability insurance, and legal environments.TPF35FPT  The 
chief features of the patient safety movement’s analysis of why errors occur, what action is 
needed, and the effects of legal liability on the ability of the health system to respond effectively 
are repeated across countries. 
 
Patient safety analysis evidences common themes and tensions across countries. 
 The following distils the salient features of the patient safety movement’s analysis: 
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32
PT Wachter, R., Shojania, K., Internal Bleeding: The Truth Behind America’s Terrifying Epidemic of Medical 
Mistakes (N.Y.: Rugged Land Press, 2004) at 57. 
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PT Wilson, R., et al., “The Quality in Australian Health Care Study:  Iatrogenic Injuries or adverse patient events in 
hospitalized patients”, (1995) 163 Med. J Aus 458-471; Thomas, E. et al., “A comparison of iatrogenic injury 
studies in Australia and the USA”, (2000) 12(5) Internat’l. J. Qual. In Health Care 371-378; Runciman, W., “A 
comparison of iatrogenic studies in Australia and the USA II: reviewer behaviour and quality of care”, (2000) 12(5) 
Internat’l. J. Qual. In Health Care 379-388. 
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PT See eg. Canadian Adverse Events Study, supra, n. 6; Davis, P., et al., “ Adverse events in New Zealand hospitals 
I: occurrence and impact”, (2002) 115 NZJM 1167; Vincent,  C., et al., “Adverse events in British hospitals: 
preliminary retrospectige record review” (2001) 322 BMJ 577-579, 1395. 
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1. Underlying systemic factors play a significant causal role in most adverse events and near 
misses in health care; it is thus inappropriate to blame individual health care providers when 
patients are injured.  
2. Analysis cannot be limited to occurrences at the “sharp end”, where practitioners interact with 
patients and each other in the process of delivering care, but must also include consideration of 
the role played by the “blunt” or remote end of the system, i.e. regulators, administrators, policy 
makers and technology suppliers, who shape the environment in which practitioners work. 
3. It is essential to find out about errors and injuries to patients, in order to (i) undertake systemic 
analysis of what has gone wrong, (ii) develop effective strategies to prevent, reduce and 
ameliorate harm, and (iii) disseminate lessons learned more widely through the health system so 
they can be implemented elsewhere as well. 
4. The risk of negative repercussions if health care providers disclose errors chills disclosure. 
5. The prospect of legal liability for negligence is a major impediment to openly disclosing errors 
and systemic analysis, because recovery of damages is conditional on a finding of fault.  Further, 
the focus on whether individual care was substandard results in an inaccurate (because 
incomplete) understanding of why harm occurred, drives knowledge about errors underground, 
and consequently hampers development of responses that would reduce error and harm in the 
future.  Practitioners’ exposure to legal liability should be reduced.    
6.  Information gathered and activities undertaken as part of quality assurance or patient safety 
initiatives should be insulated from disclosure or use in civil litigation and other types of legal 
proceedings, as well as more generally.  It is also important that patients  be given an explanation 
of what occurred and an apology when they have been harmed as a result of error, and apprised 
of plans to prevent a recurrence.  
7. The culture of the health care system must be changed from a culture of “blame and shame” to 
a culture of openness, problem-solving and safety.   
While patient safety advocates’ message calling for an end to individual blame has gained some 
acceptance, where and how to draw the line between blameless and blameworthy behaviour is 
far from settled, and major disagreements remain about what the repercussions of each should 
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be.TPF36FPT  Tensions between systems and individual accountability are unresolved.  Although patient 
safety advocates promote external oversight and pressure, such as third party error reporting 
systems, as useful tools to improve patient safety, they generally favour limiting the role of one 
of the traditional mechanisms of external oversight and accountability, the courts. 
Michael Power suggests that the growing focus on implementing systems to control and 
manage risk (an ultimately unattainable goal) is an indication of intensified strategies on the part 
of management to avoid a secondary risk, i.e. being blamed when things go wrong (reputational 
risk).  He is concerned that this tendency to “risk manage everything” will curtail development of 
creative solutions needed to address the primary risks.TPF37FPT 
 
The Tort System 
Assessments of the performance of the medical liability system generally conclude that tort 
law does not achieve any of its central goals of compensation, deterrence or corrective 
justice well. 
 In the four countries surveyed that have tort systems in cases of personal injury (Canada, 
the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia), there are strong and persuasive critiques 
of its performance. While commentators and policymakers disagree among themselves about the 
purposes and functions of the tort system, and consequently in their analyses of its deficiencies 
and the goals toward which tort reform should be directed, there is wide agreement that the tort 
system falls short in achieving any one of its three main objectives:  compensation, deterrence or 
corrective justice.TPF38FPT  This is in part because its objectives are multiple, and so to some extent 
modify each other; each is also limited in scope.TPF39FPT  However, conflicting and limited objectives 
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accessed July 2005). 
TP
38
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considered to perform poorly -- Cane, P. “Tort Law as Regulation”,  supra, n.29. 
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are only a partial explanation.  Many commentators have concluded that the tort system simply 
falls short in doing what it is supposed to do. 
Even when considering injuries that have been caused by fault, studies point out that the 
operation of the tort system is problematic as a means of compensation.  A number of these 
examined the operation of the medical negligence system.  In the United Kingdom, Lord Woolf 
singled out medical negligence cases for particularly intensive examination in his review of the 
civil justice system, because he considered it “...obvious that it was in the area of medical 
negligence that the civil justice system was failing most conspicuously to meet the needs of 
litigants”.TPF40FPT  He noted that in medical negligence cases, costs were more often disproportionate 
in comparison with damages, and were in any event so high that they constituted a real barrier to 
access to the justice system, delays in resolving claims were greater, there was a lower success 
rate than in other areas of personal injury litigation, unmeritorious claims were often pursued and 
clear-cut claims defended for too long, and relations between the parties were marked by 
heightened suspicion and less co-operation than in many other areas of litigation.TPF41FPT  While 
explained in part by complexities in the substantive law of tort and particularly difficult issues of 
proof in medical negligence cases, he concluded that many of these problems resulted from 
structural factors in this type of claim.  Making Amends, the 2003 report by the Chief Medical 
Officer of the United Kingdom on reforming the approach to clinical negligence in the National 
Health Service (NHS) concluded that, even after the civil justice reforms that followed on the 
Woolf Report, the  system for resolving clinical negligence claims remained unsatisfactory 
because it was slow, complex, unfair, costly, time-consuming, damaging to morale and public 
confidence, unsatisfactory to patients left without explanations, apologies or reassurance about 
improvements, and impeded  learning from mistakes, because it encouraged secrecy and 
defensiveness.TPF42FPT   
                                                 
TP
40
PT United Kingdom, Access to Justice (Lord Woolf), (London: Department of Constitutional Affairs, 1996), online 
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clinical negligence in the NHS (London, Department of Health, 2003), at 13. (hereafter, Making Amends), online at:  
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In the United States, too, the tort system is considered to function poorly as a means of 
compensating for negligently caused injury.TPF43FPT  Few people who have suffered injuries as a result 
of negligent health care sue, and far fewer still ever recover any compensation for their injuries.  
The Harvard Medical Practice Study concluded that only 1 in 8 patients who had been injured as 
a result of negligence commenced legal action, and of those, only 1 in 16 received any 
compensation.TPF44FPT  Assessment is similar in the other countries surveyed:  even when people have 
suffered legally compensable injuries in the course of treatment – i.e. there were harmed by 
substandard care -- they are unlikely to sue, and few medical negligence claims succeed.TPF45FPT  
Given the large numbers of preventable adverse events (a subset of which are caused by 
negligence), the small numbers of lawsuits for medical malpractice and the limited success in 
those, the evidence suggests that typically, the incidence of negligence in health care is 
significantly higher than the number of claims made, and much higher still than the number of 
people who recover any compensation.TPF46FPT   The barriers to access to justice are formidable.  They 
often affect those already least well off in society particularly harshly. TPF47FPT   
  The tort system also falls short when evaluating its effectiveness in deterring unsafe 
conduct and thus, reducing future harm.  After an extensive review of empirical evidence in the 
United States, Mello and Brennan could find only “limited evidence” that malpractice litigation 
has a deterrent effect.TPF48FPT  In Canada, Elgie et al. concluded that tort law likely has only a 
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“tangential effect” on the quality of health care, given the background presence of liability 
insurance that blunts the impact of damages awards on defendants, the small likelihood an action 
will be commenced, and the fact that the severity of the sanction and degree of culpability are 
often not commensurate. TPF49FPT  
 However, as Mark Galanter points out, courts have a complicated, multi-faceted 
relationship to disputes.  He argues that “The resolution of disputes, while important, is not the 
only (nor...the principle) link of courts and disputes...court not only resolve disputes:  they 
prevent them, mobilize them and transform them”.TPF50FPT  Parties not only bargain (and act) “in the 
shadow of the law”; courts also confer a kind of “regulatory endowment” on disputants, i.e. 
“what courts might do (and the difficulty of getting them to do it)” clothes the regulatory 
activities of others with authorizations and immunities.TPF51FPT  The very expense and remoteness of 
courts, and the overload, inertia and consequent inaction of public agencies bolsters the 
regulatory authority of other institutions (i.e. indigenous ordering).  He concludes that courts 
impact disputes “...largely by the dissemination of information”, and that law is more significant 
for the cultural and symbolic meanings it conveys, than as “a set of operative controls”.TPF52FPT  These 
observations call for a broader assessment of the effects of law than can be captured by empirical 
studies trying to determine the extent to which tort liability increases defensive medicine, or the 
existence of direct links between changes in health professionals’ practice and medical 
malpractice litigation.  They also support a more capacious view of the impact of law on 
individuals and institutions, and how they organize and conduct their affairs.  When its more 
diffuse effects are taken into account, law, and tort law in particular, casts a long shadow.  
 
The medical liability system nonetheless has strong support from a number of 
stakeholders. 
 Although positive assessments of the medical liability system are rare among academic 
commentators, it has strong support from a number of stakeholders – notably members of the 
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public and the plaintiffs’ bar, in the United States at least.  Following release of the Institute of 
Medicine’s (IOM) Report, To Err Is Human, detailing the widespread harm caused by 
preventable adverse events, members of the American public continued to believe that the major 
cause of bad care is bad physicians, and that they should be held to account and removed from 
practice.TPF53FPT  Physician and lawyer William Sage comments that for the plaintiffs’ bar in the 
United States, the IOM Report seemed “...mainly to confirm their belief in their own usefulness”, 
rather than establish the need for public policies and frameworks that would reduce error.TPF54FPT  Both 
groups took the high numbers of errors to mean that legal obligations should be strengthened, 
despite the IOM’s message that most mistakes are the result of bad systems, not bad people.TPF55FPT  
The IOM’s call to end blame and fault finding has not attracted wide public support.  Empirical 
evidence of public attitudes on this issue is lacking in Canada.  The Canadian Medical Protective 
Association, the physicians’ mutual defence organization that provides liability coverage for 
95% of physicians, considers the existing medical liability system to be “fundamentally sound”, 
although in need of procedural reform to reduce the costs of judgments.TPF56FPT    
  
On occasion, the prospect of tort liability has clearly provided an incentive to physicians to 
improve practice, leading to reduced patient injury and death. 
  In the health care context, there are instances where the prospect of tort liability has 
spurred physicians to improve practice.  Anaesthesia is the chief example.  It is widely 
acknowledged that the American Society of Anaesthesiologists undertook its review of closed 
claims and developed guidelines to improve care in the 1980’s because of professional unrest 
over large increases in malpractice insurance premiums, interest in reducing injuries that led to 
claims, and negative publicity.TPF57FPT  The result has been a “resounding success” -- dramatic 
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decreases in adverse events and deaths associated with anaesthesia.TPF58FPT  Some American 
commentators argue that conditions have changed so substantially that the anaesthesia 
experience will not recur in that country.TPF59FPT  Others argue that it shows there is an effective 
“feedback loop” between the tort system, improved practice and patient safety.TPF60FPT  One reason the 
anaesthesia experience may be cited so often is that the connection between the potential for tort 
liability and improvements in the quality and safety of care can rarely be demonstrated so 
clearly.    
 
Tort Reform 
Apart from Canada, the countries surveyed have undertaken substantial legal reform.  
However, the triggers prompting reform differed.  Given the heavy toll errors take on patients 
and the high costs they impose on society, one might have expected that changes to the tort 
system would be linked to initiatives to reduce medical error and improve patient safety.  After 
all, reducing errors and the injuries that result would mean patients had less reason to sue.TPF61FPT  
However, this was seldom the focus of reform.  
  
In Australia and the United States, tort reforms were a response to liability insurance 
crises, and were aimed at reducing the frequency and severity of malpractice claims. 
  Australia and the United States implemented the most substantial tort reforms.  In 
Australia, the catalyst for action was a crisis in the insurance industry, culminating in the 
collapse of two major insurers in 2001/02.  Although even Mr. Justice Ipp, who chaired the panel 
the government appointed to review the law of negligence, noted that there was “never 
conclusive evidence that the state of the law of negligence bears any responsibility for this 
situation ”,TPF62FPT the tort system was the obvious candidate for government action – civil liability 
does affect insurance premiums, was being widely blamed as the culprit, and was a factor 
governments could regulate.  The reforms, characterized by the Commonwealth government as 
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“unmatched in the common law world for their breadth and scope”, significantly altered both the 
substantive law of negligence and civil procedure.TPF63FPT  They were meant to reduce the size and risk 
of judgments and the costs of negligence litigation, and while they were implemented too 
recently to comprehensively  assess their effects, initial indications are that they have done so.TPF64FPT   
In the United States, tort reforms were undertaken in response to the most recent wave of 
increases in medical liability insurance premiums, not to address patient safety concerns.TPF65FPT  
Initiatives adopted continue the same approaches to liability reform that characterized responses 
to the last two malpractice insurance crises – as one writer notes,   “more of the same, plus a 
heavy dose of patient safety rhetoric”.TPF66FPT   This has meant  damages caps, offset of payments from 
collateral sources, limits on lawyers’ fees, discretionary or mandatory periodic payments of 
damages, restrictions on joint and several liability for damages, heightened requirements for 
expert witnesses, shortened limitation periods and other measures.TPF67FPT  Changes to the law have 
primarily been aimed at reducing the costs of malpractice litigation and judgments, and have 
made it more difficult for people to establish liability and entitlement to compensation.  Mello 
reports strong evidence that caps on noneconomic damages reduce the average size of award by 
20 to 30%, but not the frequency of claims.  Other tort reforms have had little impact.  Caps on 
noneconomic damages have disadvantages relating to patient safety and equity in the medical 
liability system.TPF68FPT 
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In the United Kingdom, crises in trust in the NHS resulted in little tort reform until 
recently, but did lead to substantial legal and non-legal reform to improve the safety and 
quality of care. 
Triggers for reform were different in the United Kingdom. The Woolf Report led to 
significant reform of the civil justice system.  Those of particular relevance to medical 
malpractice cases include the introduction of pre-action protocols specific to clinical negligence 
claims, and provisions to rationalize procedures governing expert evidence.   
In response to a series of scandals that plagued the National Health Service in the 1980’s 
and 1990’s, extensive public inquiries into deficient care and the resulting public outcry over 
misconduct in the NHS, and influential reports on the state of health care, the government 
implemented a number of regulatory initiatives and created a series of agencies focused on health 
quality and safety.  These include the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) (created in 2001 
to coordinate the efforts of the NHS regarding safety), the Healthcare Commission (its duties 
include investigating and assessing the performance of health facilities, addressing complaints 
about the NHS, and rating NHS performance), and the Council for Regulatory Excellence (to  
monitor the performance of self-regulating bodies).  These reforms substantially increased 
internal and external monitoring and oversight in the health care system.  However, tort law, and 
the basic requirement to prove fault in order to establish entitlement to compensation for 
negligent injury, remained largely untouched and intact until recently, despite the Chief Medical 
Officer’s conclusion in Making Amends (2003) that the system for resolving clinical negligence 
claims was unsatisfactory, and that continued tort reform without other changes could not 
satisfactorily address deficiencies that remained.TPF69FPT  Legislation is currently before Parliament 
that would provide an alternative compensation mechanism for lower value claims (the Redress 
Bill). 
 
In Canada, although substantial reforms to the medical liability system have been 
proposed, they have not proceeded.  
In Canada, the 1990 Prichard Report, which was commissioned in response to a 
perceived “malpractice crisis” in the late 1980’s, recommended introduction of an alternative 
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compensation system for people who suffered avoidable injuries in the course of treatment, while 
maintaining the option of suing in tort.  It did not lead to changes in the tort system.  As concerns 
about a “crisis” in liability coverage abated with changing economic times, and as provincial 
governments reached accommodations with physicians to subsidize the fees they paid for 
liability coverage, pressure for more substantial change dissipated, to be replaced with concerns 
about the sustainability of Canada’s publicly funded health care system and universal access to 
health care .  Although the Prichard Report had concluded that less than 10% of viable claims 
attributable to negligence in health services resulted in payment, TPF70FPT the gap between the extent of 
negligent injury and compensation was not sufficient to galvanize politicians to change the way 
that people injured in the course of treatment were (or more often, were not) compensated.   
 Reforms to the civil justice system in various provinces have not targeted clinical 
negligence litigation.  They have largely been focused on measures meant to reduce the cost of 
judgments, such as allowing courts to order periodic payment of damages awarded in personal 
injury cases, and reduce the cost of accessing the civil justice system, such as implementing 
simplified procedures for lower value claims, and expanding provisions to dispose of lawsuits 
without a full trial or the usual range of pre-trial procedures.  The latter are likely of limited 
application in medical malpractice cases.  Legislation has also been passed in a number of 
provinces strengthening qualified privilege for error reporting.  While it may increase disclosure 
within the health care system, and thus advance patient safety initiatives (although empirical 
evidence of increased reporting is limited and equivocal), it can also affect access to justice, 
because restricting information about how and why a patient was harmed can make it more 
difficult to establish entitlement to compensation in legal proceedings. 
 
No Fault Compensation Systems 
 Limited no-fault compensation systems have generally been implemented in response to 
crisis. 
No-fault compensation systems have been adopted in a few limited instances in the 
United States.  Virginia and Florida enacted administrative compensation systems for certain 
severely injured babies in 1987 and 1988, in response to rising malpractice insurance premiums 
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that were thought to threaten patients’ continued access to obstetric care.TPF71FPT  Conditions for 
eligibility are restrictive. The state programs are small, because they were meant to substitute for 
“particular tort claims that seemed to be causing a malpractice crisis”, not to expand the class of 
injured patients compensated.TPF72FPT  Provider participation is voluntary.  Claims have been too 
infrequent to give rise to generalizable findings for patient safety purposes.TPF73FPT  “Leakage” to the 
tort system and adequacy of future funding are concerns.TPF74FPT  The U.S. federal government created 
a no-fault compensation system for injuries resulting from childhood vaccination in 1986, also 
prompted by concerns that open-ended tort liability was causing manufacturers to withdraw from 
the market, threatening access.  Evaluation of the program is limited but positive, though new 
and broader claims of injury are a challenge.TPF75FPT   
Contrasting no-fault systems as envisaged in theory with their reality when implemented 
in practice, Sloan notes that in Virginia and Florida, programs were enacted in times of crisis, 
primarily in response to stakeholder (physician and insurer) lobbying.TPF76FPT  Consequently, programs 
adopted may not reflect wider public interests or sound public policy.  He cautions that “A broad 
based program will never evolve from trying to relieve acute problems of insurance availability 
and affordability”.TPF77FPT 
In Canada, the federal government implemented a limited no fault compensation system 
for people infected with HIV and Hepatitis C from blood transfusions, following 
recommendations to that effect made by the Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System.TPF78FPT  It, 
too, was responding to a crisis:  the financial collapse of the Canadian Red Cross Society that 
collected and supplied the tainted blood, and the inquiry’s findings that government oversight 
and monitoring of the blood system had been deficient.  Even then, at least as originally 
structured, compensation was limited to categories of claimants where the government would 
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have considered itself most at risk if lawsuits against it had proceeded to judgment.  Eligibility 
has since been expanded. TPF79FPT  
Quebec has had a no-fault compensation system for people who suffer severe and 
permanent injuries from vaccines in place since 1986, following a Supreme Court of Canada 
judgment denying the claim of a young girl who experienced severe neurological disability after 
being vaccinated.TPF80FPT  She had sued her physician, the vaccine manufacturer and the provincial 
government.  Although finding that the government had no legal obligation to compensate her, 
the Court suggested that compensation would be appropriate, even if not required.  The province 
implemented a no-fault compensation system shortly thereafter.  Benefits are broad, but 
establishing eligibility is difficult.  Claimants must prove a causal connection between the 
vaccine and the harm suffered.  Success rates for claims are low (20 out of 117 claimants in a 15 
year period).TPF81FPT 
 
Broad-based no-fault compensation systems to replace tort liability for personal injury 
have been informed by and developed as a result of a considered policy process and 
widespread consultation. 
In contrast to these limited schemes, New Zealand was not trying to resolve a crisis when 
it eliminated tort claims in personal injury cases in 1974 and implemented an administrative 
system to compensate for accidental injury (including injury caused by health care) in its stead.  
Its policy on accident compensation was developed pursuant to the recommendations of a 
Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury.TPF82FPT  The New Zealand system has 
not been immune to economic, social and political forces.  Economic and political pressures 
since its inception led governments to tighten conditions for eligibility and decrease benefits.  Of 
particular relevance to patient injury, the period 1992 to 2005 saw the re-introduction of a 
requirement to prove fault in cases of medical error, albeit in the context of administrative 
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determinations rather than civil litigation.  There was no need to prove fault to establish 
entitlement to compensation for other types of injury.  This requirement was eliminated in 2005; 
claimants are now entitled to compensation if they have suffered “personal injury caused by 
treatment”, rather than having to establish that the care received was substandard.TPF83FPT  Benefit 
levels have also risen, although coverage for noneconomic loss is still circumscribed.  Low 
benefit levels, and the continued inequity in distinguishing between victims of accidents and 
people whose injuries or disabilities were not caused by accident (who do not qualify for 
accident compensation benefits, even though they may have equivalent or greater need) remain 
concerns.  However, there is no movement to return to the tort system.  Most people prefer the 
certainty and speed of the accident compensation system to the vagaries of the tort system.   
In the United Kingdom, following on the Chief Medical Officer’s  recommendations in 
Making Amends, legislation introduced in 2005 would enable patients to receive redress for 
lower value claims via an administrative system, without having to sue (the Redress Bill).  
Eligibility still tracks requirements for tort liability.  This would be a system of general 
applicability.  The Bill had not been passed at the time of writing.  Making Amends had also 
proposed a no-fault Redress scheme for severely neurologically impaired babies, but at this 
point, the government has decided to proceed with a long-term plan to improve health, social and 
educational services for all children.  It is expected that any proposals for legislation will support 
improved services for all children with disabilities, rather than benefit only children with birth-
related injuries.TPF84FPT 
 
The Future of the Tort System 
In Canada, radical reform of the tort system is unlikely in the near future. 
 The tort system, and negligence law principles in particular, have shown remarkable 
resilience.  Despite sustained and cogent criticism of the tort system’s performance in achieving 
any of its central goals of compensation, deterrence and corrective justice, civil litigation has 
remained the primary means to resolve claims for medical error causing harm in  all the countries 
reviewed except one.  For more than thirty years, New Zealand, which replaced tort liability for 
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personal injury with an administrative system of compensation, for accidental injury, has been 
the only exception. Where tort reform did become a priority, as in the United States and 
Australia, it was because of crises in the availability or affordability of liability coverage, and 
was aimed at reducing the frequency and severity of claims.  Targeted no-fault compensation 
programs have been implemented infrequently, and are limited in scope. There has been little 
political will to replace or radically reform tort law.   
In Canada, the reality of a well established tort system, stakeholders’ vested interests in 
its continuation, a relatively stable claims environment, no liability insurance crisis, and the 
absence of significant, organized public or provider pressure for substantial  tort reform 
translates into considerable inertia.  Realistically, the existing tort and civil liability systems are 
here to stay, at least in the short and medium term.  Patient safety initiatives must operate within 
this environment.  A pragmatic assessment of the political and policy and environments reveals 
nothing that would crystallize the political will needed for significant change.  At the same time, 
the troubling performance of the medical liability system indicates a need for more substantial 
reform.  Consequently, I have divided my recommendations into those that can be implemented 
within the existing tort system, and those that would require more radical reform. 
 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Short and Medium-Term Reform: Working With The Existing Tort System 
 What reforms in the short and medium term would assist in advancing a patient safety 
agenda within the confines of the tort system?  The most obvious goal is to reduce error and 
harm to patients.  The primary benefits would be safer health care and fewer injured patients; the 
secondary benefit, even though lawsuits for medical malpractice are already rare, would be a 
reduction in the need to sue. 
1.  Qualified Privilege, Error Reporting and Disclosure of Harm to Patients:  
 How can the civil justice system be changed to promote safer care?  Patient safety 
advocates in all the countries surveyed have argued persuasively first, that there is an urgent need 
for accurate information about errors that have occurred, so that they can be investigated, their 
causes determined, and effective strategies developed to prevent or reduce harm in the future, 
and second, that confidentiality is essential to encourage disclosure.  However, empirical 
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evidence that shielding information from disclosure in civil litigation increases error reporting is 
lacking.  Consequently, only limited qualified privilege can be justified.  
At the same time, disclosure of harm to patients is both a moral and legal obligation.  
Patients are entitled to know what happened and why.  Too often, this does not occur.  Incentives 
to encourage disclosure are important.  Qualified privilege must be crafted as narrowly as 
possible to still ensure meaningful disclosure to patients.  
In the United States, where QA activities have been protected by statutory privilege for 
longer than in Canada, evidence that statutory protection positively affects disclosure is limited 
and equivocal, and under-reporting is endemic.TPF85FPT  Canada lacks robust empirical evidence of the 
effects of existing qualified privilege provisions on error reporting.  The causes of under-
reporting are broader and more complex than concerns about legal liability.  Shielding 
information from use in legal proceedings will not necessarily mean that health care providers or 
healthcare institutions will become open and frank about errors that have occurred.TPF86FPT  Qualified 
privilege legislation should include a sunset clause to ensure review of its effectiveness, and give 
providers and institutions a “use it or lose it” incentive to report error, and to disclose harm to 
patients.  If under-reporting and non-disclosure persist, the positive effects of privilege may not 
be sufficient to justify the costs of non-disclosure to patients, the public and the justice system. 
Recommendation 1.1  
Limited qualified privilege legislation that shields information gathered in connection with 
and the activities of quality assurance committees or designated patient safety initiatives 
from use in civil litigation should be adopted, including protection for external reporting 
and sharing of information for patient safety purposes, but its continuation should be 
linked to evidence of compliance with requirements to report error and also to disclose 
harm to patients. 
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 Error reporting systems are not a panacea, and adopting a systems approach to 
understanding the causes of injury will not guarantee an end to error suppression. Qualified 
privilege can be misused to avoid disclosure.  As American bioethicist Edmund Pellegrino has 
noted, “The ‘system’ can be just as reluctant to admit error as the individual”.TPF87FPT  For example, in 
Australia, the 2005 Bundaberg Hospital Inquiry found that successive state governments had 
improperly invoked qualified privilege to shield information about health system performance 
from disclosure following requests under the Freedom of Information Act, and that governments’ 
readiness to conceal information set the tone for Queensland Health staff, with similar results.TPF88FPT  
Recommendation 1.2  
Effective oversight is required to ensure compliance with error reporting and investigative 
obligations, as well as with requirements for disclosure to patients 
 Evidence is required to establish that error reporting systems are effective, i.e. that the 
initiatives they support improve care and reduce harm to patients.TPF89FPT  In addition to their cost to 
patients and the public in information foregone, error reporting systems impose additional 
burdens and costs of compliance on providers and institutions.  If they do not lead to effective 
action in response, providers will not continue to report.  In the United Kingdom, the National 
Audit Office has warned that, despite the sophisticated error reporting system the National 
Patient Safety Agency developed for the NHS, if it does not go beyond collecting data about 
errors to feed back useful lessons to health care providers and institutions, people will stop 
reporting.TPF90FPT  In a number of inquiries into substandard hospital care and injury to patients in 
Australia, staff reported that they did not report incidents, let alone near misses, because there 
was no feedback about what would change – i.e. there was no indication their reports would 
make any difference.TPF91FPT 
Recommendation 1.3 
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Patient safety initiatives such as error reporting systems must be monitored and evaluated 
to assess their results in improving care, communication and outcomes.    
 
2.   Make Litigation Count for Patient Safety I: Reframing Liability to Advance Patient 
Safety Goals 
  Legal frameworks governing negligence claims can be structured to advance patient 
safety goals of error reduction and harm prevention.  Expanding hospital liability to include 
responsibility for non-employed physicians’ negligence on-site could assist in doing so. 
Systemic analysis of errors and patient injury highlights the problematic nature of the 
way in which the law attributes responsibility for negligence.  Hospitals owe duties of care to 
their patients, and are directly liable for their own negligence (for instance, in monitoring staff 
competence or establishing systems needed to safely operate the hospital), and vicariously liable 
for wrongdoing by those for whom they are legally responsible -- most commonly, hospital 
employees, such as nurses.  They are not generally liable for the negligence of independent 
contractors, most notably, non-employed physicians.  It is not clear whether recent Supreme 
Court of Canada jurisprudence expanding the scope of vicarious liability and non-delegable 
duties of care in other contexts will be applied to health care, such that hospitals would be held 
liable for physicians’ negligence.   
In some countries, such as the United Kingdom, the issue does not arise in connection 
with hospital care for publicly insured services, because most physicians working in hospitals are 
employed by the National Health Service, and in any event, it has a policy of ignoring the 
distinction between employees and independent contractors in responding to claims, provided the 
claimant was injured in the course of receiving NHS treatment. TPF92FPT  In the United States, courts 
have increasingly held hospitals liable for the negligence of “independent” physicians on a 
variety of theories, although this is not always the case.TPF93FPT  Canadian courts have been reluctant to 
interfere with hospitals’ and physicians’ settled expectations about physicians’ independence, 
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and with their arrangements about their respective spheres of liability.TPF94FPT  However, the status quo 
is open to challenge as circumstances change.   
         The insights of the patient safety movement into the role of systemic factors in causing 
medical errors and patient injury, and in particular, about the ways in which constraints imposed 
at the “blunt end” of institutional decision-making shape decisions at the “sharp end” of 
practitioners and patients, lend considerable force to arguments for extending hospitals’ liability 
to include responsibility for the negligence of non-employed physicians.  This is reinforced by 
changes in the organization and delivery of care:  when physicians treat patients in hospitals, 
they do so as part of a team, and their practices are shaped by the confines of a particular 
institutional environment.  The case for imposing enterprise liability that encompasses physician 
negligence is strengthened by the frequent observation that institutions are better able to 
undertake systemic analysis, and have far greater ability than individual practitioners to 
implement effective changes to reduce risk and prevent harm.TPF95FPT  In the United States, where 
private funding is a significant feature of the health system, commentators argue that enterprise 
liability would both sharpen and better focus the deterrent signal sent by a finding of liability for 
negligence.  As they point out, hospitals must bear the costs of most patient safety 
improvements, but the benefits flow largely to patients and providers, in the form of reduced 
injuries and decreased costs of error.  Shifting to enterprise liability would align incentives for 
health care institutions to invest resources to make patient safety a priority – i.e. it would 
strengthen the  “business case for safety”.TPF96FPT  Even in systems such as Canada’s, where private 
funding and delivery of services is not a significant part of the hospital system, the prospect of 
organizational liability could function as an important external pressure for improvements in 
safety and quality.  
Although not presently interpreted this way, the common law could incorporate this 
understanding of the extent of hospitals’ responsibility, and support a finding of liability for non-
employed physicians’ negligence.  Alternatively, enterprise liability could be imposed by 
legislation.  In deciding whether such a development is warranted, it is important to determine 
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what would be gained by imposing responsibility for physician negligence on hospitals.  The 
Supreme Court of Canada has identified two primary policy reasons for expanding vicarious 
liability in other contexts:  ensuring effective compensation, and deterring future wrongdoing by 
imposing liability on the entity best able to take steps to prevent it.TPF97FPT  Since both physicians and 
hospitals are insured, the concern is generally not to ensure plaintiffs will be able to recover 
damages awarded.TPF98FPT  What should be key is whether extending hospital liability to include 
physician negligence will act as an incentive to hospitals to monitor and review systems and 
individual care providers, and to implement changes to reduce harm to patients, and whether the 
benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.  Apart from liability insurance considerations, enterprise 
liability raises concerns among physicians that their autonomy in clinical decision-making would 
give way to institutional control.  It also raises reputational concerns – that institutions (and their 
insurers) will lack incentives to vigorously defend physicians’ reputations, or conversely, will 
shield providers’ errors from disclosure,TPF99FPT or that physicians will lack motivation to defend the 
institution’s reputation and programs, once they are no longer individually at risk. 
 On the whole, enterprise liability has the potential to pressure hospitals to require health 
care providers to cooperate in making patient safety a priority, and could ease health care 
providers’ concerns about liability.  It fixes hospitals with incentives to remedy unsafe systems 
in order to avoid future liability.  However, enterprise liability would represent a significant 
departure from existing law on hospital liability.  Cases that squarely raise the issue are rare, and 
hospitals and physicians have an incentive to settle cases prior to trial to avoid unfavourable 
precedents.  There is no assurance courts will move in the direction of enterprise liability soon, 
uniformly, or at all.  Legislation could be a more reliable way to ensure adoption of an 
“enterprise approach”  
Hospital liability for physician negligence will not automatically translate into 
comprehensive, effective quality assurance activities and patient safety programs.  The patterns 
of problematic care and harm to patients that led to numerous public inquiries into hospitals in 
the United Kingdom and Australia, although the state already assumes responsibility for the 
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negligence of physicians providing care in the public system, is evidence of that.TPF100FPT  More far-
reaching changes in addition to enterprise liability will still be required.TPF101FPT   
Recommendation 2.1 
 Provinces should consider legislation extending hospital liability to include responsibility 
for the negligence of non-employed physicians treating patients on-site.   
The settings in which care is delivered are continuing to change.  More health services, 
increasingly complex care and sicker patients are being moved outside hospitals to other types of 
health care institutions (such as long term care), clinics (increasingly the site of diagnostic 
procedures), physicians’ offices and patients’ own homes.  Care is provided by formal and 
informal caregivers; the latter may lack training in the services to be provided.  Little is known 
about the nature and extent of preventable adverse events in these settings, although they 
certainly do occur.  As care provided intensifies, preventable adverse events will increase in 
number and severity as well, as will the potential for civil liability arising from negligent injury 
to patients.  However, the “enterprise” providing care is no longer a hospital in these situations, 
and the “system” in which care is provided may be a single practitioner or loose cluster of 
locations and providers.   The potential for error can be exacerbated by decisions about 
workplace organization, such as casualization of the labour force, reduced staffing or staff 
qualifications and other factors.TPF102FPT  This is true of (and occurring in ) hospitals as well, but is 
even more of a risk in smaller settings.  Proactively incorporating patient safety considerations in 
decisions about the location of and resources devoted to health care can reduce error and harm to 
patients.  
Recommendation 2.2 
Implications for patient safety should be an important, explicit consideration in decision-
making about and oversight of care, both in and outside hospitals.    
 
3.  Make Litigation Count for Patient Safety II:  Lawsuits as a Learning Resource 
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 Lawsuits can provide important information about how patients are injured, and thus, can 
assist in improving safety and quality of care.  The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) in the United States recognizes the utility of claims 
information for patient safety purposes, and has called for greater access to ongoing as well as 
closed claims, in order to increase the information available, and decrease the length of time that 
elapses before it can be accessed.TPF103FPT  Similarly, the National Audit Office in the United Kingdom 
recommended that the Healthcare Commissioner make greater use of information from litigation 
and complaints as a learning resource, and work with other agencies to determine how best to 
share data.  Confidentiality clauses often included in settlement agreements hamper access to this 
information for patient safety purposes.  While insurers typically alert hospitals and health care 
providers to significant developments in judicial decisions as a risk management practice, it is 
not clear that such information is systematically or consistently incorporated into practice.   
Recommendation 3 
Provision should be made for systematic identification and dissemination of patient safety 
lessons to be learned from lawsuits, potentially under the aegis of or in conjunction with the 
Canadian Patient Safety Institute, or through external error reporting structures or 
provincial patient safety organizations where these exist.   Possibilities for earlier and more 
comprehensive access to claims information for patient safety purposes should be explored 
with the affected stakeholders. 
  
4. Liability Coverage, Government Subsidy and Access to Information 
 Malpractice litigation is relatively infrequent in Canada, particularly when compared to 
the extent of preventable adverse events (as noted previously, not all preventable adverse events 
indicate negligent care, but a subset do).   Although the litigation environment can be volatile 
given the nature of claims made (such as those on behalf of infants seriously injured during 
birth), and the potential for aggregated liability in class actions, for physicians at least, claims 
experience has been relatively stable over the last several years.TPF104FPT   Unlike recent experience in 
Australia, or current experience in the United States, Canada is not in the midst of a crisis in the 
availability or affordability of liability coverage.    
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Most physicians are remunerated for the services they provide patients on a fee for 
service basis.  Fees for services covered under Canada’s universal health insurance system are 
negotiated between provincial medical associations and their respective provincial governments.  
Increased fees for liability coverage cannot be passed on to patients by charging more for insured 
services.  Recognizing this, and wanting to ensure both continued access to health services and 
the availability of compensation when patients have been negligently injured and damages 
awarded, governments and provincial medical associations have negotiated agreements pursuant 
to which governments contribute to the cost of physicians’ liability coverage.  Arrangements 
vary among provinces, but the total amount of government contributions and the proportion of 
individual physicians’ fees for liability coverage are substantial.TPF105FPT  Hospitals’ insurance 
arrangements resemble more traditional contracts of insurance.  Many obtain liability coverage 
through participation in the Health Insurance Reciprocal of Canada (HIROC), a member-owned 
non-profit organization.  Almost all hospitals in Canada are public, not private.  While not 
generally owned by government, they receive the great majority of their funding from provincial 
governments, and the bulk of services they provide are publicly insured.  Thus, hospitals, too, 
cover the cost of liability coverage with funds provided by government. 
  The patient safety movement repeatedly stresses the need for more information about 
errors and patient injury, and also the importance of open disclosure of harm to patients.  The 
substantial financial assistance governments provide to defray the costs of liability coverage 
should give them leverage to require both physicians and hospitals to advance patient safety 
initiatives.  This could be used to counter under-reporting of errors, or entail more extensive 
reporting of patient safety incidents, more detailed information on claims experience, changes in 
providers’ practices, greater participation in patient safety initiatives, more disclosure of harm to 
patients, or other measures to advance patient safety. 
Recommendation 4 
The substantial funding that governments contribute to the cost of physician and hospital 
liability coverage (thereby indirectly assuming a share of the risk of liability) should be tied 
to improved performance in specified, targeted patient safety initiatives. 
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5. Expanded Complaints Mechanisms as an Alternative to Litigation 
 The focus of this study is on the tort system, so a detailed consideration of complaints 
mechanisms is beyond its scope.  However, they could be used to reduce litigation.  Litigation 
can be a grueling, costly, uncertain and stressful experience for all involved, but especially for 
injured patients.  Not everyone who has been injured in the course of treatment is seeking 
compensation, but it may be the only way to have their concerns heard.  Patients and families 
may want information, an explanation and apology, or assurance that steps have been taken to 
prevent a recurrence.  Litigation will not achieve those ends; remedies are limited to an award of 
damages.  Conversely, lack of explanation does fuel lawsuits.TPF106FPT  More routes to different forms 
of redress, such as in-house or independent complaints processes responsive to those needs could 
divert claims away from litigation and defuse the impetus to sue.  Complaints resolution could be 
facilitated if integrated with mediation.TPF107FPT  
The United Kingdom has implemented a number of different ways to have complaints 
about care addressed that are independent of the court system.  Explanatory notes to the Redress 
Bill, described earlier, indicate that where patients have been injured, the NHS is expected to 
“put the problem right, regardless of fault”, and that patients will be entitled to apologies and 
explanations, as well as financial compensation where appropriate.TPF108FPT  In Australia, state Health 
Commissioners not only have the power to investigate complaints involving institutions and 
different types of health care providers, but in some instances can also order limited financial 
compensation.  In New Zealand, the Health and Disabilities Commissioner can undertake both 
individual and systemic investigations, primarily in response to patient complaints, but also on 
his own initiative.  These examples could provide models, and should be examined further to 
determine their suitability in the Canadian context.  
Recommendation 5 
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More low key, accessible, inexpensive, conciliatory complaints resolution mechanisms, with 
power to consider complaints involving both institutions and different types of health care 
providers, should be made available. 
 
6. Long-term Reform:  Should Canada Make Medical Malpractice Litigation History?  
Exploring No-Fault and Administrative Compensation Systems 
   Both the Canadian Patient Safety Institute and the Health Council of Canada have called 
for an examination of no-fault compensation.TPF109FPT  The evidence that the medical liability system 
performs poorly in compensating patients and deterring unsafe care is strong.  A number of 
commentators in the countries studied have called for adoption of “no-fault” injury compensation 
programs to replace the tort system.  No-fault compensation has been proposed in Canada, either 
as a tort alternative (with eligibility premised on avoidability of injury rather than fault), or for 
all who suffer harm from medical procedures (regardless of error or avoidability), or for limited 
categories of designated compensable events (such as children severely injured during birth).TPF110FPT  
However, outside New Zealand, no-fault compensation has only been adopted in very limited 
circumstances. 
 Should no-fault compensation be made more broadly available for injury occasioned by 
health care?  Proponents argue that more victims of injury would be compensated more quickly 
and predictably, and that it has the potential to provide access to a wider range of benefits than 
are available through litigation.   The administrative expenses of such a system would be 
dramatically reduced in comparison to the current medical liability system, because substantial 
resources would no longer be devoted to proving negligence and defending claims.  Eligibility 
for compensation varies among the different proposals, but most are premised on avoidability of 
injury, an easier threshold to  satisfy than proving fault, so more people could qualify for 
compensation.  Some proposals for administrative compensation mechanisms incorporate 
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schedules of designated compensable injuries and events, which would reduce the costs of 
determining eligibility and entitlement to benefits and speed claims processing still further.  
Advocates of no fault also argue that it would improve injury deterrence through more 
systematic case identification, allow better monitoring and education, and (if combined with 
some form of experience rating and/or enterprise liability) could incorporate effective incentives 
for institutions and providers to implement programs to reduce error and provide safer care.TPF111FPT   
 Opponents of no-fault compensation contend that it reduces incentives to take care.  They 
argue that the tort system, even if inefficient, is still valuable because it pressures health care 
providers and institutions to improve care and reduce harm to patients.  Even supporters of 
alternative compensation mechanisms acknowledge that “innovation that improves safety often 
happens in the shadow of liability”.TPF112FPT  As the anaesthesia example described earlier 
demonstrates, the prospect of legal liability can in some instances lead to effective, concerted 
action to change patterns of care, reducing patient injury and death.   
The projected costs of a broad no-fault compensation system give rise to the greatest 
disagreement.  Supporters of no-fault compensation contend that the costs of such a system 
would be manageable, that benefit levels comparable to those available under the tort system 
could be provided, with the advantages that many more people could be compensated than at 
present, and that current inequities in who receives compensation  could be alleviated.TPF113FPT  
Opponents argue that savings are overstated, and costs are understated.TPF114FPT  If eligibility were 
easier to establish, then more people would be compensated, and either costs would be 
prohibitive, or the level of compensation provided, particularly to those most seriously injured, 
would be seriously inadequate.  Even with a threshold of avoidability of injury rather than fault 
(the most common proposal), distinguishing the effects of the underlying disease or disability 
from those caused by health care would still be contentious.  In their view, a no fault system 
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would require unacceptable compromises in eligibility for compensation, the extent of coverage 
and/or the benefit levels paid.TPF115FPT   
In the United Kingdom, despite itemizing the serious and ongoing deficiencies in the tort 
system as a means of compensation, the Chief Medical Officer nonetheless recommended that it 
be replaced only for lower value claims and for claims on behalf of infants injured at birth, 
principally because of the expense of a broader alternative.TPF116FPT  The Redress Bill presently before 
Parliament is limited to lower value claims (less than  20,000 pounds), and still retains vestiges 
of a fault requirement in the administrative claims determination mechanism proposed, raising 
questions about how broadly monetary compensation will be available.TPF117FPT   
New Zealand has had an administrative system for accident compensation since 1974.  
Claims can certainly be made more easily, are less costly, more certain, and resolved more 
quickly than through litigation.  However, New Zealand’s experience also illustrates that, as with 
other no-fault administrative compensation mechanisms such as workers’ compensation, 
entitlements are subject to political, economic and social pressure, the vagaries of the political 
process, and neglect.TPF118FPT  Indeed, from 1992 until 2005, New Zealand effectively re-introduced a 
requirement that claimants establish fault in order to prove entitlement to compensation for 
injuries resulting from medical error.  Benefit levels for certain types of damages were 
significantly curtailed during part of that period as well.  As described earlier, eligibility for 
benefits was expanded in 2005.  Claimants are now entitled to compensation for treatment injury, 
and no longer need to establish fault.    
Rates of preventable adverse events among hospitalized patients are broadly similar in 
New Zealand as in the other countries reviewed.TPF119FPT  However, despite a simple, inexpensive, 
non-adversarial claims process, New Zealand, too, experiences significant under-claiming for 
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compensation for injuries incurred in the course of health care.  Davis et al. estimated the ratio of 
potentially compensable events to successful claims for compensation to be approximately thirty 
to one.TPF120FPT  Nor do a high proportion of people who experienced preventable adverse events 
complain to the Health and Disability Commissioner (HDC).  In a study by Bismark et al., only 
.4% of adverse events, and 4% of serious preventable adverse events resulted in complaints to 
the HDC.TPF121FPT  The authors noted that patients who suffered more severe injuries were more likely 
to complain to the HDC, but that patients who were elderly, socioeconomically deprived, or of 
Pacific ethnicity were least likely to complain.TPF122FPT  In a multi-country survey of the experience of 
patients with health problems, 61% of New Zealand patients surveyed reported that their 
physicians had not told them a mistake had been made in their medical care or medication, 
although 54% had experienced a serious health problem as a result.TPF123FPT  Although more patients 
reported being told about an error in their care in New Zealand than elsewhere, the extent of non-
disclosure of harm is still significant. 
The experience in New Zealand is surprising in light of the great emphasis that writers in 
countries with tort systems place on the barriers to access to justice that injured patients face 
when they must sue in order to obtain compensation for negligent injury.  There are a number of 
possible explanations for low rates of complaints and claims for compensation, but it does seem 
clear that removing the prospect of civil liability and implementing no-fault compensation are 
not sufficient in themselves to ensure that health care providers disclose error to patients, or to 
ensure that patients who are entitled will obtain compensation for their injuries, or that the 
circumstances will be brought to the attention of authorities with a mandate and power to 
identify and develop strategies to address both individual and systemic shortcomings.     
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 Ensuring providers and health care institutions remain accountable for the care they 
deliver (in the sense that they can be called to account to an authority for their actionsTPF124FPT) is an 
ongoing concern.TP PTCritiques of the tort system’s ability to deter unsafe care have been reviewed 
previously.  Among other factors, the sheer infrequency of claims weakens the deterrent signals 
tort sends.TPF125FPT  Accountability is more of an issue with no-fault systems of compensation, because 
even the risk of tort liability is eliminated.  Advocates of no-fault are quick to point out that “no-
fault” does not mean “no accountability”, and that indeed, the term “no-fault” is a misnomer, 
because not only would systems to ensure ongoing provider competence and quality of care be 
revised and strengthened, but no fault compensation systems can be structured to incorporate 
incentives to providers and institutions to improve the safety and quality of care. TPF126FPT  
 The patient safety movement favours minimizing the role played by the tort system, 
believing it chills disclosure of harm to patients, suppresses error reporting, and thus, impedes 
the systemic analysis of error that is needed to improve care. TPF127FPT   Commenting on the situation in 
the United States, Bovbjerg characterizes the safety-reform movement as “positioning itself to 
favor internal openness, largely surrounded by an external wall to shut out injured patients and 
their lawyers”, a difficult position to justify, given the information it brought to light on the scale 
of error and harm to patients.TPF128FPT  There is a lack of consensus on when individual, as opposed to 
systemic accountability is appropriate.  While beyond the scope of this study, evidence is lacking 
that professional governance or other internal or external accountability mechanisms monitor and 
oversee practitioners and care well; indeed, these systems are often heavily criticized because 
they are perceived to protect provider over patient interests.  Whether the tort system is replaced 
or not, patients and the public need and are entitled to effective external oversight and 
accountability mechanisms.  Public trust that accountability can be effectively maintained will 
affect the willingness to countenance alternatives to the tort system.  Additionally, reforms must 
address the availability and adequacy of compensation for patients who have been injured by 
medical error.  As a pragmatic matter, patient safety advocates cannot expect wide acceptance of 
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their prescriptions for reform if they leave behind patients injured by error, or make it more 
difficult for them to recover compensation.  More broadly, patients (and all of us who are 
prospective patients) deserve no less.  
On the whole, a broad no-fault compensation system seems attractive because it could 
compensate more people harmed by health care, while at the same time, easing providers’ and 
institutions’ concerns about the risk of legal liability, and consequent tendency to suppress 
errors.  However, the evidence base requires further examination and development.  As Sloan 
points out, no-fault systems may be adopted for different reasons:  coverage of losses caused by 
medical injuries, meeting needs of injured patients, efficient administration and loss 
management, ensuring continued availability and affordability of liability coverage, and 
improved deterrence of errors.TPF129FPT Consequently, assessments of their performance do not 
necessarily evaluate programs on the same basis.  Disagreements about the costs of such 
programs are substantial.  The range of possibilities in scope, benefit levels, conditions for 
eligibility, funding and other factors is wide.  Concerns about ensuring  accountability when the 
prospect of tort liability is removed persist.  Targeted no-fault programs providing compensation 
to limited classes of beneficiaries in response to crisis situations, such as compensation for 
patients transfused with tainted blood, can be expected to re-appear periodically.  They are ad 
hoc responses to crisis and as such, not satisfactory models for broad-based programs.   
Research on the operation of the accident compensation and complaints systems in New 
Zealand has raised questions about the extent of patient uptake of either, even in the face of 
preventable adverse events.   Other countries, such as Sweden and Denmark, have had no fault 
compensation systems for treatment injury in place for a considerable period of time as well.  
They were not studied as part of this project, and their experiences may differ.   Because 
alternative compensation mechanisms, and no-fault compensation in particular, (i) seem to offer 
considerable promise, and (ii)  the operation and effects of the medical liability system are so 
problematic, but (iii) much remains unknown about the impact of such systems, options to 
replace the tort system in the health care context should be studied further, with a view to 
determining the advisability of moving away from tort liability. 
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Recommendation 6 
Research should be sponsored to evaluate alternative compensation mechanisms, including 
no-fault compensation systems, with a view to determining their desirability in the 
Canadian environment. 
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APPENDIX A:  Glossary 
Adverse Event 
An injury resulting from a medical intervention or medical management, rather than the 
underlying condition of the patient.TPF130FPT 
 
Error 
“The failure of a planned action to be completed as intended, or the use of a wrong plan to 
achieve an aim.”TPF131FPT  Not all errors result in harm. 
 
Negligence 
The law of negligence is a branch of tort law.  In law, negligence refers to a breach of a duty of 
care owed by one person or entity to another, which if breached, results in foreseeable and 
compensable harm to that other, or to some interest of his or hers. TPF132FPT  More narrowly, negligence 
can refer to one element of the cause of action for negligence, i.e. whether the defendant’s 
conduct met the standard of care.TPF133FPT 
 
Non-delegable duty of care 
A non-delegable duty of care is not merely a duty to take care, but to ensure that care is taken.  It 
is imposed when the nature of the defendant’s relationship with the plaintiff (for example, a 
special statutory undertaking of care or responsibility) is such that the defendant remains 
responsible for performance of the duty, no matter how or by whom it arranged to have the work 
done.TPF134FPT 
 
Patient  safety 
“The avoidance, prevention and amelioration of adverse outcomes or injuries stemming from the 
processes of health care”. TPF135FPT   
 
Preventable adverse event 
An error that results in injury to a patient.TPF136FPT 
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Tort 




A doctrine of law that imposes liability on certain persons or entities for injuries suffered by 
another, not because of any wrongdoing on their part, but because of the relationship the person 
or entity has with the wrongdoer.  Vicarious liability is imposed most commonly in the 
employer/employee relationship:  an employer is vicariously liable to third parties for torts 
committed by employees in the course of employment.  
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APPENDIX B:  Understanding Negligence Law 
To establish liability for negligence, a plaintiff must prove on a balance of probabilities that: 
1.   The defendant owed him or her a legal duty of care; 
2.  The defendant breached the standard of care established by law; 
3.   The defendant’s breach caused injury or loss to the plaintiff; and 
4.   The plaintiff’s damages are not too remote to be recoverable in law. 
Liability in negligence can arise from substandard care or treatment, and also from a failure to 
obtain the patient’s informed consent to treatment.   
 
Elements of a Negligence Claim 
Duty of Care:  It is well established that health professionals owe their patients a duty of care, as 
do hospitals and other health care institutions.  Issues may arise with respect to the scope of the 
duty, but not its existence.  Whether and in what circumstances statutory regulators or 
governments owe a private law duty of care to individuals with respect to health care is more 
problematic; case law on this points is divided and developing. 
Standard of Care:  As in negligence law generally, health care professionals must act in such as 
way as not to cause an unreasonable risk of harm to others.  In determining the standard of care 
to be met, they are held to the standard of a reasonably competent member of their profession:TPF138FPT 
“Every medical practitioner must bring to his task a reasonable degree of skill and knowledge 
and must exercise a reasonable degree of care.  He is bound to exercise that degree of care and 
skill which could reasonably be expected of a normal, prudent practitioner of the same 
experience and standing, and if he holds himself out as a specialist, a higher degree of skill is 
required of him than of one who does not profess to be so qualified by special training and 
ability”. 
As a general rule in Canada, expert evidence of compliance with generally approved practice on 
questions of treatment and care is conclusive evidence of absence of negligence.TPF139FPT  If the 
common practice is divided, a practice is acceptable if followed by at least a respectable minority 
of competent practitioners in the same field.TPF140FPT  Professional judgment prevails in determining 
the standard of care, except in very limited circumstances. TPF141FPT  Error in judgment does not 
necessarily constitute negligence, or give rise to liability.TPF142FPT 
 Causation:   
(a) Substandard Care: The general, but not conclusive test for causation is the “but for” test, 
which requires the plaintiff to show that the injury would not have occurred but for the 
negligence of the defendant.TPF143FPT  Causation can be difficult for a plaintiff to establish in a medical 
malpractice case, particularly given the risks often inherent in treatment, however skilfully 
performed, and the background presence of the plaintiff’s illness.   Medical experts “...ordinarily 
determine causation in terms of certainties”, and when they cannot, are often reluctant to provide 
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a firm opinion supporting the plaintiff’s theory, making proof difficult.TPF144FPT  Recognizing this, in 
some circumstances the stringency with which the plaintiff’s evidence is assessed is relaxed; the 
court will draw a rebuttable inference of causation against a defendant on the basis of “very little 
affirmative evidence” on the part of the plaintiff.TPF145FPT  Nonetheless, the barrier presented by the 
need to prove causation is often still formidable. 
 Once that hurdle has been passed, it is not essential that the defendant have been the sole 
cause of harm:  “There will frequently be a myriad of other background events which were 
necessary preconditions to the injury occurring...As long as a defendant is part of the cause of an 
injury, the defendant is liable, even though his act alone was not enough to create the 
injury...most events are the result of a complex set of causes”.TPF146FPT  Once the causal connection is 
established, the defendant is held liable for any injuries caused or contributed to by his or her 
negligence. 
This approach could allow for systemic analysis of the causes of injury, but most often, 
negligence actions are tightly focused on the individuals directly concerned in the events giving 
rise to the lawsuit.  The court’s task is to assess what occurred among the parties before it; they 
do not generally focus on the role more diffuse, systemic factors played in the plaintiff’s injuries.  
Although institutional decisions about resources and constraints shape the environment in which 
health professionals treat patients and may have significantly contributed to the plaintiff’s 
injuries, that causal connection may go unrecognized without a sophisticated understanding of 
organizational responsibility.  Absent greater openness to theories of enterprise liability, this 
limits the utility of the tort system as a means to identify and deter systemic causes of injury.     
The burden of proof that the plaintiff bears in a lawsuit can present additional 
difficulties.  Medical error may materially increase the risk of injury (for example, that a 
particular disease or condition will develop).  However, if the plaintiff cannot prove that her 
injury more probably than not resulted from the defendant’s negligence (i.e. if non-negligent 
causes were equally or more likely to have been the cause), then she will not be able to meet the 
burden of proof, and her claim will fail.TPF147FPT  Similarly, if the defendant misses the diagnosis of a 
serious illness through error, but the disease is unlikely to respond to treatment in any event, then 
the plaintiff would be unable to prove that the missed diagnosis more probably than not affected 
her prognosis.  Some plaintiffs have tried to claim damages for loss of the opportunity to seek 
treatment as a compensable injury in itself, or to argue that materially increasing the risk of harm 
should be taken as proof that the defendant caused the injury, if that is the very kind of harm that 
the plaintiff suffered.TPF148FPT  Neither argument has had notable success in Canada, unless the 
plaintiff can establish causation on a balance of probabilities.TPF149FPT  Each of these theories, though, 
has been the basis for finding liability in the United Kingdom and elsewhere.TPF150FPT  Lower courts in 
Canada are beginning to take note of these developments and consider their implications for 
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Canadian law. TPF151FPT  It is not clear at this point whether and to what extent they will affect Canadian 
jurisprudence.   
(b)  Informed Consent: 
 The duty of care that health professionals owe patients includes an obligation to disclose 
information about treatment proposed, including any material, special or unusual risks, so that 
the patient can give informed consent.  Courts have steadily broadened the information that must 
be given to the patient.  In order to establish liability for breach of the duty to obtain informed 
consent, the plaintiff has to show that if properly informed, he or she would not have gone ahead 
with the treatment, i.e. the information would have made a difference to her decision, and 
therefore, the failure to inform was a cause of her injuries.  What the plaintiff would have done is 
determined on a modified objective standard – i.e what a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s 
position would have done if properly informed.TPF152FPT  It is difficult to discharge the burden of proof 
in this type of case; often, courts conclude that because of the plaintiff’s underlying condition 
and the need for treatment, he or she would have consented, even if told about all the risks, 
because the alternatives were so much worse. TPF153FPT   
Damages:  Damages in negligence cases are compensatory.  Awards of punitive damages are 
very rare.  Once liability has been established, damages are meant to compensate the plaintiff for 
all losses incurred – i.e. to return him to the position he would have been in if the injury had not 
occurred, insofar as money can do so.  While damages for pecuniary losses, such as the cost of 
future care and lost employment income, are fully recoverable, damages for nonpecuniary losses 
are calculated differently.  In a trilogy of cases  
revamping the law of damages in 1978, the Supreme Court of Canada imposed a cap of $100,000 
on damages for nonpecuniary loss for a “most extreme case”, reasoning that such losses are 
incalculable in any event, pecuniary losses are already fully covered by other heads of damage, 
this type of compensation should be viewed from a functional perspective and is meant to make 
life more endurable by providing for more general physical arrangements beyond those relating 
directly to the injuries, and the judgment’s broader effects (for instance on the cost of insurance) 
are relevant considerations when calculating this head of damages, and call for moderation.TPF154FPT  
Adjusted for inflation, by 2005 the upper limit for awards for nonpecuniary loss in personal 
injury cases was approximately $295,000. TPF155FPT  Periodic pressures to abandon or substantially 
increase the upper limit have not been successful to date. 
 
Vicarious Liability:   Vicarious liability is imposed when one person or entity is legally 
responsible for the torts of another because of the relationship between them.  It does not require 
any wrongdoing by the party who is held vicariously liable.  It is most common in the context of 
employment relationships:  an employer is vicariously liable for the negligent acts or omissions 
of its employees committed within the course of employment.  Thus, hospitals are vicariously 
liable for the negligence of employees, such as nurses and orderlies.  Vicarious liability can also 
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arise from the relationship between principal and agent.TPF156FPT  However, vicarious liability is 
generally not imposed when the relationship between the parties is that of principal and 
independent contractor.  Most often, doctors are considered to be independent contractors to 
whom the hospital has granted privileges enabling them to admit and treat patients.  They are not 
hospital employees, and the hospital is not liable for their negligence.TPF157FPT  The characterization of 
this relationship will depend on all the circumstances – interns and residents, for instance, are 
generally employed by the hospital as house staff.TPF158FPT    
 
Non-Delegable Duty of Care:  In some instances, courts have held defendants liable on the 
basis that the nature of the defendant’s relationship with the plaintiff (for example, a special 
statutory undertaking of care or responsibility), was such that it was under a non-delegable duty 
of care, i.e. a duty of care that could not be discharged by delegating performance to another, no 
matter how or by whom it arranged to have the work done.TPF159FPT  The defendant is liable for a third 
party’s negligence that injures the plaintiff, regardless of the character of its relationship with the 
negligent party.  The defence of due diligence, i.e. that it took all reasonable steps to select 
competent people to carry out the tasks and monitor them, is not available 
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CHAPTER 2:  CANADA 
  Public awareness of the scale of medical error, the harm it causes patients, and the 
financial and other costs of adverse events came later in Canada than in other countries surveyed.  
That is not to say that the safety of patients was not a concern previously.  Here as elsewhere, 
treating patients safely has long been one of the goals of health care.  The release of To Err is 
Human in the United States, the Institute of Medicine’s 1999 report on patient safety and medical 
error, gave new impetus to Canadian research on these issues, as well as to the efforts of health 
care providers, policymakers, professional associations and others to advance patient safety 
initiatives.TPF1FPT  Publication of initial Canadian data, followed by the release of the National Steering 
Committee on Patient Safety’s 2002 report, “Building a Safer System:  A National Integrated 
Strategy for Improving Patient Safety in Canadian Health Care” and subsequent media attention 
to the issue, finally brought public recognition to the magnitude of injury to patients and the 
pressing need to develop effective responses.TP F2FPT   
The first section of this chapter sets out a brief synopsis of developments since release of 
the National Steering Committee’s Report, and summarizes data on the incidence of both 
preventable adverse events and negligent injury to patients.  Section II describes arrangements 
for medical and hospital liability insurance.  The third section reviews and assesses the 
implications of patient safety initiatives for the law of negligence and the reverse, with particular 
attention to the law governing hospital liability for physician negligence, statutory privilege for 
error reporting, and disclosure of harm.  The final section considers proposals for reform of the 
tort system and their fate in Canada. 
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I.  PATIENT SAFETY 
The National Steering Committee on Patient Safety Report, “Building a Safer System” 
Like its counterparts in other countries, the National Steering Committee concluded that 
underlying systemic factors contribute to most adverse events, critical incidents and near misses 
in health care, and underlined the importance of being able to report problems without blame 
attaching in order to inform systemic analysis of errors and develop solutions.TPF3FPT  A systemic 
approach recognizes that analysis cannot be limited to occurrences at the “sharp end”, where 
practitioners interact with patients and each other in the process of delivering care, but must also 
include consideration of the role played by the “blunt” or remote end of the system, i.e. 
regulators, administrators, policy makers and technology suppliers, who shape the environment 
in which practitioners work.TPF4FPT   It made two recommendations with respect to the legal system:  
first, that the statutory protection accorded data and opinions associated with patient safety and 
quality improvement discussions be strengthened to prevent their disclosure in legal proceedings, 
while preserving patients’ ability to access factual information about the adverse event.  Second, 
it called for further consideration of the effects of the tort and health insurance systems on patient 
safety, with a view to formulating recommendations to promote a culture of safety.TPF5FPT   
Canadian Patient Safety Institute 
 The Prime Minister and provincial Premiers included a provision in the 2003 First 
Ministers’ Accord on Health Care Renewal committing to take leadership in implementing the 
National Steering Committee’s recommendations.TPF6FPT  In December, 2003, the federal government 
established the Canadian Patient Safety Institute (CPSI), an independent nonprofit corporation 
with a mandate to advance safer health systems and facilitate collaboration among governments 
and stakeholders; it also included provision in the 2003 budget for $50 million over five years to 
support patient safety initiatives, including $8 million annually for CPSI, and $2 million each 
year for development of a Canadian Medication Incident Reporting and Prevention System.TPF7FPT 
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CPSI’s role is facilitative and advisory; it has no power to require that action be taken.   Of its 
key priorities, the most salient to the medical liability system are:TPF8FPT  
(1) examining the tort system and its effect on patient safety, and working with 
provincial/territorial governments and other stakeholders to make appropriate changes;  
(2) developing a legislative model for (i) protecting information shared from subpoena, (ii) 
no fault insurance, and (iii) mandatory reporting of adverse events, for  consideration by 
provinces; and 
(3) developing and promoting national policy guidelines on disclosure of adverse events, 
and communication between health care professionals and patients when errors occur. 
Of these, a no fault insurance system in particular could have radical implications, depending on 
its scope.  The Health Council of Canada, which monitors progress on the   2003 First Ministers 
Accord on Health Care Renewal and the 2004 10-Year Plan to Strengthen Health Care, has also 
called for a re-examination of the issue of no-fault compensation for victims of adverse health 
care events as part of its strategy to improve quality of care, both so that health care providers 
will be more open to disclosing errors, and so that injured patients can be compensated without 
having to sue.TPF9FPT  Assessing these calls for action, the themes that recur most frequently vis a vis 
the medical liability system are (1) exploring tort reform / no-fault compensation; and (2) 
encouraging error reporting by preventing use of quality assurance information in legal 
proceedings. 
Incidence of Adverse Events and Patient Injury 
 A study of the incidence of adverse events and patient injury in acute care hospitals in 
Canada published in 2004 (hereafter, the Canadian Adverse Events Study) identified an 
incidence rate of 7.5%; of these, the expert reviewers considered 36.9% highly preventable.TPF10FPT  
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An adverse event was defined as “an unintended injury or complication that results in disability 
at the time of discharge, death or prolonged hospital stay and that is caused by health care 
management [including both individual hospital staff and broader systems and care processes] 
rather than by the patient’s underlying disease”.TPF11FPT  Most (64.4%) resulted in no or minimal to 
moderate impairment, with recovery within six months.  However, 5.2% of adverse events 
resulted in permanent disability, and 15.9% in death.TPF12FPT  Extrapolating from their study, the 
authors estimated that in 2000, of the almost 2.5 million annual admissions to similar hospitals in 
Canada, about 185,000 were associated with an adverse event, of which 70,000 were potentially 
preventable, and that 9250 to 23750 deaths could have been prevented.TPF13FPT  The Canadian Institute 
for Health Information (CIHI) notes that this makes preventable adverse events one of the 
leading causes of death in Canada – more than deaths from breast cancer, motor vehicle/transport 
accidents and HIV combined.TPF14FPT    
 Turning to patients’ perceptions of medical error, a 2005 six country survey of patients 
with health problems found that, of the 751 Canadians surveyed, 15% reported a medical mistake 
having been made in their care, and 30% had experienced an error in their medical care, 
medication or laboratory tests during the past two years (the combined rate was exceeded only 
by the United States).  Serious health problems resulted for 46% of patients who experienced a 
medical mistake or medication error.TPF15FPT  CIHI reported that in a 2003 survey, 5.2 million 
Canadians (approximately 24% of the population) responded that they or a family member had 
experienced a preventable adverse event in the course of treatment; 30% of these had occurred in 
the past year.TPF16FPT  More than half had serious health consequences.TPF17FPT 
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The extent of preventable adverse events and patient injury is even greater than indicated 
by the Canadian Adverse Events Study, which only measured patient injury in acute care 
hospitals.  Patients receive health care in many settings, from formal and informal caregivers.  
Sometimes, care is self-administered.  Preventable adverse events will occur in these situations 
as well.TPF18FPT  While the majority of claims for “medical misadventure” arise in hospital settings,TP F19FPT 
the structure and location of health care delivery is changing.  As more health services, 
increasingly complex care, and sicker patients are moved outside hospitals to other types of 
health care institutions (such as long term care), clinics (increasingly the site of diagnostic 
procedures), physicians’ offices (primary and specialist care) and their own homes, adverse 
events and the severity of the consequences for patients will increase in these locales as well, as 
will the risk of clinical negligence.  
Incidence of Negligent Injury to Patients 
 While the Canadian Adverse Events Study provides recent measures of the incidence and 
effects of preventable adverse events, there are no studies of Canadian data that determine how 
frequently patients are harmed by negligent health care, or how many people recover 
compensation for their injuries.  Most preventable adverse events are not caused by negligence 
(i.e. substandard care that harmed the patient), but a subset are.  In a 1990 report commissioned 
by the Conference of Deputy Ministers of Health in response to a perceived malpractice “crisis” 
in the late 1980’s, Prichard  extrapolated from American and Swedish data to conclude that in 
Canada, too, less than 10% of viable claims attributable to negligence in health services resulted 
in payment.TPF20FPT  In the United States, the Harvard Medical Practice Study’s expert reviewers 
concluded that only 1 in 8 patients who had been injured by negligence sued, and of those, only 1 
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in 16 recovered any compensation.TPF21FPT  While the litigation environment in the two countries 
differs, there are not obvious reasons that a substantially smaller percentage of injuries would be 
caused by negligence in Canada, or that significantly more Canadians injured by negligent   
treatment sue and recover than in the United States.    
The Canadian Adverse Events Study estimated that 70,000 hospital admissions were 
associated with preventable adverse events in 2000, and that thousands of deaths that occurred 
were potentially preventable.  A portion of those would have been the result of negligence.  The 
same is true of adverse events that were not included in that study, the ones that occur outside 
hospitals – some would have been caused by negligent care as well.  Yet relatively few 
physicians are sued for negligence, especially when compared to the number of preventable 
adverse events.  The Canadian Medical Protective Association (CMPA), the physicians’ mutual 
defence organization that provides liability coverage for approximately 95% of Canada’s 
physicians, consistently reports low rates of malpractice claims and lawsuits against its more 
than 66,000 members.  It sets out its claims experience in its 2004 Annual Report:  there were 
1083 new legal actions commenced against its members in 2004 (continuing a decline in new 
legal actions evident over the past several years).  A medical malpractice action lasts on average 
three to four years, and most are settled, dismissed, discontinued or abandoned.  CMPA reports 
that 92% of cases concluded in 2004 were resolved prior to trial, with payment made to the 
plaintiff in 32% of these cases; the remaining 60% were withdrawn or abandoned by the 
plaintiff.  Only 8% of cases concluded (104 cases) went to trial; of these, 86 cases resulted in 
judgment for the defendant physicians, and 18 cases in judgment for the plaintiffs.TPF22FPT  These 
outcomes are similar to its five year average (2000-2004).TPF23FPT  Putting the two sets of  data 
together, given the extent of preventable adverse events, it is likely that the incidence of 
negligence is significantly higher than the number of claims made, and much higher still than the 
even smaller number of people who actually recover any compensation. 
 
II.  MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL LIABILITY INSURANCE  
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 Almost all physicians in Canada are members of the Canadian Medical Protective 
Association (CMPA), a physicians’ mutual defence organization that, while not an insurer per se, 
provides liability coverage and representation in medical malpractice actions to its members, as 
well as legal advice, counsel and assistance in other types of medico-legal proceedings.TPF24FPT  There 
is no cap on the amount of financial assistance a member can receive, but there is also no 
obligation in the CMPA by-laws requiring it to provide assistance in respect of any particular 
medico-legal incident.TPF25FPT  The CMPA operates on a fully funded model for current and past 
procedures.TPF26FPT  Membership fees vary substantially by specialty and region of the country, but are 
not individually experience-rated.TPF27FPT  Ontario physicians pay the highest fees, and Quebec the 
lowest, while the rest of the country falls in between. TPF28FPT   
Most physicians are remunerated for the services they provide to patients on a fee for 
service basis.  Fees for insured services covered under Canada’s universal health insurance 
system are negotiated between provincial medical associations and their respective provincial 
governments.  Fees are meant to cover remuneration for physicians’ services as well as overhead, 
including the cost of liability coverage (generally, the fees paid to CMPA).  Increased CMPA 
membership fees cannot be passed on to patients by charging more for insured services.  In 
recognition of this, since about the mid-1980’s, provincial governments and medical associations 
have negotiated arrangements to provide for public contributions to physicians to reimburse them 
in whole or part for CMPA fees or similar medical liability insurance premiums.  Arrangements 
vary in different provinces, but the total amount of government contributions and the proportion 
of individual physicians’ CMPA fees governments pay are substantial.TPF29FPT    
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 Hospitals’ insurance arrangements do not parallel those of physicians, but rather, 
resemble more traditional contracts of insurance.  Many health care institutions participate in the 
Health Insurance Reciprocal of Canada (HIROC), a member-owned non-profit organization 
founded in 1987. TPF30FPT  Unlike physician liability coverage, ratings used to determine individual 
facilities’ premium levels are to some extent loss-sensitive, i.e. experience-rated. 
 
III.  DEVELOPMENTS IN TORT LAW   
1. Constitutional Division of Powers 
 Any consideration of tort reform must take into account the division of powers between 
the federal and provincial governments.  Provinces have constitutional jurisdiction over the 
administration of justice, and while “health” is not a single matter assigned exclusively to one 
level of government, the heads of provincial jurisdiction subsume so many aspects of health care 
(from general responsibility for property and civil rights in the province, through matters of a 
local or private nature, to specific authority to make laws concerning the establishment of 
hospitals) that the lion’s share of responsibility for health care clearly rests with the provinces.TPF31FPT  
Consequently, reform of tort law, rules of civil procedure, regulation of health professionals, and 
the legal governance of hospitals and other components of the health care system are matters for 
the provinces.  That is not to say there is no role for the federal government, or for concerted 
action by all levels of government on issues of patient safety and tort law, but proposals for 
reform must take into account the realities of the Canadian federal system.TPF32FPT  
2.  Common Law Developments in Negligence Law and Medical Liability   
  As explained in Chapter 1, in order to establish negligence, a plaintiff must prove on a 
balance of probabilities that: (i) the defendant owed him or her a duty of care; (ii) the defendant 
breached the standard of care established by law; (iii) the defendant’s breach caused injury or 
loss to the plaintiff; and (iv) the plaintiff’s injuries are not too remote to be recoverable in law.  
In the context of health care, liability for negligence can arise from substandard care or 
treatment, and also from a defendant’s failure to obtain the patient’s informed consent to 
                                                 
TP
30
PT Health Insurance Reciprocal of Canada, online at HTUhttp://www.hiroc.comUTH (last accessed June 2004). 
TP
31
PT Constitution Act, 1867, (U.K.), 30&31 Vict., c.3, s.92; Canadian Bar Association, What’s Law Got To Do With It?  
Health Care Reform in Canada  (Ottawa: Cdn. Bar Ass’n., 1994); Hogg, P., Constitutional Law of Canada (2004 
student ed.) (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2004). 
TP
32
PT For example, CPSI was established by the federal government. 
 57
treatment.  This section considers developments in the law of negligence that may be particularly 
affected by patient safety initiatives and the reverse.   
 (i)  Guidelines, Policies and Accreditation Standards:  Implications for Health 
Professionals’ and Hospitals’ Standard of Care 
 Clinical guidelines, patient safety policies and codes of conduct developed by health care 
organizations, professional associations, and NGO’s such as health accreditation agencies can 
influence determinations of the standard of care in clinical negligence litigation. This type of 
“soft law”, while not definitive in itself, may provide at least persuasive evidence of the standard 
of care.TPF33FPT  Some provinces have approved health professions’ codes of ethics through legislation, 
giving them the force of law.TPF34FPT  If these include provisions requiring health professionals to 
inform patients of error, that requirement too is imported into the law.TPF35FPT  As more patient safety 
standards are developed by accreditation bodies, self-regulating professions and other 
organizations, arguments may be raised that hospitals’ or physicians’ failure to comply is 
evidence that care was substandard, or that systems to prevent error and protect patients from 
harm were inadequate.  Such claims may be met with the argument that the challenged practice 
was nonetheless followed by a respectable minority of competent practitioners, and so, is 
acceptable.TPF36FPT  Patients would still have to prove the other elements of a negligence claim, 
including the causal link between the breach and the harm suffered.  
  Accreditation standards for health facilities may provide a case in point, although 
jurisprudence is scant.  The Canadian Council on Health Services Accreditation (CCHSA) is a 
private non-profit accreditation agency that assesses health organizations against a set of national 
standards.  It has representation from a number of organizations, including the Canadian 
Healthcare Association, the Canadian Medical Association, the Royal College of Physicians and 
Surgeons of Canada, the Canadian Nurses Association and the Canadian College of Health 
Services Executives.TPF37FPT  It accredits a large majority of Canadian hospitals.  Most accreditation 
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takes place on a voluntary basis, although in some provinces, it is mandatory – for example, 
Quebec requires private and public health care facilities to be accredited.TPF38FPT  The Health Council 
of Canada has called for more health facilities to become accredited as a means to improve 
patient safety.TPF39FPT  However, as it notes, few make their full assessment reports public.TPF40FPT   
   To a great extent, the process relies on self-assessment.TPF41FPT  The CCHSA recently added 
patient safety goals to its accreditation standards, and will consider compliance with them as part 
of its accreditation program commencing in 2006.TPF42FPT  It has developed a list of sentinel events 
related to system or process deficiencies that can lead to death or major and enduring loss of 
function, and expects member organizations to implement a reporting system for adverse events, 
with provision for internal reporting, investigation and action on sentinel events, and external 
reporting as applicable.TPF43FPT  Arguably, accreditation standards could inform the standard of care in 
malpractice proceedings, or provide evidence of shortcomings.TPF44FPT   
The same is true of standards developed by patient safety organizations, such as the 
“Safer Healthcare Now!” campaign that has adopted six targeted initiatives for implementation 
in hospital settings.TPF45FPT  It now has more than 150 participant organizations.  Such programs raise 
questions about the legal implications of (i) not participating when there is evidence these 
programs will reduce harm to patients, and (ii) joining, but not complying with  program 
requirements.  Will they be considered best practices, and so not legally required, or the new 
standard of care?  While patient safety advocates generally favour minimizing the role of 
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litigation, patient safety standards have the potential to affect determinations of the legal standard 
of care; such a development would in turn raise concerns about chilling organizations’ 
willingness to participate.    
(ii)  Implications of Developments in Vicarious Liability and Non-Delegable Duties of Care:  
Extending Hospital Liability to Physician Negligence 
  As described in Chapter 1, physicians are generally considered independent contractors, 
and hospitals are not liable for their negligence.TPF46FPT  The Supreme Court of Canada recently 
expanded the application of vicarious liability and non-delegable duties of care and thus, 
expanded liability for the negligence of third parties in some circumstances.TP F47FPT  However, none of 
these decisions arose in the context of health care.  What will these developments signify for 
hospitals?  Some commentators have suggested that the logic underlying these cases would apply 
to hospitals as well, such that they should be subject to a non-delegable duty of care to ensure 
care and skill are taken in the treatment of patients, based on their special relationship with a 
vulnerable population and public reliance on the hospital to ensure quality care is delivered, as 
well as their statutory duties.TPF48FPT  Others argue that hospitals could be held vicariously liable for 
non-employed physicians’ negligence.TP F49FPT  Recent jurisprudence (again in contexts other than 
health care) evidences a somewhat more restrictive approach to imposing vicarious liability or a 
non-delegable duty of care.TPF50FPT   
When the question of imposing liability for third parties’ wrongdoing has been raised in 
the health care context, some lower courts have continued to reject arguments that health 
facilities can be held liable for the negligence of non-employed physicians.TPF51FPT  Others, however, 
                                                 
TP
46
PT Yepremian v. Scarborough General Hospital (1980), 110 D.L.R. (3d) 573 (Ont.C.A.); rev’g. (1978), 88 D.L.R. 
(3d) 161 (Ont.H.C.). 
TP
47
PT The concepts of vicarious liability and non-delegable duties of care are explained in Appendix B to Chapter 1. 
TP
48
PT Osborne, P., The Law of Torts (2d ed.) (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2003) at 324; Fridman, G., Introduction to the 
Canadian Law of Torts (2d ed.) (Markman, ON: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2003), 336. 
TP
49
PT Picard, E.,  “The Liability of Hospitals in Common Law Canada”, (1981) 26 McGill L.J. 997 at 1018, suggested 
that if properly applied, the organization test could result in a finding of vicarious liability. 
TP
50
PT See, eg. B.(K.L.). v. B.C., [2002] 2 S.C.R. 403; M.B. v. B.C., [2003] 2 S.C.R. 477; G.(E.D.) v. Hammer, [2003] 2 
S.C.R. 459; Blackwater v. Plint, [2005] S.C.J. No. 59,  2005 SCC 58; E.B. v. Order of the Oblates of Mary 
Immaculate, 2005 SCC 60.  See also B.(J.-P.) v. Jacob, (1998) 166 D.L.R. (4PthP) 125 (N.B.C.A.) (hospital not 
vicariously liable for sexual assault of patient by nurse it employed,; since patient was not under this nurse’s care, 
the assault did not occur in the course of employment). 
TP
51
PT See eg. H.(J.E.) v. Lay [2001] A.J. No.296 (Alta. Q.B.); Locke v. Smith, [2002] O.J. No. 2173 (C.A.); Lafond v. 
Fabian, [2004] O.J. No. 2787, para. 18 (Ont. Master). 
 60
have refused to dismiss the issue summarily.TPF52FPT  Yepremian v. Scarborough General Hospital, in 
which a divided Ontario Court of Appeal held that a hospital could not be found liable for a non-
employed physician’s negligence, has remained the controlling precedent for more than 25 
years.TPF53FPT  The Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal in Yepremian, but the hospital 
agreed to pay the patient a guaranteed minimum of $2 million to settle the case before the appeal 
was heard, and the matter ended there.TPF54FPT  Commentators question whether the logic of 
Yepremian should continue to prevail, given changes in the organization and delivery of care.TPF55FPT  
Courts in other countries increasingly hold hospitals liable for the negligence of “independent” 
physicians, on a variety of theories.TPF56FPT  
  Courts have been reluctant to disturb physicians’ and hospitals’ settled expectations and 
arrangements about their respective spheres of liability.TPF57FPT  However, deference to existing 
insurance arrangements made by hospitals and physicians is open to challenge.TPF58FPT  The insights of 
the patient safety movement into the role of systemic factors in causing medical error and patient 
injury – i.e. the ways in which constraints imposed at the “blunt end” of institutional decision-
making shape decisions and events at the “sharp end” of practitioners and patients -- lend 
considerable force to arguments for extending hospitals’ liability to include responsibility for the 
negligence of non-employed physicians.  The case for doing so is strengthened when coupled 
with the Court’s rationale for expanded recognition of vicarious liability, i.e. that deterrence can 
best be promoted by fixing liability at an organizational level, where there is the power to 
implement effective changes to reduce risk and prevent harm.TPF59FPT  Expanding hospital liability 
would also reflect changes in the organization and delivery of care more accurately.  In many 
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instances, physicians’ services cannot be evaluated properly in isolation from treatment  
provided by the rest of the health care team, and the institutional environment in which they are 
provided.   
The inquest into the deaths of twelve children while undergoing or shortly after cardiac 
surgery at the Winnipeg Health Sciences Centre in 1994 shed considerable light on the 
inextricably intertwined roles of the various actors and levels of activity when considering the 
reality of how health care is delivered in the setting of a modern hospital.TPF60FPT  One of the striking 
features of the inquest report is the careful detailing of the many levels and systems in which 
there were shortcomings, as well as the variety of decision-makers who did not discharge their 
responsibilities properly, and the ways in which these deficiencies combined to contribute to the 
children’s deaths.  For instance, hospital decisions about staffing levels, monitoring of problems, 
recruitment procedures and other matters significantly affected the ability of the team caring for 
the children to provide proper care.TPF61FPT  In light of this reality, the exercise of partitioning 
responsibility when poor care is provided in circumstances such as this seems particularly 
contrived.   
(iii)  Liability of Statutory Regulators and Government 
 Dissatisfaction with the oversight exercised by statutory regulators and an inability to 
recover from individual tortfeasors has led some victims harmed by members of self-regulating 
professions to sue statutory regulators in tort, alleging that their failure to effectively control the 
member after being alerted to misconduct allowed him or her to continue practicing and cause 
them harm.  Initially, the Supreme Court of Canada held that claims in negligence would not lie 
against statutory regulators, based on its analysis of the statutory immunities and the law 
regarding the duty of care owed by such entities.TPF62FPT  It has since modified that position, and held 
that in some circumstances, regulators may be liable for gross negligence despite good faith 
immunity provisions in the enabling statute.TPF63FPT  
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 Governments have generally been immune from liability for negligence in their decision-
making about the organization and funding of the health care system, on the basis that such 
decisions did not give rise to a private law duty of care, and were not amenable to a finding of 
negligence because they were policy and not operational decisions.TP F64FPT  More recently, creative 
pleading by plaintiffs has successfully invoked governments’ responsibility to take reasonable 
care in implementing policy decisions, for which it can be found negligent.TPF65FPT  Many of these 
cases involve allegations that governments failed to maintain safe systems – for instance, in 
response to outbreaks of SARS or West Nile virus. TP F66FPT  In patient safety terms, these claims seek 
to hold the ultimate “blunt end” actor responsible – government.  Most such claims have only 
faced preliminary challenges at this point, and it is not clear whether they will ultimately 
succeed.   Jurisprudence establishing the lines between policy and operational decisions, and the 
boundaries of private law duties of care that governments owe members of the public with 
respect to health care is not yet well developed.  Plaintiffs face formidable challenges.TPF67FPT    
3.  Disclosing Information, Reporting Errors and Qualified Privilege 
   Patient safety advocates urge that information about medical errors and near misses 
disclosed or gathered in the course of patient safety and quality assurance processes must be kept 
confidential.  Because information about what has gone wrong is so important to systemic 
analysis of patient injury and in developing strategies to reduce injury, and because health care 
providers are reluctant to make such disclosure if doing so carries the risk of negative 
repercussions (i.e. “blame and shame”), they argue that the public interest in facilitating 
initiatives to make health care safer justifies non-disclosure.  In advancing this position, patient 
safety advocates’ arguments are aligned with those of organized medicine and medical liability 
insurers, who have long resisted allowing access to or use of quality assurance information in 
medical malpractice litigation, although for somewhat different reasons.TPF68FPT 
 There is another important public interest at stake.  Access to information assists those 
concerned to learn about and evaluate what occurred.  There are legitimate reasons to do so 
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beyond the confines of error reporting systems.   An injured patient certainly has a powerful 
claim to know what happened and why.   More generally, disclosing errors helps maintain trust 
in the integrity of the health care system and practitioners.  In the event that a patient does sue, 
the ability to access all relevant information and put it in evidence before a court is considered 
key to resolving disputes accurately.  Professional governing bodies and human resources 
departments also have an interest in access to information about what occurred, to ensure 
accountability and safety and quality of care.  When access is restricted, their ability to discharge 
their responsibilities can be diminished as well.  Decision-making about access to information 
and confidentiality must take both public interests into account.  
(i) Internal and External Error Reporting 
  Hospitals implemented formal and informal processes to review the safety and quality of 
care long before the advent of the patient safety movement.  Although most often partial and 
piecemeal, they provided some opportunity to analyze errors and adverse events.  Because 
confidentiality was considered important to encourage participation, a number of provinces 
shielded at least some internal quality assurance (QA) processes from disclosure by means of 
qualified privilege legislation.TPF69FPT  Statutory protection for QA activities has expanded steadily, 
such that all provinces and territories now provide some legislative protection for quality of care 
information.TPF70FPT  The availability, scope and extent of qualified privilege varies.TPF71FPT  Generally, 
factual information is still accessible to the patient, at least to the extent it is not already included 
in the patient’s health record.TPF72FPT   
Where statutory protection is not available, production in connection with civil 
proceedings can sometimes be resisted on the basis that the information is protected by common 
law privilege.  Determinations are made case by case.  The basis for such a claim is generally 
either legal professional privilege, i.e. that the information was obtained or prepared for the 
dominant purpose of assisting in litigation, or that privilege is justified because the public 
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interest in fostering the confidentiality of such communications outweighs what the information 
would add in assisting the court to correctly dispose of the litigation (the “Wigmore criteria”).TPF73FPT  
The public interest argument has met with mixed success in the health care context.TPF74FPT   
 Systems for reporting errors and near misses are becoming increasingly formalized and 
expansive within institutions, and are being extended to require both reporting by more types of 
health facilities, and reporting to third parties, such as regional health authorities or government. TP 
F
75
FPT  Third party reporting may be mandated by statute, or imposed by policy.  For example, in 
Quebec, the executive director of an institution or designate is required by law to report all 
accidents or incidents (essentially, near misses) in non-nominate form to the regional board.TPF76FPT  
Quebec also requires creation of risk and quality management committees to identify incident or 
accident risks, ensure support to the victim, and establish monitoring systems to undertake causal 
analysis and prevent recurrence.TPF77FPT  Alberta mandates reporting of “significant mishaps” at non-
hospital surgical facilities to the relevant regional health authority and the ministry of health. TPF78FPT   
Wider reporting requirements have raised questions about whether external reporting and 
new internal reporting procedures are protected by privilege.  Statutory regimes that expand 
reporting have generally expanded protection for information and new third party QA activities 
as well.  For instance, Saskatchewan requires health districts to report specified types of critical 
incidents to the ministry of health on a non-nominate basis, and health facilities to similarly 
report to the regional health authority.  The authority must investigate the incident and determine 
how to prevent its recurrence.  Its report, too, is submitted to the minister, who can then share it 
with other regional health authorities and health facilities in order to disseminate lessons 
learned.TPF79FPT  These activities and documents are protected from disclosure by statutory privilege.TPF80FPT  
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Other provinces are also creating protected zones to enable information about adverse events and 
responses to be shared beyond the bounds of the institution for patient safety purposes.TPF81FPT     
Error reporting and adverse event investigation are insulated from disclosure on the 
assumption that reporting will not occur otherwise.  The case for doing so is based on anecdotal 
evidence.  Canada lacks empirical studies to determine whether, in provinces where statutory 
protection for error disclosure in the context of QA activities has been in place for some time, the 
existence of the privilege has made any difference to reporting.  Does it in fact encourage more 
health care providers to come forward, more reports of error, and/or more forthright explanations 
of what occurred?   In the United States, where QA activities have been protected by statutory 
privilege for longer, evidence that it positively affects disclosure is limited and equivocal.TPF82FPT  The 
causes of under-reporting are broader and more complex than concerns about legal liability.  
Consequently, shielding information generated as part of QA processes will not necessarily boost 
reporting.  
When statutory privilege is expanded, it is important to remember that doing so comes at 
a cost – (i) to injured patients, in accessing information so they can find out what happened, as 
well as obtain information needed to establish legal entitlement to compensation when harmed 
by negligence, (ii) to the public, in learning about and assessing health care delivery, and (iii) to 
accurate dispute resolution by courts and other decision-making bodies.TPF83FPT  We know little about 
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whether QA processes and/or error reporting systems actually reduce error and injury.  In a 1989 




“...unable to ensure or guarantee quality of care.  Terms such as ‘quality assistance’ ...are 
preferable as these terms more accurately describe the goal to improve quality of care...The 
term quality assurance is presumptuous and misleading as this process does not currently 
have the capability of guaranteeing high quality care to patients in hospitals.  The 
assessment of problems necessarily involves conjecture and speculation.  Methods used to 
measure and describe quality are unreliable”. 
 
Her point was that in light of this, QA information can be easily misconstrued by patients and 
courts, and so ought not be disclosed.  While it is to be expected that quality assurance activities 
have improved over the years since she wrote, her analysis also supports the conclusion that 
shielding QA activities from disclosure via qualified privilege in order to support programs 
meant to keep people safer may be protecting an aspiration rather than a reality.  
Because confidentiality is considered essential to encourage disclosure, and the need for 
accurate information about errors is urgent, qualified privilege legislation can be justified.  
However, given the lack of robust evidence of its efficacy, such legislation should include a 
sunset clause.  This would enable review to ensure it is effective.  If under-reporting persists, the 
positive effects of privilege for patient safety programs may not be sufficient to justify the costs 
of non-disclosure.  In the American context, Marchev noted that when powerful stakeholders 
achieve strong statutory protections for confidentiality in error reporting, they are difficult to 
repeal, whether they achieve their goals or not.TPF85FPT  Incorporating a sunset clause into qualified 
privilege legislation would take this reality into account, and give providers a “use it or lose it” 
incentive to report error.  Legislation in the various provinces, however, has not made qualified 
privilege conditional on acceptable results.    
 (ii) Disclosure to Patients 
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 When a patient has been harmed in the course of treatment, the ethical obligation to 
disclose what has occurred to the patient is clear.TPF86FPT  There is a legal obligation to disclose harm 
to patients as well, although the precise parameters of the legal duty – what must be disclosed, by 
whom, and in what circumstances – are not entirely settled.TPF87FPT  In many instances, disclosure is 
also required by professional standards of practice.TPF88FPT  In some provinces, disclosure to patients 
harmed by adverse events is required by law, either directly, or by means of statutory approval of 
professional codes of ethics that in turn mandate disclosure of harm. TPF89FPT  In Quebec, for instance, 
patients receiving care in hospitals have a statutory right to be informed of accidents (defined as 
“an action or situation where a risk event occurs which has or could have consequences for the 
state of health or welfare of the user...”).TPF90FPT  Hospitals and other types of health care facilities 
have  begun to adopt policies requiring disclosure of adverse events to patients.  The CMPA, 
which provides liability coverage for most physicians, encourages members to disclose the 
occurrence of adverse events to patients, as well as the nature of adverse clinical outcomes.TPF91FPT  
However, policies are often couched in limited and guarded terms.  The College of Physicians 
and Surgeons of Ontario, for instance, states that a patient has a right to disclosure about harm 
that may have occurred to him, but that its policy is not meant to address “...issues concerning 
the cause of the harm” or reporting to third parties.TPF92FPT  The CMPA cautions that disclosure to 
patients “...relates to the prompt, factual and non-judgmental disclosure of the clinical 
information about the particular adverse event...”, but cautions against being more expansive.TPF93FPT  
 Widespread support for disclosing harm to patients has not translated into widespread 
action; practice still falls short.  In a 2005 survey of the experiences of patients with health 
problems in six countries, 19% of Canadian patients surveyed reported experiencing a 
medication error or a mistake in their treatment or care; 46% experienced serious health 
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problems as a result.  However, 74% of those patients had not been told about the error by 
doctors involved in their care.TPF94FPT    
4.  Expanding Access to Information 
(i) Profiling 
 In contrast to statutes shielding an increasing range of QA activities from disclosure, a 
recent initiative to expand public access to information about physicians’ professional history 
does incorporate a sunset clause.  Manitoba’s Physician Profile Regulation, which took effect in 
2005, makes information about physicians’ professional history publicly available, including 
disciplinary actions and judgments in medical malpractice cases in the 10 preceding years.TP F95FPT  It 
resulted from recommendations made by a committee reviewing results of the Manitoba 
Pediatric Cardiac Surgery Inquest, and is meant to support better informed decision making by 
the public.TP F96FPT It applies only to physicians. The regulation’s effectiveness must be reviewed 
within five years.TPF97FPT  There is no equivalent elsewhere in Canada, although some provinces 
provide limited public access to information about professionals’ disciplinary history.TPF98FPT 
(ii) Apologies 
 No Canadian jurisdiction currently has legislation protecting apologies from use in civil 
proceedings.  While it may be no more than a theoretical possibility, there is concern that an 
apology could be construed as an admission of liability, or adversely affect entitlement to 
liability insurance coverage as an admission against interest.TPF99FPT  Believing apologies are important 
to patients, and that they can benefit providers and potentially reduce litigation as well, British 
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Columbia became the first province to introduce legislation in 2006 that would prevent use of 
apologies (including admissions of fault) in determining fault or liability in civil proceedings, or 
to affect insurance coverage, regardless of contractual provisions to the contrary.TPF100FPT  In doing so, 
it is following the lead of a number of American states that have passed what are colloquially 
termed “I’m Sorry” laws.  The British Columbia statute had not been passed at the time of 
writing. 
5.  Procedural Reform 
(i)  Class Actions 
 Most instances of patient injury involve harm only to individuals, so class actions are not 
often available on the facts in medical malpractice cases.  However, the potential to aggregate 
claims through a class action, although a relatively recent arrival in Canada,  can make litigation 
a realistic possibility when it would not have been on an individual basis.TPF101FPT  Flaws in drugs, 
medical devices, use of equipment and other technology, testing the safety of blood and other 
products, substandard infection control, institutional and government policies and procedures, 
and others have all given rise to class actions in the health care context.  While not large in 
number, potential liability for damages can be very great indeed.  The CMPA reports that it 
settled a single class action for $29.5 million in 2001.TPF102FPT  Recovery of this magnitude is not 
common, but as the types of acts and omissions alleged to constitute wrongdoing, the parties 
owing duties of care, and the frequency of claims continue to grow, so will findings of 
aggregated liability.TPF103FPT 
(ii) Simplified Procedure; Summary Proceedings 
Beyond liberalizing rules for class actions, procedural reforms affecting the tort system 
have been limited.  A number of provinces have adopted simplified rules of court applicable to 
lower value claims.  Rules of procedure, maximum recovery, and costs recoverable are all 
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limited; the aim is to increase access to the civil justice system by reducing the costs of lawsuits.  
Rules of court have also been amended to expand circumstances in which actions can be 
disposed of by summary proceedings – i.e. without a full trial.  These types of initiative are not 
likely to be of much utility in medical malpractice claims, given the complex legal issues and 
disputed facts often involved, and the need for expert evidence and significant investment of 
lawyers’ time to properly prepare and present a case.  Even at the time of the Prichard Review in 
the late 1980’s, the evidence was that medical negligence claims involving less than $100,000 
were routinely discouraged by legal counsel.TPF104FPT  
(iii) Periodic Payment of Damages 
Some provinces have granted courts discretion to order damages to be paid by way of 
periodic payments without the consent of both parties.TPF105FPT  Others are considering moving to 
discretionary or mandatory periodic payments when damages awarded exceed a minimum 
amount. The underlying reasoning is that periodic payments, while complying with the principle 
that damages awarded should return the plaintiff to the position she would have been in had she 
not been negligently injured, will achieve that end for substantially less money.  Scheduled 
periodic payments raise concerns that plaintiffs’ decisions about how to spend the damages 
awarded would be restricted.   
 
 
IV. PROPOSALS FOR TORT REFORM 
Reform proposals have included no-fault compensation, hybrid systems, alternate dispute 
resolution, and changes to the tort system.  Trebilcock has pointed out the need for caution when 
considering radical reform:  “Whatever the empirical frailties in the evidence on the deterrent 
effects of tort law, tort theorists who propose...alternatives have rarely bothered to acquaint 
themselves with the empirical evidence on the efficacy of alternative control mechanisms”.TPF106FPT  
He concluded that, at least with respect to automobiles and industrial accidents, the evidence has 
often been inconclusive or disappointing.TPF107FPT 
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The 1990 Prichard Report, Liability and Compensation in Health Care, which was 
commissioned by the Conference of  Deputy Ministers of Health in response to a perceived 
malpractice crisis in the late 1980’s, recommended that the tort system be maintained for clinical 
negligence claims, although with the addition of a companion enriched no-fault compensation 
option for injuries resulting from avoidable events.TPF108FPT  It concluded that the threat of tort 
litigation was useful in improving the quality of health care, and further, that the ability to seek 
compensation through civil litigation was likely to force governments to ensure that benefit 
levels paid under a no-fault system were not allowed to become so low that they were no longer 
an attractive option compared to suing for negligence.  However, no changes to the tort system 
resulted.  Even though the Report concluded that less than 10% of viable claims attributable to 
negligence in health services resulted in payment,TPF109FPT the extent of uncompensated negligent 
injury was not enough to prompt politicians to change the way patients were (or more often, 
were not) compensated. 
Mr. Justice Krever, who conducted the Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System after 
many people became infected with HIV and Hepatitis C from blood transfusions, considered the 
tort system a failure as a compensation mechanism, and recommended the creation of a no-fault 
system for blood-related injury.  He rejected the option of maintaining tort liability as an 
alternative, because of the public costs involved in operating both a tort-based and no-fault 
system, the negative aspects of what could become a two-tier justice system, and the lack of 
certainty in compensation.TPF110FPT  He also advocates implementing no-fault compensation more 
generally for patients injured in the course of treatment, in order to address the needs of the many 
people left without recourse under the current medical liability system.TPF111FPT  
Pursuant to the Commission’s recommendations, the federal government implemented a 
limited no fault compensation system for people infected with HIV and Hepatitis C from blood 
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transfusions.TPF112FPT  In doing so, it was responding to a crisis:  the financial collapse of the Canadian 
Red Cross Society that collected and supplied the tainted blood, and the inquiry’s findings that 
government oversight and monitoring of the blood system had been deficient.  Even then, at least 
as originally structured, compensation was limited to categories of claimants where the 
government would have considered itself most at risk if lawsuits against it had proceeded to 
judgment.  Eligibility has since been expanded.TPF113FPT  
Quebec has had a no-fault compensation system for people who suffer severe and 
permanent injuries from vaccines in place since 1986, following a Supreme Court of Canada 
judgment denying the claim of a young girl who experienced severe neurological disability after 
being vaccinated.TPF114FPT  She had sued her physician, the vaccine manufacturer and the provincial 
government.   The Court suggested that government compensation would be appropriate, 
although not legally required.  The province implemented a no-fault compensation system 
shortly thereafter.  Benefits are broad, but establishing eligibility is difficult.  Claimants must 
prove a causal connection between the vaccine and the harm suffered.  Success rates for claims 
are low (20 out of 117 claimants in a 15 year period).TPF115FPT 
The Dubin Report commissioned by the CMPA supported retaining existing approaches 
to determining medical liability.  It did suggest further study of designating compensable events 
in limited instances, such as in the case of birth-related injuries.TPF116FPT   
The CMPA commissioned an international review of selected compensation and liability 
systems, and released a policy paper on medical liability in 2005.TPF117FPT  It identified its goals as (i) 
reduction of adverse events, (ii) compensation (“ensuring patients suffering harm as a result of 
physician negligence are compensated quickly, appropriately and equitably”), (iii) due process, 
(iv) accountability, and (v) affordability.TPF118FPT  Both the review and the CMPA policy paper argued 
for retaining the existing medical liability system; in the CMPA’s view, “The current medical 
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liability system in Canada is fundamentally sound and is very likely the best possible model for 
our circumstances”.TPF119FPT   
This conclusion is weakened by the striking absence of any consideration in either 
document of the great disparity between the extent of patient injury in Canada caused by 
preventable adverse events, and the very small number of cases in which patients receive 
compensation for the injuries they have suffered.  Not all preventable adverse events equate with 
negligence, but a subset do.  The estimates available indicate that the number of negligent 
adverse events is much larger than the number of people who sue or recover for negligence.TPF120FPT  
The CMPA’s conclusion about the medical liability system seems based on outmoded 
perceptions of the health care system – i.e. that errors are rare, and that few true quality and 
safety problems exist.  The Canadian Adverse Events Study and other research in Canada and 
internationally have shown that view to be without basis.  The failure to take into account either 
the scale of patient injury or the preventable nature of many adverse events (and the implications 
of both for the incidence of negligence) makes it difficult to accept the CMPA’s contention that 
the existing medical liability system is the best possible in the Canadian context, particularly 
when one of its own goals is that patients harmed by physician negligence obtain prompt, fair 
compensation. 
  Much of the academic work on medical liability was produced in response to the last 
medical malpractice “crisis”, when fees charged to CMPA members for liability coverage and 
health care institutions’ liability insurance premiums increased dramatically.TPF121FPT  Commentators 
pointed out that, if there was a crisis, it was in how poorly the tort system functioned to 
compensate patients injured by negligence – i.e. how few people harmed by health care sued, and 
the even smaller number that succeeded.TPF122FPT  Picard and Robertson note that one of the principal 
reasons for low rates of claiming is   “...problems of access to the justice system”.TPF123FPT  Given 
information asymmetries between patients, providers and institutions, there is no assurance a 
patient will know or be able to obtain and appreciate the information needed to understand that 
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he or she has been a victim of a medical error.  Lawsuits are slow, complex, costly despite 
greater availability of contingency fees, unpredictable, and in the case of medical liability claims, 
usually unsuccessful.  These factors are felt particularly acutely by those with the fewest 
resources, who are already the most vulnerable.  The result is that those least advantaged in 
society (sometimes as a result of injuries from treatment received) are also least able to access 
the civil justice system.TPF124FPT  Access is not improving.  Recent years have seen a steady decline in 
claims frequency against physicians; with the exception of the impact of a single large class 
action settlement in 2001, average awards and settlements paid by the CMPA have remained 
fairly stable over the past 5 years.TPF125FPT    
Proposals for procedural reform have generally been directed towards controlling costs, 
not towards reducing medical error.   The CMPA has lobbied for several procedural reforms for 
years:  greater use of structured settlements and periodic payments in judgments, an end to 
subrogated claims by provincial health insurers for the cost of providing health and social 
services (on the basis that such awards essentially transfer money from one government pocket 
to another), and greater opportunities for settlement pre-trial, such as mediation.TPF126FPT  Reducing the 
cost of lawsuits make sense, as long as it can be done in ways that are fair to all concerned.  It 
has also suggested that the possibility of a segregated compensation system for compromised 
infants be explored further; these are the most costly type of individual claims it faces.TPF127FPT  
Depending on the structure of any system adopted, particularly conditions for eligibility and 
scope and level of benefits, such a scheme has the potential to be a better means of compensation 
in this type of case.  Provincial governments, too, have an interest in re-structuring damages 
awards, particularly in cases of clinical negligence.  Doing so would reduce their costs, since the 
subsidies governments provide for the cost of liability coverage now constitute a significant 
portion of the total amounts paid.  Changes to federal legislation have also been suggested, to 
end taxation of personal injury awards so that damages would no longer need to include amounts 
to “gross up” the award to take into account liability to pay tax on future investment income 
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earned on lump sum compensation.  This type of proposal, too, is directed towards reducing 
costs.  Beyond this type of procedural reform and legislation strengthening qualified privilege for 
error reporting, however, there seems little will – public or political – for more radical change, 
and consequently, little likelihood of substantial tort reform in the near future. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
  Procedural reforms affecting the tort system have been directed at reducing costs – costs 
to the losing party of damages awarded (for example, by ordering periodic payment of damages), 
and costs to the parties and the civil justice system (for instance, establishing simplified 
procedures for lower value claims, or expanding summary proceedings).  A few law reform 
initiatives have had a patient safety focus, at least in their most recent incarnation.  Strengthened 
statutory protection from disclosure for QA activities is one example.  Its effects are broader, 
though:  restricting access to information also makes it more difficult for patients to prove 
negligence and entitlement to compensation when they have been injured.  To date, governments 
have not taken advantage of the opportunity to link strengthened protection from disclosure to 
progress on error reporting, disclosure of harm to patients, or other policy goals. 
Courts, for their part, have steadily expanded common law liability for negligence, 
particularly in personal injury cases.TPF128FPT  They have extended circumstances when a duty of care 
is owed, become more demanding in determining whether the standard of care was breached, and 
adopted alternative approaches that make it easier to prove causation.  Writing extra-judicially 
about developments in the law of causation in negligence cases, McLachlin, J. (now Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada) observed that judges’ willingness to relax the traditional 
“but for” test stemmed from the growing “imbalance between the perception of a wrong and the 
inability to bring the wrongdoer to account and compensate the victim”, as well as the need to 
ensure effective deterrence of harmful activity.TPF129FPT  She warned that the frequent result of “no 
recovery” even when people have suffered harm and there has been wrongdoing is “inconsistent 
with modern expectations”, and may lead people to turn elsewhere “...if the tort system is unable 
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to meet public perceptions of justice”.TPF130FPT  Alternatives may not be a realistic possibility for 
people injured by treatment, given the limited powers and mandates of complaints resolution 
mechanisms at present.  Not only courts, but policymakers, too, grapple with whether the role of 
tort law should be altered to reflect new understandings of responsibility, and the appropriate 
balance between distributive and corrective justice.  Other countries face similar conundrums.  
Their experiences, both positive and negative, can provide valuable insights to inform 
consideration of these issues in Canada.  The remaining chapters in this study review 
developments at the juxtaposition of medical malpractice law and patient safety initiatives in 
jurisdictions that share similar legal systems and patient safety sensibilities with Canada, with a 
view to assessing lessons to be learned. 
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CHAPTER 3.  UNITED STATES 
Introduction 
The patient safety movement had its origins in the United States.  The subject has been 
researched, theorized, critiqued, assessed and analyzed longer and more extensively there than 
anywhere else.  The federal and state governments, non-governmental organizations and the 
private sector have all devoted substantial funds and other resources to patient safety initiatives.  
At the same time, tort reform has been an American preoccupation for many years.  The 
literature on both in the United States is vast.  Consequently, despite significant differences in 
the structure and funding of health care, medical liability insurance, and legal climate between 
the United States and Canada, American experience with the interface between patient safety and 
tort reform can be instructive.  Developments must be understood, however, in the context of that 
country’s health care and legal systems.  Vis a vis health care, even though public funding 
accounts for more than half of national health expenditures, the private for-profit sector plays a 
much greater role in the funding and delivery of health care than in Canada.TPF1FPT  With no system of 
universal health insurance, access to health care differs as well.  While most Americans do have 
health insurance, many are significantly underinsured, and a significant percentage do not have 
any health insurance to cover the cost of needed health services.  As for medical liability 
insurance, the availability of adequate and affordable insurance to physicians is far less certain 
than in Canada.TPF2FPT  These differences affect both analysis of the problems presented by the 
troubled relationship between patient safety and the tort system, and prescriptions for reform.  
The legal environments in the two countries differ as well. Leaving aside variations in 
substantive law, American litigation is characterized by the potential for markedly higher 
damages awards, greater reliance on contingency fees, more extensive use of juries in civil trials, 
different rules to determine damages for pain and suffering, and different costs rules (costs do 
not “follow the event” -- i.e. responsibility for the costs of litigation does not shift depending on 
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success).TPF3FPT  On the whole, Americans are more litigious than their Canadian counterparts, and this 
holds true for medical malpractice claims as well. 
This chapter outlines and analyzes the interrelation of the tort system and the patient 
safety movement.  It explains the background to the Institute of Medicine (IOM) report that 
made the problem of medical error a public issue, and recounts what has occurred in its 
aftermath.  It reviews scholarship assessing the performance of the tort system, the history of the 
present malpractice “crisis”, and the tort reforms adopted as a result.  It describes proposals for 
more radical law reform, including some that would supplant the tort system entirely, and others 
meant as “workaround” solutions to political inertia and deadlock.  Finally, it considers the role 
of patients and the public at the interface of patient safety and malpractice litigation, and the 
place of tort law in regulatory scholarship. 
The Institute of Medicine Report, To Err Is Human 
The release of the Institute of Medicine’s landmark report, To Err is Human, in 1999 
made the extent of medical error and the grievous harm it causes to patients a national issue.TPF4FPT  It 
concluded that between 44,000 and 98,000 deaths each year in the United States were the result 
of medical errors, making it the eighth leading cause of death.  More people died from medical 
errors than from motor vehicle accidents or workplace accidents; total national costs of 
preventable adverse events were between $17 billion and $29 billion, of which health care costs 
represented over half.TPF5FPT  Both the scale of the problem and its devastating results made the need 
for effective action apparent.   
To that end, the report also examined how errors occur in health care.  It pointed out that 
most errors are the result of slips, lapses and other human shortcomings within complex systems 
of care that were not designed to prevent errors.  The usual response of blaming and punishing 
individuals considered to be “at fault” not only misstated the problem, but also misdirected 
efforts to prevent future harm, and hampered initiatives to learn from errors so that 
improvements could be implemented.  Accordingly, it recommended that the systems within 
which errors occurred be studied, “...to make it easier to do the right thing, to reduce the 
likelihood that any residual errors will reach patients, and to intervene promptly with remediation 
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should injuries nonetheless occur;... a transformation in the response to errors, which it called 
moving to a culture of safety.  This means fixing problems rather than fixing blame...”.TPF6FPT  The 
new approach, with its focus on systemic analysis, ending the “culture of blame” and de-
emphasizing individual fault-finding, quickly became highly influential. It is a philosophy that 
has become the mainstay of the patient safety movement, not just in the United States, but 
around the world.TPF7FPT  However, as the American experience indicates, putting it into practice in the 
context of a pre-existing and complex landscape of rights, relationships, obligations, interests 
and needs is far from easy. 
Background to the IOM Report 
 The Institute of Medicine was not the first to identify patient safety as a pressing issue; 
much of the intellectual foundation had been laid by scholars and practitioners over the 
preceding decade.TPF8FPT  The IOM’s work was based on a series of earlier reports on medical errors.  
In the mid-1970’s, a study of the costs of medical injuries sponsored by the California Medical 
Association revealed significant levels of adverse events, many of which were considered likely 
to have resulted in a finding of physician liability had patients sued. TPF9FPT  This was followed by the 
Harvard Medical Practice Study in the 1980’s, which undertook an extensive review of medical 
records of hospitalized patients, adverse events and malpractice claims in New York.  It 
estimated that nearly 7000 New Yorkers died as a result of negligent injury in hospitals in 1984.TP 
F
10
FPT   In the early 1990’s, a study of Utah and Colorado found rates of adverse events similar to 
New York’s, although fewer deaths resulting from negligence. TPF11FPT  While all of these earlier 
studies were undertaken with a view to bringing about tort reform, in the IOM report itself, one 
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finds surprisingly little discussion of medical malpractice law.TP F12FPT  Commenting on this omission, 
Mello and Brennan note that the IOM’s decision was strategic:  “Having seen that medical 
malpractice reform was difficult and contentious, they hoped to keep the patient safety 
movement out of that quagmire”, and instead, went “direct to the public”, bypassing the medical 
profession and hospitals, and using public relations techniques to make the case for urgent 
action.TPF13FPT  The IOM called for substantial improvements in error prevention – a 50% reduction in 
5 years.TPF14FPT  The hope was that pressure from external environments on health care providers and 
organizations would make errors so costly that the case for safety would become compelling.TP F15FPT  
Combined with their calls for an end to legal, cultural and other impediments to safety initiatives, 
and more research to identify and develop effective responses, they expected they were setting 
the stage for major change.  
 Five Years After the IOM Report  
Despite the attention generated by the IOM Report, error and patient injury remain a 
serious problem in the United States.  In a 2005 study of patients with health problems in six 
countries, one third (34%) of American patients reported experiencing medical, medication or 
laboratory errors in the previous two years, the highest of all the countries surveyed.TPF16FPT  Of these, 
77% occurred outside hospital.  For 45% of those who reported a mistake in care or medication, 
the error caused serious health problems.TPF17FPT  
Patient safety advocates confirm that the situation remains grave.  This study coincided 
with the fifth anniversary of the release of To Err Is Human, an occasion which provided an 
opportunity for taking stock.  The assessment of some of the most influential leaders in the 
patient safety movement was that progress had been frustratingly slow, and that, while the IOM 
Report had “changed the conversation”, there was “little evidence that systematic improvements 
in safety are widely available”; despite considerable activity, efforts are “affecting patient safety 
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at the margin”.TPF18FPT  The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) 
commented in 2005 that “error remains ubiquitous in health care delivery”.TPF19FPT  Leape and Davis 
summarize the situation:  “When it comes to improving patient safety, we have plenty of 
recognition of the problem but no real commitment to solving it.  As a result, hospitals are still 
dangerous places to be if you are sick”.TPF20FPT   
Why So Slow?  
Leape and Berwick, leaders in the patient safety movement from the beginning, 
concluded that structural factors had posed formidable barriers: professional fragmentation, 
deeply rooted traditions of professional autonomy and individualism in medicine, entrenched 
hierarchical authority structures, and diffuse accountability.TPF21FPT  A number of other factors 
contributed as well: physicians’ fear – of loss of autonomy, external control, untried analytical 
approaches, and malpractice liability – as well as lack of leadership prioritizing patient safety in 
health care institutions, the absence of robust measures to assess improvement, and a perverse 
reimbursement structure that in some instances subsidizes unsafe care, since physicians and 
hospitals can bill for services required to treat patients injured through their errors.TPF22FPT   
There has also been a degree of “push-back” against viewing safety as a problem of 
system design. TPF23FPT  As Bovbjerg et al. point out, the patient safety movement is “...grounded in 
institutions and associations rather than a grass-roots response to liability-disciplinary fears 
among those practitioners affected by the accidents”.TPF24FPT  Among physicians, not all are convinced 
that the best explanation for medical error is systems failure, nor that the best way to respond is 
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by ending blame.TPF25FPT  Turning to patients and the public, patient safety advocates’ message that 
individual liability and fault-finding will actually impede progress in making health care safer 
has not found wide acceptance.  As William Sage wryly observed, tort reform that shields health 
care providers from legal liability “is not an intuitive solution to rampant medical error”.TPF26FPT  In a 
system which many characterized as “insiders protecting insiders”, people may simply consider 
systemic analysis to be another way to achieve exactly the same end.TP F27FPT  That conclusion is even 
more understandable given that patient safety advocates themselves acknowledge that, despite all 
the activity meant to reduce errors and make care safer, there has been little improvement.   
Responses to the IOM Report 
That is not to say that nothing was done in response to the IOM Report – quite the 
contrary.  The focus of this study is on the interactions between patient safety and the tort 
system, so other than a brief reference to some of the more significant developments, 
consideration of the many government, NGO and private sector initiatives that resulted will be 
limited to how they impact on or are affected by the operation of tort law.TPF28FPT 
(i) Federal: 
The U.S. Congress appropriated $50 million annually for patient safety research in 2001, 
launching hundreds of new investigators and studies in patient safety research; it also confirmed 
the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality as the lead federal agency to coordinate patient 
safety research. TPF29FPT  However, despite the IOM’s recommendation, there is no comprehensive 
national monitoring system, and while a number of federal agencies have mandates and priorities 
focused on patient safety, oversight is fragmented by clinical area or among agencies.TP F30FPT 
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Although there is no unified mechanism to collect data on adverse events or medical errors, or to 
aggregate data across multiple health settings, the passage of the federal Patient Safety and 
Quality Improvement Act in 2005 should facilitate sharing of data among patient safety 
organizations.TPF31FPT    
(ii) State: 
Mello and Brennan identify common themes from the many legislative and 
administrative initiatives that states undertook: they (1) established organizations to study patient 
safety, (2) provided for central repositories of data about adverse events, with mandatory or 
voluntary reporting systems, (3) adopted or strengthened confidentiality for information reported, 
(4) protected whistleblowers, (5) directly regulated structural elements significant for safety, 
such as staffing levels, (6) some created financial incentives such as discounts on hospital 
liability insurance for reductions in serious adverse events, (7) required disclosure of adverse 
events to patients, and (8) used their licensure authority to require facilities to improve safety.TP F32FPT  
Yet despite what seem to be wide-ranging responses, Mello and Brennan consider the state 
action to have been largely “...augmenting the information base for regulation, rather than 
deploying specific error-reducing interventions”. TPF33FPT 
 Further, as they point out, “...the base of evidence about effective safety-enhancing 
interventions is surprisingly thin”.TPF34FPT  There is little empirical evidence to inform decisions about 
what types of initiatives or regulation to pursue, and much of what is available measures 
effectiveness (i.e. what produces affirmative benefit), rather than safety (i.e. what prevents 
inadvertent harm to patients).  At present, there is neither a common understanding of what 
issues come within the concepts of medical error and patient safety, nor scientifically sound 
methods to measure errors and their causes.TPF35FPT  Nor is there agreement in the health care 
community on a standard set of patient safety measures.TPF36FPT  However, preventable adverse events 
are so widespread, and the harm they cause so great, that stakeholders often respond to the 
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imperative to take some action that could reasonably be expected to improve safety, even in the 
absence of robust evidence. 
(iii) Private Sector 
 The private sector, including both for-profit entities and non-profit NGO’s, plays a 
stronger role in patient safety initiatives in the United States than in other countries, acting in a 
number of capacities.  There are numerous research, policy and technical initiatives to support 
patient safety, led by an array of organizations and coalitions across the country.  I comment on 
three instances of private sector involvement with implications for the medical liability system:  
as regulator, as purchaser of health care services (including indirectly, through provision of 
health benefit plans to employees), and as contractor.  Each of these is discussed in more detail 
below.   
(a) Private Regulation:   
Non-profit organizations play a leading role in the accreditation of health care facilities.  
The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) accredits 
hospitals, nursing homes, home health and other facilities, and the National Committee on 
Quality Assurance (NCQA) accredits managed care plans and other providers.TPF37FPT  JCAHO 
remains heavily dominated by hospital and physician representatives.TPF38FPT  While facility 
accreditation is nominally voluntary, federal and state governments rely on JCAHO accreditation 
in their hospital licensure and Medicare/Medicaid certification programs, making it effectively 
mandatory.TPF39FPT  Government reliance on private accreditation rather than its own routine 
monitoring is explained on pragmatic grounds: the cost of the accreditation program is borne by 
the facilities rather than government, and private accreditation working with institutions in a 
consultative fashion is expected to achieve greater voluntary compliance.TPF40FPT 
 Even prior to the IOM Report, JCAHO had been active in patient safety initiatives, 
adopting a Sentinel Events reporting policy in 1996 to encourage facilities to report errors and 
root cause analyses to it.TPF41FPT  While loss of accreditation is a possibility if JCAHO learns of non-
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reporting, it is rare.TPF42FPT  The same can be said of reporting – it, too, is a rare occurrence, with only 
400 reports of sentinel events a year. TPF43FPT  JCAHO added a standard requiring disclosure of harm to 
affected patients in 2001, and in recent years, has continued to focus more of its accreditation 
standards on improving safety and quality.TPF44FPT  There has been no systematic evaluation of the 
effectiveness of its oversight.TPF45FPT  JCAHO itself notes that hospitals have identified its 
accreditation requirements as the major driver of their patient safety initiatives.TPF46FPT  However, 
JCAHO’s collaborative approach to the institutions it regulates has been criticized for being too 
accepting, “...slow to develop meaningful standards and reluctant to develop meaningful 
enforcement mechanisms”.TPF47FPT 
 Public and private regulation were integrated still further, as the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) (the federal agency responsible for managing health care quality for 
Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries) instituted a rule in 2003 requiring hospitals to develop 
quality assessment and performance improvement (QAPI) programs.TPF48FPT  To a great extent, CMS 
is relying on JCAHO’s accreditation process for evaluation of these programs; it has indicated 
that JCAHO surveys could provide grounds for CMS enforcement.TPF49FPT    
  What do the actions of private regulators have to do with the medical liability system?  
First, because of role they play in the health care system, they wield substantial  influence in 
debates about tort reform.  Second, they represent important accountability mechanisms at the 
interface of the public/private divide.  Third, some commentators have suggested that clinical 
guidelines and patient safety policies developed by health care organizations, professional 
associations and NGO’s such as JCAHO could influence determinations of the standard of care 
in clinical negligence litigation.  Arguments that compliance with guidelines and policies should 
serve as at least persuasive, if not definitive evidence that the standard of care was met are 
                                                 
TP
42
PT Furrow et al., supra, n. 39 at 58. 
TP
43
PT JCAHO 05, supra, n.19.   
TP
44
PT RAND Report, supra, n.30 at 27 (almost half JCAHO’s accreditation standards are directly related to safety); 
Furrow et al, supra, n.42. 
TP
45
PT Mello & Brennan 05, supra n.32 at 382, note that the AHRQ concluded it was “reasonable to assume” JCAHO’s 
contribution was positive. 
TP
46
PT JCAHO, supra n.19 at 9, citing Devers, K., Pham, H., Liu, G., “What is driving hospitals’ patient-safety efforts?”, 
(2004) 23(2) Health Affairs . 
TP
47
PT Furrow, B., “Medical Mistakes:  Tiptoeing Towards Safety”, (2003) 3 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 181-217 at 209. 
TP
48
PT White, supra, n.29 at 51; RAND Report, supra, n.30 at 28: QAPI’s are to include systemic examination of 
hospitals’ programs, and quality improvement projects 
TP
49
PT Ibid., 60-62;  
 86
familiar in malpractice litigation.TPF50FPT  However, as the patient safety movement’s findings about 
the extent of error become widely disseminated and more patient safety standards are developed 
by JCAHO and other organizations, arguments may also be raised that hospitals’ or physicians’ 
failure to comply is evidence that care was substandard, or that systems to prevent error and 
protect patients from harm were inadequate.TPF51FPT  Private regulators’ patient safety standards could 
be accepted by courts as the legal norm for institutions and practitioners. 
(b) Private Purchasing:  
American commentators and policymakers see great potential in the ability of health care 
purchasers and payers (including government) to exert pressure to bring about change.TPF52FPT  While 
individual consumers/patients cannot realistically do so, larger entities can, essentially enforcing 
accountability for standards they set via market mechanisms, i.e. the negative threat to take their 
business elsewhere, or the positive incentive of increased remuneration for meeting safety 
targets. Capitalizing on their greater role in the United States, buyers have started to become 
more assertive in demanding improvements in patient safety.  The most notable example of 
concerted action by purchasers of health care was the creation of the Leapfrog Group in 2000.  It 
is a coalition of major employers and other large private and public healthcare purchasers that 
provide health care benefits to more than 37 million people, and was formed to mobilize 
employer purchasing power to reduce preventable medical errors.TPF53FPT  It chose 3 main goals for 
hospitals to achieve, based on their expected effects on preventing error and saving lives: 
implementing computerized physician order entry; concentrating highly technical surgery 
services in high volume centres; and specialized staffing in intensive care units.TPF54FPT  Some of these 
goals have been controversial because of the high costs of implementation, shortages of 
specialists, and limited access to care in areas without the specified volume of procedures; 
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Leapfrog has since revised its standards somewhat as a result.TP F55FPT   Mello and Brennan, while 
generally supportive of initiatives such as Leapfrog, question whether the standards it set, albeit 
easy to measure, are the most effective approaches to improving safety; this in turn raises 
questions about whether the costs of compliance are justified.TPF56FPT    
(c) Private Contracting:   
With radical tort reform stymied by lack of political will and powerful stakeholder 
interests, some commentators have proposed that private organizations such as hospitals supplant 
the tort system by simply adopting alternative compensation systems as part of their contracts 
with employers/patient groups to provide health care.TPF57FPT  Contracting out of the tort system entails 
complex issues that are beyond the scope of this study.  However, the proposal does raise 
intriguing possibilities, not just for private entities, but also for government in the United States, 
since government funded Medicare and Medicaid programs are major components of health care 
spending in the United States.   
 
Assessing the Tort System 
Americans courts and commentators identify the same three purposes of the tort system 
as elsewhere in the common law world:  deterrence, compensation, and corrective justice.  
Assessment of the tort system’s performance is also similar across jurisdictions:  it is not 
considered to perform any of these functions particularly well.TPF58FPT  This assessment is explained in 
more detail below.  American academic commentary emphasizes the deterrent role of tort law 
more than other common law jurisdictions, an approach influenced not just by law and 
economics scholars, but also by scholarship that focuses more broadly on the role of law in 
regulating human conduct and safety.TPF59FPT  That orientation has influenced recommendations for 
reform.   
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(i) Compensation 
  Few people who have valid claims arising from their medical care sue, and fewer still 
actually receive compensation.TPF60FPT  The graphic analogies in the IOM Report – that the death toll 
from medical error was equivalent to a jumbo jet crashing each day -- made the extent of medical 
error and the gravity of the harm it causes very clear.  While most errors are not caused by 
negligence in the legal sense, a significant portion are – many more than give rise to lawsuits, 
and substantially more again than ever result in awards of damages.  The Harvard Medical 
Practice Study estimated that 8 times as many patients suffered an injury from negligence as 
filed a malpractice claim in New York state, and about 16 times as many patients suffered an 
injury from negligence as received compensation from the tort liability system.TPF61FPT  The barriers to 
litigation are formidable – cost, delay, uncertainty, information assymetries that leave some 
patients unaware their injuries were caused by errors rather than their underlying illness, and 
difficulties in meeting legal tests for causation and fault.TPF62FPT  The tort system is criticized not just 
because it is poor at compensating people injured in the course of treatment (which is not its 
goal), but because it is not well equipped even to compensate people who have been injured by 
negligence.  This is especially troubling in light of the scale of negligent error that occurs. 
(ii) Corrective Justice 
Liability for negligence is premised on personal responsibility to make good the harm 
caused by one’s wrongdoing.  Liang and Ren contend that in the context of medical liability, this 
has translated into one prevalent philosophy: “punish the last person to touch the patient”.TP F63FPT  The 
underlying premise in clinical negligence litigation is the traditional one that “practitioners are in 
charge, need to be held personally responsible, and should take the primary blame for injuries”.TPF64FPT  
However, that model no longer accurately reflects the organization of health care, given 
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advances in technological capabilities, changes in care delivery, effects of cost constraints on 
clinical decision-making, pressure to maintain revenues, and other factors. The individual focus 
in much malpractice litigation misses the mark in important ways, particularly in light of the 
IOM’s compelling argument that the causes of error in health care are most often systemic, and 
not individual. Tort law, however, is not concerned with identifying all, or even the most 
significant causes of injury.  Its concern is with the defendant before the court; analysis need 
only start and end there.  In order to establish liability, a plaintiff need only demonstrate that he 
or she caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s injury.   
(iii) Deterrence  
Commentators agree that the tort system underperforms in deterring future harm.  After 
an extensive review of the empirical evidence, Mello and Brennan could only find   “limited 
evidence” that malpractice litigation has a deterrent effect.TPF65FPT  Several features of the medical 
liability system contribute.    
(a) Misaligned Incentives 
Even solid supporters of the tort system concur with this assessment, although they argue 
that it could be made more effective if its incentives for behavioural change were altered to shift 
the risk of liability from individual health care providers to health care institutions.TPF66FPT  They 
consider tort’s deterrent signals to be not only piecemeal, but misdirected, because responsibility 
for the costs of making improvements in safety is generally borne by hospitals and other health 
care institutions, but the benefits (in terms of reduced injuries and reduced liability costs) are 
reaped by patients and providers.TPF67FPT  Aligning the incentives to make care safer would strengthen 
the “business case for safety”.TPF68FPT   
(b) Under and Overdeterrence 
Tort law is criticized for both underdeterring unsafe care and for overdeterrence.  Tort is 
said to underdeter because so few instances of clinical negligence actually result in litigation; as 
a result, the deterrent signals tort gives are weak and not always consistent.  On the other hand, 
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many physicians overestimate the risk of being sued, and may alter their practices in ways that 
are unnecessary and inappropriate.TPF69FPT Although “chronic defendants” often rely on the latter 
argument to bolster calls for tort reform, robust evidence of such practices has been lacking. TPF70FPT  It 
is difficult to isolate defensive medicine; practitioners may order tests and procedures for 
complex and intertwined reasons, including not only fear of litigation, but also legitimate risk 
reduction for the patient, response to patient demand, reimbursement incentives, habit, and 
others.TPF71FPT  However, recent research suggests that defensive medicine is widespread, especially in 
high-risk specialties.TPF72FPT  To the extent it occurs – for instance, ordering tests or performing 
diagnostic procedures of low predictive value, or aggressively treating low-risk conditions – 
defensive medicine may have the perverse effect of raising the legal standard of care, by making 
this level of response the new norm. TPF73FPT        
(c) Inaccurate Results? 
Critics also argue that the tort system not only fails to compensate people who were 
injured by negligent care, but that it awards compensation to people even though they were not 
negligently injured.  The Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS) is often cited in support of 
this conclusion. TPF74FPT  If the charge is accurate, the deterrent signals in judgments finding care 
negligent would be an unreliable guide to future conduct.  Physicians in particular view the 
outcomes in medical malpractice litigation as haphazard, rather than reflecting accurate 
judgments about whether care was substandard.TPF75FPT  Their conclusions are likely reinforced when 
legal scholars and organizations such as JCAHO do the same.TPF76FPT  For instance, writing in 2005, 
Mello and Brennan acknowledge that studies confirm that patients who are injured by negligence 
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are more likely than others to sue, and also that the tort system does a “fairly good job” of 
compensating meritorious claims.TPF77FPT  However, later in the same article, they comment that 
providers perceive malpractice litigation as punitive, and critique it for the “well demonstrated 
mismatch of claims and negligent adverse events”.TPF78FPT  They do not explain that the mismatch is 
between the many negligently caused injuries and the small number of successful lawsuits, rather 
than between findings of negligence and treatment that met the standard of care. A recent review 
of closed claims confirmed that, although claims with no evidence of error are not uncommon, 
most of these are denied compensation.  Further, most claims that involved injuries due to error 
did result in compensation.TPF79FPT  However, the claims process was lengthy (5 years on average), and 
costly – for every dollar spent on compensation, 54 cents went to administrative expenses.  
Criticizing the tendency to overstate how frequently incorrect attributions of negligence 
are made in malpractice litigation, Baker demonstrates that the HMPS finding that many medical 
malpractice claims do not involve negligence “rests on a small and precarious empirical base”.  
He cites a number of more recent studies that contradict the HMPS conclusion; they establish 
that medical malpractice claims handling “appropriately filters out most non-meritorious cases”, 
and that the presence or absence of negligence most strongly explains both the likelihood and 
size of payment to the plaintiff. TP F80FPT  Hyman and Silver, too, undertake to rehabilitate tort law, 
arguing that the prospect of liability restrains providers and institutions, keeping them from 
acting primarily out of self-interest by threat of payment and sanctions. While the civil justice 
system is a very inefficient way to bring about behavioural change, they conclude that liability 
does make a “modest positive contribution to patient safety”.TPF81FPT  It could be improved by (i) 
shifting more liability to institutions, since they have greater capacity to implement the systemic 
improvements needed to reduce errors, and to monitor and control practitioners so they adhere to 
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safe practices; and (ii) linking providers’ compensation to measurable improvements in keeping 
patients safer, and better informed when things have gone wrong – i.e. pay for performance.TPF82FPT  
(iv) Anaesthesia – a Tort Success Story 
There is general agreement that the prospect of tort liability has clearly spurred 
physicians to make their practices safer in a few instances.  Anaesthesia is one.  In the mid-
1980’s, the American Society of Anaesthesiologists (ASA), motivated by professional unrest 
over large increases in malpractice insurance premiums, interest in reducing injuries that led to 
claims, and negative publicity, began a review of closed claims.TPF83FPT  Mello and Brennan recount 
that the objective of the study was not to address the incidence of adverse events per se, but to 
identify the major types of injuries that resulted in claims, and design strategies to improve 
patient safety.TPF84FPT   The result was a    “resounding success”, dramatically decreasing adverse 
events and deaths associated with anaesthesia.TPF85FPT   
Hyman and Silver argue that this demonstrates both that external pressure plays an 
important role in compelling practitioners to protect patients (since the profession had long 
known these types of injuries were preventable, but did not mount a concerted response until 
compelled by liability and negative publicity), and that an effective “feedback loop” can exist 
between litigation and health care quality.TPF86FPT  Sage, too, concludes that  “innovation that improves 
safety often happens in the shadow of liability”.TPF87FPT  Mello and Brennan, however, argue that, 
although practitioners “considered patient safety a good risk management strategy” before the 
HMPS study raised doubts about the accuracy of negligence determinations, the context has 
changed; now, providers “seek merely to limit their liability”.TPF88FPT  Consequently, they believe the 
anaesthesia experience, in which tort liability did spur significant improvements in patient safety, 
is not likely to be repeated.   
 
Background to Current Tort Reforms 
(i) Context   
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While progress in improving patient safety has been limited, there has been a great deal 
of action on tort reform.  Medical malpractice law operates at the state and not federal level, so 
tort regimes are not uniform nation-wide. Given the heavy toll errors take on patients and the 
high costs they impose on society, one might have expected that medical liability reform would 
be linked to initiatives to improve the safety of health care.  Civil litigation has, after all, 
remained the primary means to address claims of medical error in the United States for many 
years.TP F89FPT Most obviously, reducing errors and the injuries that result would mean patients had less 
reason to sue, but this was not the focus of legislative reform or lobbying.TPF90FPT  Although “[l]egal 
reform and improved patient safety seem inextricably intertwined...none of the traditional 
approaches to liability reform...aim to break this cycle.  Instead, they all primarily seek to help 
medical professionals and their liability insurers rather than patients and patient safety 
improvement efforts”.TPF91FPT  Tort reform was undertaken in response to the most recent wave of 
increases in medical liability insurance premiums, not to address patient safety concerns.TPF92FPT  The 
American Medical Association declared malpractice reform its top legislative priority, with at 
least 20 states in a malpractice “crisis”, and another 24 at risk. TPF93FPT  As with the preceding two 
malpractice insurance crises, changes to the law were primarily aimed at reducing the frequency 
and severity of claims. TP F94FPT  
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 Recounting that history, Sage notes that in the 1960’s, what had been a stable malpractice 
climate and insurance environment changed, as litigation against physicians increased.TP F95FPT  The 
1970’s were characterized by a “crisis of availability” in medical liability insurance as claims 
frequency and severity rose rapidly; state legislatures responded with “generous” tort reform, and 
also took direct measures to ensure access to insurance, such as establishing joint underwriting 
associations.  The 1980’s saw a “crisis of affordability”, marked by steep increases in the price of 
insurance, rather than unavailability per se; in response, the medical profession successfully 
obtained tort reform in most states that had not previously enacted it.  In the relatively long 
periods of stability between malpractice insurance crises, both courts and legislatures steadily 
expanded liability, as they tended to do with other industries.TPF96FPT  Another malpractice insurance 
crisis emerged in the late 1990’s and continues to the present time.TP F97FPT  Commentators argue that it 
is more severe, and is certainly different in character than its predecessors. TPF98FPT  A number of 
factors have combined to distinguish this insurance crisis   from those that preceded it, including 
advances in medical technology (increasing medicine’s capacity both to treat and to err, and 
raising patients expectations);  industrialization in health care driving structural changes in care 
delivery; the impact of cost containment; and the real possibility that access to care will be 
affected as the cost of insurance increases. The responses, though, have been familiar; Sage 
characterizes these as “more of the same, plus a heavy dose of patient safety rhetoric”.TPF99FPT   
(ii) Medical Malpractice, Liability Insurance and Health Policy: 
 Sage argues that for too long, both the debate over medical liability reform and the 
political process in the United States have been characterized by what he terms “malpractice 
exceptionalism”, i.e. a sense of a sharp divide between medical liability and other issues in health 
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system design. TPF100FPT  This has seriously affected the ability to link patient safety to risk 
management within health care organizations.  As he says, “Physician defendants are happiest if 
few claims arise, fewer claims are validated by verdict or settlement, still fewer claims are 
publicized.  Accordingly, the prudent insurer and its counsel urge secrecy, dispute fault, deflect 
responsibility and make it as slow, and expensive as possible for plaintiffs to continue the 
fight”.TPF101FPT  There is little summary information available about the actions of health insurers to 
address patient safety issues and performance as part of their contracts with providers.TPF102FPT  
However, Sage argues that liability insurance must be understood as a component of the health 
system, and  re-configured in that light.   
I. Tort Reform:  Limiting the Size and Risk of Judgment   
The tort reforms most sought by medical interest groups are caps on damages, collateral 
source offset provisions, shorter limitation periods, and limits on plaintiffs’ attorneys’ 
compensation.TPF103FPT  Furrow et al. divide the measures adopted in various states into four groups:TP 
F
104
FPT   
(1) reducing claims, via shortened limitation periods, controls on legal fees, and other means;  
(2) limiting compensation paid to plaintiffs, most powerfully by (i) caps on damages awards 
applicable to either the non-pecuniary portion of compensation or the total recovery (as at April, 
2006, 26 states had some form of damages cap, primarily on the non-economic component of 
lossTPF105FPT), but also including (ii) collateral offset provisions that require or allow reduction of 
damages awards by the amount of other compensation; (iii) allowing or requiring courts to order 
damages payable by periodic payments rather than a lump sum; (iv) ending joint and several 
liability; 
(3) altering the plaintiff’s burden of proof, such as heightened requirements for expert witnesses; 
and  
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(4) altering the role of the courts, for instance by mandating pre-trial screening devices or 
mediation. TPF106FPT  
Despite the many reforms, their effect on the rapid increases in medical liability insurance 
premiums has been limited. TPF107FPT  In a 2006 study, Mello reports strong evidence that caps on 
noneconomic damages reduced the average size of awards by 20 to 30%, but not the frequency 
of claims.  They have disadvantages for patient safety and equity considerations.  Other tort 
reforms have shown little impact.TPF108FPT 
 Legislative initiatives that limit liability have in some instances been countered by   
initiatives that could impose greater sanctions on practitioners.  For instance, in what appears to 
be a legislative tug-of-war, voters in Florida passed a constitutional amendment in 2004 that 
would prohibit physicians found to have committed three or more incidents of medical 
malpractice (based on “clear and convincing evidence” before a court or administrative agency 
such as the state board of medicine) from being licensed to practice medicine in the state.TPF109FPT  
This initiative was reportedly championed by Florida trial lawyers in response to an aggressive 
tort reform campaign by the Florida Medical Association to cap non-economic damages in 
medical malpractice cases at $250,000.TPF110FPT  Commentators expect the new provision to increase 
pressure to settle cases prior to any final determination (whether well-founded or not), to avoid 
application of the “three strikes and you’re out” law.  Tort reform in the United States is highly 
politicized, with well organized and sophisticated pressure groups on all sides.   
Some reforms are meant to align incentives between malpractice and patient safety 
regimes.  In Pennsylvania, medical malpractice reforms were accompanied by the first state-wide 
system requiring reports of adverse events that harmed patients, near-misses and infrastructure 
failures to a central authority, as well as written disclosure of serious adverse events to patients, 
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and imposing penalties for failure to do so. TPF111FPT  Provisions shielding error reports from use in civil 
litigation depend on compliance with the state reporting system.TPF112FPT 
II.  Tort Reform:  No-Fault Administrative Compensation 
 Replacing tort liability with administrative systems to determine compensation on a no-
fault basis had been proposed even before the IOM’s 1999 Report.  Proponents argue that they 
provide a fairer way to compensate injured patients, avoid the damaging effects of adversarial 
civil litigation, and reduce malpractice insurance premiums.TP F113FPT   However, no-fault 
compensation schemes have been implemented in only a few instances for narrowly defined 
categories of injuries.  In 1987 and 1988, Virginia and Florida enacted administrative 
compensation systems for certain severely injured newborn babies. TPF114FPT  They did so out of 
concern about rising malpractice insurance premiums for obstetricians in particular, which were 
thought to threaten patients’ access to obstetric care.TPF115FPT  When litigated, these types of cases 
typically involve high claims for compensation, take a long time to resolve, and are 
unpredictable in outcome.  Both states narrowly limit eligibility for compensation, and while 
both provide broad benefits, they are more limited than those potentially available in a successful 
tort claim.TPF116FPT  Bovbjerg nonetheless maintains that compensation levels claimants actually 
receive are comparable to those in the tort system.TPF117FPT Eligibility is determined administratively; 
benefits are paid as expenses accrue, and are secondary to other sources of compensation. 
Virginia requires referral of practitioners who have been the subject of a claim to the state 
medical board, but claims are not reported to the National Practitioner Databank.TPF118FPT  Physician 
participation is voluntary; funding is raised by levies on hospitals and physicians; participating 
physicians pay higher levies.TPF119FPT  Evaluation of the programs is hampered by the small number of 
claims that qualify, and claims have been too infrequent to draw lessons for patient safety 
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purposes.TPF120FPT  “Leakage” of cases to the tort system, adequacy of future funding, and provider and 
hospital reluctance to tell parents about the programs have been identified as concerns.TPF121FPT   
A federal no-fault compensation system, the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 
1986, was also created because of concerns that open-ended tort liability was causing too many 
manufacturers to stop producing vaccines, threatening access. TPF122FPT  Claimants are automatically 
compensated if the injury they suffer is one of the listed side effects in the Vaccine Injury Table; 
otherwise, they must prove that the vaccine caused or significantly aggravated their condition, 
but need not establish fault.  Again, benefits are broad, but more limited than those recoverable 
in a successful tort claim.  Claims are determined before a federal court officer.  Claimants who 
are unsuccessful, or who do not accept the compensation offered, can still sue in tort, but must 
proceed in federal court.TPF123FPT  Evaluation has been largely positive with respect to both the process 
and the scheme’s effect on stabilizing the vaccine market.TPF124FPT   
III.  Tort Reform:  Shielding Information from Disclosure in Litigation  
Some commentators go beyond criticizing the medical liability system’s shortcomings on 
the compensation, deterrence and corrective justice fronts to castigate it as inimical to and in 
conflict with basic patient safety premises.  Patient safety advocates consider it essential that 
errors be reported, so that providers can investigate mistakes and learn how to prevent them in 
the future. JCAHO concludes that the “tort system inspires suppression”.TPF125FPT  Brennan, a 
physician, lawyer, and lead investigator on the HMPS investigative team, writes of the “dead 
weight of the legal system” holding hospitals back from embarking on error prevention 
programs.TPF126FPT  Don Berwick, a leading patient safety advocate and the force behind the 100,000 
Lives Campaign, reportedly refers to the tort system as “poison” to openness and honesty.TPF127FPT 
Similar sentiments abound among patient safety advocates – that fears of legal liability sparked 
                                                 
TP
120
PT Sloan, supra, n. 115 at 56, 63:  72 claimants paid in 15 years in Virginia; 161 claimants paid in 14 years in 
Florida, as at 2002. 
TP
121
PT Ibid., at 58; Bovbjerg 05, supra, n.51 at 484. 
TP
122
PT National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Title III of Public Law 99-660, 42 USC Sec. 300a-1 et seq.; 
Bovbjerg, 05, supra, n.51 at 483. 
TP
123
PT Ibid. (Bovbjerg) at 484; Furrow et al., supra, n.39 at 492. 
TP
124
PT Ibid. (Bovbjerg) at n.98 and references cited therein. 
TP
125
PT JCAHO, supra, n.19 at 11. 
TP
126
PT Brennan, T., “The IOM Report:  Could It Do Harm?”, (2000) 342 NEJM 1123; see also Bov 05, 479, 
commenting that it is difficult to implement patient safety fully in the shadow of liability 
TP
127
PT Bovbjerg 05, supra, n.51 at 479. 
 99
by the tort system drive errors underground and impede efforts to improve patient safety.  
Physician and lawyer William Sage captures the irony in this position well:  
“For decades, the medical profession denounced malpractice suits on the ground that few 
true quality problems existed.... patient safety gurus prov[ed] the profession wrong.  Nonetheless, 
these reformers echo the ‘no lawyers’ refrain of the very physicians whose overconfidence they 
exposed, although they argue against liability not because the health care system is perfect, but 
because it can only become so if sheltered from outside scrutiny”.TPF128FPT 
Protecting reports about errors and quality assurance (QA) information from disclosure in 
legal proceedings and to patients became the second major focus of tort reform, vigorously 
lobbied for by patient safety advocates as well as its traditional supporters, organized medicine 
and malpractice insurers.TPF129FPT  This section analyzes developments in the law governing reporting 
(providing information to oversight bodies) and disclosure (providing information to patients and 
families).     
(i) Error Reporting Systems 
 Many states have implemented voluntary or mandatory reporting systems for adverse 
events, and also adopted or expanded peer review protection for information disclosed or 
gathered in connection with quality assurance activities, preventing its use in medical 
malpractice lawsuits, and sometimes more broadly.  Following the IOM Report and the most 
recent round of increases in malpractice insurance premiums, more states imposed mandatory 
reporting systems (23 states by 2005), while acceding to renewed pressure by providers for 
stronger protection of reported data from disclosure in legal proceedings.TPF130FPT  The Institute of 
Medicine had proposed a system for mandatory reporting of serious adverse events with 
significant public access, stating that “requests for confidentiality and protection from liability 
seem inappropriate in this context”.TPF131FPT  It also recommended confidential, voluntary reporting 
systems for near misses and errors that caused minor or moderate injuries. TPF132FPT  Most states have 
enacted protections from disclosure that provide more expansive protection than this.TPF133FPT  A 2003 
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study prepared for the National Academy for State Health Policy reviews various types of state 
confidentiality provisions in place, ranging from peer review protection (the most vulnerable to 
challenge) to inclusion as an integral part of a reporting system established by statute (the most 
reliable protection).TPF134FPT  It points out that, despite provider concerns, it is unclear whether 
reporting actually does lead to increased litigation.TPF135FPT    
  Neither voluntary nor mandatory reporting systems have been particularly  effective at 
surfacing errors.  The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, for 
instance, has had a voluntary Sentinel Events Reporting policy in place since 1996. However, it 
receives only about 400 new reports of sentinel events (i.e. serious adverse events) each year – 
nowhere near the 44,000-98,000 error-related deaths (let alone the far more numerous injuries) 
that the IOM estimated occurred annually.TPF136FPT  State systems that require mandatory error 
reporting are also plagued by under-reporting, facilitated by ease of avoidance and failure to 
sanction non-compliance. TPF137FPT TP PT he newest generation of mandatory reporting systems attempts to 
rectify this: some broaden reporting requirements to include near misses as well as adverse 
events that caused harm, and impose penalties for non-compliance.  While they also shield 
information from use in legal proceedings, protection may not be absolute, but conditional on 
compliance with the statutory reporting system in order to encourage compliance.TPF138FPT  The extent 
of protection afforded by the state systems varies and can give rise to tension.  Providers and 
institutions want broad protection; state governments may be prepared to protect information 
from disclosure in civil litigation, but may want to use it in the course of regulatory proceedings 
or in connection with licensure or facility accreditation.TPF139FPT  There are also conflicts between the 
need for data specificity in order to make reports useful, and legal requirements to aggregate data 
to protect privacy.TPF140FPT  This, too, can affect compliance.   
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Reports alone will not prevent errors.  In order to be effective, reporting systems must be 
adequately resourced to analyze data properly, disseminate lessons learned, and ensure 
compliance.TPF141FPT  Health care institutions also need sufficient resources to respond adequately to 
advice received.  Wachter and Shojania note that at one point, JCAHO was pressured to declare a 
temporary moratorium on new sentinel event alerts (identifying clear and present dangers) until 
the old ones had been cleared away, because hospitals did not have the resources to respond. TP F142FPT  
State systems’ focus on improving performance following events reported has been weak, and 
the reporting systems themselves are vulnerable to financial pressure occasioned by shrinking 
budgets and political opposition.TPF143FPT  
The federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act, which came into force in 2005, 
is meant to address concerns about whether errors and analyses reported to a third party, such as 
a state agency or JCAHO, are entitled to legal privilege protections.TPF144FPT Citing the IOM Report, 
the importance of supporting a non-punitive culture of learning, and the superiority of voluntary 
reporting systems to do so, the statute provides broad protections from use in civil, criminal and 
administrative proceedings at the federal, state and local levels for reports of patient safety 
information to and among patient safety organizations.   
It is unclear whether increasing protection from disclosure for data about errors and 
patient injury will actually lead to an increase in reporting.TPF145FPT  The causes of under-reporting are 
broader and more complex than concerns about legal liability.  Once  powerful stakeholders 
achieve strong statutory protections, they are difficult to repeal.TPF146FPT  Consequently, Marchev 
suggests that states enacting such provisions would be wise to include sunset provisions in the 
legislation to ensure review of their effectiveness.  If under-reporting persists, it may be 
necessary to change strategies to boost compliance. TPF147FPT  
(ii) Disclosure to Patients 
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 It is widely recognized that there is an ethical obligation to disclose harm to patients.TPF148FPT  
Disclosure is urged on the grounds of moral obligation, and also as an important component of 
the culture of openness needed to establish safe systems.  JCAHO’s accreditation standards have 
required disclosure of sentinel events and other unanticipated outcomes of care to patients since 
2001. TPF149FPT  Nonetheless, disclosure by either institutions or providers is not widespread.TPF150FPT  
JCAHO reports that in a recent study, half the hospitals surveyed were reluctant to comply with 
this standard because of fear of medical liability lawsuits.TPF151FPT  Even with many states enacting 
laws that prohibit relying on apologies as an admission of liability in legal proceedings, JCAHO 
reports that if disclosure is extended to include the offer of an apology, hospitals and physicians 
“...are even more likely to gravitate to traditional ‘defend and deny’ behaviors”.TPF152FPT  Evaluating 
progress 5 years after the IOM Report, patient safety leaders Leape and Berwick expressed the 
hope that the “ethically embarrassing debate over disclosure of injuries to patients” is fading, but 
acknowledged that “actual practice still lags far behind rhetoric”.TPF153FPT  While JCAHO certainly has 
a model of what should occur, Sage notes that no models have yet been developed to 
successfully implement disclosure of adverse events to patients.TPF154FPT   
Some states have made disclosure of adverse events to patients mandatory.TPF155FPT  However, 
both the structure of patient safety programs and laws cloaking QA activities in secrecy can 
make it even more difficult for patients to get information about what happened to them and 
why.  As Bovbjerg notes, the safety-reform movement “favors internal openness, largely 
surrounded by an external wall to shut out injured patients and their lawyers”.TPF156FPT  A 2005 study 
of patients with health problems in six countries confirms that patients are still often kept in the 
dark about medical error.  Of the patients surveyed in the U.S., 22% reported having experienced 
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an error in their medical care or medication, and of those, 75% had not been told about the 
mistake by doctors involved in their care, although for many, serious health problems resulted.TPF157FPT     
Disclosure is also promoted as a form of risk management, on the basis that open 
communication when things have gone wrong reduces the likelihood of litigation.TPF158FPT  While 
there is evidence that non-disclosure predisposes people to sue, Bovbjerg reports being able to 
find only one published study on the converse, i.e. that disclosure is associated with either 
reduced litigation or lower payments to injured patients.TP F159FPT   Beyond anecdotal experience that 
the effects of full disclosure are salutary, evidence that it bears a direct relationship to reducing 
the frequency and severity of claims is very limited. Particularly when patients have suffered 
serious harm, they may need to sue regardless of disclosure and apology, in order to offset the 
financial burden of their injuries.  This is especially likely in the United States, where there is no 
system of universal coverage for the costs of health care. 
  Increasing restrictions on the various avenues to access information about health care 
and the results of treatment can spark a backlash, as increasingly dissatisfied injured patients and 
consumers become more assertive in demands for disclosure of medical errors.TPF160FPT  Evidence of 
this can be seen in some recent state legislative initiatives.  For example, in Florida, a 
constitutional amendment passed in 2004 allows patients who suffered adverse events in the 
course of their care to access documentation about the incident and/ or similar incidents affecting 
other patients, including records of provider deliberations such as QA reviews. TPF161FPT  This is 
unlikely to be an isolated instance of efforts to circumvent increasingly stringent restrictions on 
access to information.    
(iii) Using Medical Malpractice Information To Improve Patient Safety 
Despite its antipathy towards the tort system, JCAHO recognizes that claims information 
can provide important information about how patients are injured, and thus, could assist in 
improving quality and safety.TPF162FPT  However, access is limited, because most cases are settled on 
                                                 
TP
157
PT Schoen et al., supra, n.16 at W5-514. 
TP
158
PT See eg. JCAHO, supra, n.19 at 27. 
TP
159
PT Bovbjerg 05, supra, n.51 at 482. 
TP
160
PT Marchev, supra, n.94 at 11. 
TP
161
PT Greene, L., “Patients’ rights law narrowed”, St. Petersburg Times State (Apr. 29, 2005), online at:  




PT JCAHO 05, supra, n.19 at 37; see also Marchev, supra, n.94 at 11.   
 104
terms that require confidentiality.  Even when cases go to trial, access is available only for closed 
claims, entailing long delays.  JCAHO and others have called for changes to these rules to 
provide greater access to this data for patient safety purposes.  
Physicians named in medical liability judgments and settlements, as well as disciplinary 
actions must be reported to the National Practitioner Databank (NPDB).TPF163FPT Access to this 
information is limited:  hospitals and licensing boards can access it in order to track physician 
performance issues, but it is not available more widely – for instance, for use in medical 
malpractice litigation.   
Not surprisingly, there is disagreement about what use should be made of NPDB data.  
Patient advocates note that a small percentage of physicians are involved in a high proportion of 
payouts reported to the NPDB, and criticize the disparity between the incidence of payments in 
malpractice claims and the lack of disciplinary action or review by state licensing boards.TPF164FPT  
They consider this evidence that authorities are not being sufficiently vigilant in monitoring for 
problematic practitioners.  Critics of the NPDB consider this a simplistic and misleading 
analysis.TPF165FPT  JCAHO has called for the system to be redesigned or replaced, both because the 
information it contains is substantially incomplete, and because its focus on individual 
practitioners is incompatible with the patient safety movement’s focus on systemic analysis.TPF166FPT   
Many physicians argue that claims history is not useful in judging performance, and 
argue that the NDPB is effectively disseminating misinformation.  For instance, an insurer may 
settle a claim for economic reasons (the high costs of proceeding to trial), or because the 
plaintiff’s circumstances (age, extent of injuries, and other factors) were considered particularly 
sympathetic, even though the physician involved was not negligent.  Yet as Wachter recounts, 
that case will be reported to the NPDB, “which is checked every time the physician applies for a 
new job—much like sex offenders are obliged to register with the local police every time they 
move”.TPF167FPT  The analogy is flawed, but clearly conveys physicians’ resentment that NPDB data 
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informs external accountability mechanisms.  They consider it unfair, inaccurate, inappropriate 
and unnecessary.  Tying regulatory oversight to the medical liability system intensifies 
practitioners’ determination to resist findings of legal liability. TPF168FPT 
IV.  Proposals for More Radical Law Reform   
 Proposals have also been made for more radical restructuring of the medical liability 
system.  These involve substantial reform of one or more of the central attributes of the tort 
system, i.e. what constitutes a compensable event and eligibility; the measure of compensation; 
mechanisms for and sources of payment; and the forum for dispute resolution.TPF169FPT  The different 
approaches centre on (i) creating alternative mechanisms to compensate patients; (ii) resolving 
disputes through a “no fault” administrative system; and (iii) shifting liability from individuals to 
organizations.TPF170FPT    Elements of all three may be combined.   
(i) The Institute of Medicine:  Demonstration Projects 
 The Institute of Medicine called for a series of demonstration projects to test no-fault 
systems for injury compensation.TPF171FPT  It suggested that four or five states create non-judicial 
injury compensation systems that would be patient-centred and focused on enhancing safety.  
The aim was to develop systems that provided fair, reasonable, timely compensation for 
avoidable injuries to a greater number of patients, while stabilizing the malpractice insurance 
market by limiting health care providers’ financial exposure.  Two administrative models were 
proposed:TPF172FPT   
(1) Provider-based early payment, with limits on damages for self-insured or experience-rated 
provider groups that agreed to identify and promptly compensate patients for avoidable injuries, 
with state-set limits on compensation for pain and suffering, and backed by federal re-insurance; 
and 
(2) Statewide administrative resolution:  States would grant all health care providers immunity 
from most tort liability in exchange for mandatory participation in a state-sponsored 
administrative system to compensate patients for avoidable injuries. 
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These systems would incorporate incentives for health care providers to report and analyze 
medical mistakes, and involve patients in efforts to reduce errors.TP F173FPT  The demonstration projects 
recommended have not been implemented to date. 
(ii)  Voluntary Reform: 
In the absence of progress on state-wide demonstration projects, academic commentators 
and policy makers have continued to develop and promote reforms meant to integrate error 
prevention with better ways to compensate injured patients who have been harmed, adding 
“workarounds” that take into account constraints in the political environment that make 
substantial law reform highly unlikely.TPF174FPT  Some represent radical departures from tort law; 
others could be adapted to fit within the existing medical liability system.   Bovbjerg divides the 
alternatives into four categories: those that (i) voluntarily increase disclosure within the existing 
tort system; (ii) encourage disclosure by allowing defendants who make “early offers” to pay 
limited damages; (iii) replace tort with an administrative system of compensation; and (iv) use 
pre-determined lists of “avoidable classes of events” (ACE’s) as the basis for awards of 
compensation.TPF175FPT  JCAHO has also canvassed the alternative system reforms most frequently 
proposed: strict liability / no-fault administrative systems, preventable events (ACE’s), 
mediation-early offer, health courts, and enterprise liability.TPF176FPT  Its summary and assessment is 
included in Appendix A to this chapter.  Of the various options, the two that attract the most 
support are enterprise liability and administrative systems of compensation meant to replace the 
tort system. TPF177FPT    
(a) Enterprise Liability: 
Enterprise liability can co-exist with tort and no-fault systems.  It changes the locus of 
liability for patient injuries from individual physicians to hospitals or other health care 
institutions, without requiring major changes to other rules for proving liability and damages.  As 
in Canada, hospitals can already be held directly liable in negligence for breaches of the standard 
of care they owe patients, and vicariously liable for the negligence of employees.  Developments 
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in the law regarding corporate negligence, vicarious liability, and non-delegable duties of care in 
the United States  increasingly shift the locus of liability from non-employed physicians to 
hospitals.TPF178FPT  Consequently, moving to enterprise liability would not be such a radical departure 
from existing trends in American medical liability law. 
Enterprise liability fits with the philosophy of patient safety -- i.e. that the causes of most 
error are systemic, and solutions need to be as well.  Institutions, not individual practitioners, 
control systems of care and can effect such changes.  As a practical matter, institutions are better 
able to undertake systemic analysis, and also have the ability to plan and institute effective 
system-wide responses.  Enterprise liability is also favoured because it would both sharpen and 
better focus the deterrent signals sent by a finding of liability.  As explained previously, 
American commentators consider the lack of a compelling “business case for safety”(since 
hospitals must bear the costs of most patient safety improvements, but patients and providers 
reap the benefits in reduced injuries and decreased costs of error) a significant drawback to the 
current medical liability system.  Shifting to enterprise liability would align responsibility for the 
costs of safer systems with the prospect of benefiting from reduced liability, increasing the 
incentives for health care institutions to invest resources to make patient safety a priority.TPF179FPT 
Supporters of enterprise liability fine-tune their proposals further, with provision for measures 
such as experience-rated contributions to increase incentives for safety,TPF180FPT and “channeling”, 
which aggregates physicians into larger enterprises such as hospitals, and consolidates 
malpractice coverage in a single carrier.TPF181FPT 
Despite the appeal of being relieved of the prospect of individual liability, earlier 
proposals to move to a system of enterprise liability encountered strong opposition from 
organized medicine.TPF182FPT  Physicians are concerned about the loss of autonomy entailed in such a 
shift; they foresee professional control over clinical decision-making becoming subject to 
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institutional control.TPF183FPT  In reality, moves in that direction are already well advanced in the 
United States, with the rise of managed care organizations and their influence on the practice of 
medicine, the purchase of group medical practices by hospitals, and other developments that 
substantially affect the conduct of clinical practice.TPF184FPT  In any event, enterprise liability focused 
on shifting liability to hospitals was largely overtaken by events in the U.S., as managed care 
organizations rather than hospitals became the new locus of control over financing and delivery 
of care.TPF185FPT  Proposals for enterprise liability remain alive and well in debates over patient safety 
and tort reform. 
(b) No-Fault Administrative Systems: 
  Experience with administrative compensation systems for injuries caused by medical 
care in the United States has been very limited.  However, proponents envisage a broadly 
available alternative to the current fault-based system. The threshold for eligibility for 
compensation proposed would be avoidability of the injury, rather than negligence.TPF186FPT  Eligibility 
would be determined through administrative procedures; some proposals incorporate schedules 
of compensable injuries and events, and/or determination by specialized panels as well.TPF187FPT  
Administrative systems are compatible with enterprise liability, and can include provisions to 
encourage injury prevention, such as experience-rated contributions to the compensation fund 
and incentives for reporting error.TPF188FPT  Supporters recognize that, in order to ensure that “no-fault” 
does not mean no accountability, systems to ensure ongoing provider competence and quality 
would have to be revised and strengthened as well.TPF189FPT   
Critics of no-fault systems have raised concerns about cost. At present, many people who 
have suffered even serious injuries caused by clinical negligence do not sue.  Under a no-fault 
system, eligibility would be easier to establish, and more people would be compensated.  
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Opponents argue that either the cost of such a system would be prohibitive, or the level of 
compensation provided, particularly to those most seriously injured, would be seriously 
inadequate.TPF190FPT  Mehlman notes that the only examples of no-fault systems currently operative in 
the health care context in the United States involve situations where ensuring continued access 
had become a concern.  As noted previously, supporters nonetheless argue that on the whole, 
experience has been sufficently positive to warrant closer consideration. 
(c) Reform Without Law Reform   
  Increasingly, reformers are proposing ways to work around legislative inaction by 
developing alternative systems that could be implemented without substantial law reform.  They 
no longer seem to expect that any comprehensive alternative to the medical liability system can 
be enacted successfully in the current political environment.TPF191FPT  The entrenched interests arrayed 
on all sides of the debate on tort reform are simply too powerful and too divided.  Bovbjerg, for 
example, suggests that health care organizations implement one of the alternatives by contracting 
with patients (organized in groups to equalize bargaining power or through employer-provided 
health benefits plans, and protected by revamped consumer protection laws).TPF192FPT  Alternatively, 
“virtual” demonstration projects could be conducted, shadowing the experience of patients and 
determining what would have occurred had one of the alternatives been in place, in order to 
evaluate their performance.TPF193FPT  Taking a different approach to the idea of demonstration projects, 
Sage points out that the federal government could implement alternatives with a comprehensive 
restructuring of medical malpractice claims involving Medicare and Medicaid patients. TPF194FPT  This 
approach would enlist government support in its capacity as funder of health care services, rather 
than as lawmaker. 
Patients, Patient Safety and Medical Malpractice Litigation 
 Although patient safety advocates routinely acknowledge that patients are important 
partners in making care safer, such avowals are difficult to reconcile with lobbying for legislative 
change to keep more information confidential and inaccessible to patients.  The actual 
involvement proposed for patients is quite limited; they are usually directed to ask more 
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questions and report unusual occurrences in their care.TPF195FPT  However, patients may not know what 
to expect, or that they have been harmed by an adverse event.  Commentators caution against 
unrealistic and inappropriate plans to shift too much responsibility to sick patients to ensure there 
is no error in their care.TPF196FPT  Not only do they lack the practical support needed to assume this 
role, but recent research suggests that patients who are seen as more assertive and demanding run 
the risk of being met with defensive behaviour by physicians, perhaps extending beyond 
suspicion to confrontation and abandonment.TPF197FPT 
 Patients who have been injured in the course of treatment need compensation, especially 
when they are also responsible for the costs of the health care they require as a result of medical 
error.  Entitlement to compensation under the current system is fault-based, i.e. it requires proof 
that the injuries were the caused by negligence.  Most people will not be able to sue, given the 
high costs and unpredictability involved, and those that do face a difficult road, not made any 
easier by some of the legislative reforms sought in the name of patient safety.  As Bovbjerg 
notes, “...the public face of patient safety has not been friendly to injured patients”.TPF198FPT  This 
reality adds weight to the case for integrating efforts to improve both patient safety and 
compensation for injured patients. 
 The Public, Patient Safety and Medical Malpractice Litigation 
The IOM bypassed organized medicine and health administration by taking its message 
about the toll exacted by medical error directly to the public when it released To Err is Human.  
However, five years later, leading patient safety advocates Leape and Berwick concluded that 
public concern had proved “too evanescent” to sustain sufficient external pressure on the health 
care system to bring about change.TPF199FPT  Others disagree, and believe public and media attention to 
particularly egregious incidents has had a positive effect on patient safety.TPF200FPT  Returning to the 
example of anaesthesia described previously, one of the factors that prompted the ASA to 
undertake its analysis of patient injury was the intense media and public attention to a few cases 
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where error was apparent.  This suggests that public pressure can play a significant, if sporadic, 
role.TPF201FPT       
Sage comments that, without a climate of trust and effective internal and external 
controls, efforts to reduce practitioners’ legal liability will be strenuously resisted. TPF202FPT    The 
public wants to “retain avenues of self-help”, including litigation, even if realistically, the high 
costs and uncertainty preclude a lawsuit in all but a few cases.TPF203FPT  The threat of legal liability is 
still widely perceived as an important, even if theoretical pressure.   
Tort Law as Regulation: 
  As noted previously, American legal scholars tend to emphasize the deterrent functions 
of tort law.  Some take that position further, arguing that tort law should be understood as a form 
of regulation, defined broadly as the organized and deliberate leveraging of power or authority to 
effect changes in behaviour.TPF204FPT  From that viewpoint, tort is “part of an overall regulatory 
strategy” that sets standards of behaviour, monitors compliance and enforces those standards; its 
effectiveness is evaluated by how well it performs those functions.TPF205FPT  The focus then becomes 
determining how best to create synergies between public and private law to achieve desired 
goals.  While this argument has not yet been fully developed in the health law field, it has 
attracted some support in scholarship on tort reform and patient safety.TPF206FPT  Commenting on 
efforts to theorize tort law as regulation in regulatory scholarship generally, some 
Commonwealth writers caution that analyzing tort law exclusively through a regulatory lens 
distorts understanding.TPF207FPT  They accept that tort law certainly has instrumental and distributional 
effects (despite that not being its explicit orientation), and also that it is useful to assess tort law 
instrumentally.TPF208FPT  However, they argue that it is important to take account of tort law’s other 
purposes as well – both compensating those who have suffered harm, and imposing liability on 
the basis of interpersonal responsibility.  While resolving the larger debate on the applicability of 
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regulatory scholarship to areas of private law is outside the scope of this study, it is an important 
issue to bear in mind in decision-making about regulatory reform.   
Conclusion: 
 Although the Institute of Medicine intentionally set out to downplay the role of 
malpractice law in To Err Is Human,TPF209FPT experience over the six years since the release of that 
Report has made it clear that advancing the patient safety agenda requires careful attention to its 
interface with the medical liability system.  Law shapes the environment for the provision of 
health care, assessment of risks, and responses to adverse events by all concerned.  As such, it 
conditions the solutions that can be implemented.  Taking law into account means more than 
assessing the legal implications of different patient safety initiatives.  Bovbjerg and other writers 
are correct when they urge the patient safety movement to promote better compensation for 
patients who have been injured by medical error.TPF210FPT  Not only is it the right thing to do, but it is 
becoming apparent that without getting patients and the public behind reforms, there is little 
chance they will be implemented.  What patients and the public have seen instead are efforts to 
reduce compensation payable to injured patients and make it more difficult to recover, and to 
block access to information about their injuries that could assist in establishing entitlement.  
They will not support reforms that are, or are perceived to be, harmful to their interests. 
 The explicit attention to the ability of health care purchasers to influence health care 
providers to improve safety that is evident in much of the American literature presents intriguing 
possibilities in the Canadian environment, because of the existence of universal health insurance.  
Canadian governments are by far the largest funders of health care in the country, and their 
power is magnified by their position as single payer.  They also contribute substantial sums to 
the cost of physicians’ and hospitals’ liability coverage.  It would be useful to explore the 
possibility of linking targets for specific patient safety improvements in some way with funding 
health care or government subventions.  The ramifications of linking pay for performance in this 
way would be complex, and unintended consequences are likely to abound.  Further study would 
be essential prior to embarking on such a program. 
The assessment of physicians’ attitudes in much of the American literature is    discouraging – 
for doctors too, I expect. Sage describes it as follows:   
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“Doctors hate malpractice suits.  They hate them passionately and continuously.  Being sued 
becomes a recurring nightmare for many physicians, and occasionally an obsession.  Eliminating 
malpractice suits takes precedence over every other political objective – whether public-
interested or self-serving—for the American Medical Association and state medical societies.  
No contradictory belief, however well-reasoned, empirically based, or sincerely held, succeeds in 
crowding out antipathy toward malpractice from physicians’ minds.  Not the large number of 
patients who die unnecessarily each year from medical errors; not the desirability of allowing 
patients to sue HMOs for improper care”.TPF211FPT   
Such attitudes, staunchly maintained despite countervailing arguments, make the gulf between 
the medical profession and what patient safety advocates hope for and patients need immense.  It 
is difficult to craft solutions to bridge a gap of these dimensions. 
Would the situation improve if the prospect of malpractice liability were removed?  
Medical liability is such a force on the American scene that it understandably becomes the focal 
point of legal scholarship on patient safety and tort reform.  For supporters of radical tort reform, 
a no-fault or administrative compensation system can seem the answer to all their problems.  
However, unintended consequences need to be anticipated and taken into account as well. 
 Proposals to move to a system of no-fault compensation have attracted a great deal of 
support from scholars and leaders in the patient safety field over the years.  All are quick to agree 
that any such move would have to be accompanied by strengthened provisions for professional 
oversight and discipline, in order to ensure that practitioners can still be held accountable. This 
will not be as straightforward as seems to be assumed.  Much American writing has been so 
focused on criticizing the tort system and hammering home its shortcomings that relatively little 
attention has been directed to how alternative systems to ensure continuing individual 
accountability would operate.  Most seem to assume some variation on a discipline system that 
would cull the really bad apples, i.e. cases of “true” incompetence, incapacity, or repeated and 
unjustified refusal to follow safe procedures.  Even less attention has been devoted to the likely 
effects of a reduced and re-oriented discipline system on providers’ willingness to disclose errors 
and otherwise participate in a more open system. 
I suggest that, based on experience in other countries, both these issues require 
considerably more attention.  The question of when providers’ conduct crosses the line and 
should be referred to professional discipline proceedings or have employment repercussions is 
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highly contentious.TPF212FPT  Nor will removing tort liability automatically result in changed behaviour 
by practitioners and institutions, such that they openly disclose and discuss errors that have 
occurred.  Provider resistance should not be underestimated.  In New Zealand, which abandoned 
tort liability for personal injury more than 30 years ago, health care practitioners have still felt 
threatened by the prospect of professional disciplinary or employment sanctions, and have not 
been forthcoming about patients harmed by medical error.TPF213FPT  The reasons for non-disclosure are 
far more complex and multi-faceted than simple fear of legal liability.  If a no-fault system is not 
seen to impose meaningful accountability on institutions and providers, then it will not attract 
public support; at the same time, if it cannot reassure practitioners that accountability will not 
revive blame, shame and punishment in another forum, it will meet with significant opposition 
from them. 
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CHAPTER 4.   UNITED KINGDOM 
I.  THE TORT SYSTEM AND REFORM 
The principles of negligence law are broadly the same in the United Kingdom as in 
Canada, although their interpretation and application differ somewhat. The focus of this chapter 
is on the laws of England.  Continuing dissatisfaction with the system for resolving claims of 
clinical negligence, particularly in medical malpractice cases, has prompted a number of reviews 
of the civil justice system, and reform to procedural law in particular.  These are reviewed in 
more detail below, in order to understand their import for the conduct of negligence claims and 
for patient safety initiatives.  
Structure of Medical Malpractice Claims   
 While doctrinal tort law is similar in the two countries, there are differences in the 
structure and funding of malpractice litigation.  First, with respect to structure:  most medical 
treatment in the U.K. is carried out by the National Health Service (NHS) and is publicly funded.  
Since the introduction of NHS Indemnity in 1990, the NHS has been legally responsible for 
claims of medical negligence made against its employees, including physicians.TPF1FPT  The NHS does 
not seek contribution from the employee.TPF2FPT  Hospitals are vicariously liable for the negligence of 
their employees, and directly liable for their own negligence, but the incentive to shift blame and 
therefore, responsibility for paying damages, to an independent contractor physician or the 
reverse (as in Canada) is absent, at least relative to NHS services.  Physicians’ status as hospital 
employees, together with the NHS policy of ignoring the distinction between employees and 
independent contractors provided the claimant was injured in the course of receiving NHS 
treatment, also mean that arguments that the hospital owes the patient a non-delegable duty of 
care (which can be breached by a physician’s negligence) are of much less practical importance.TPF3FPT  
As Strickland notes, with the expansion of the NHS’ legal liability, the indemnity aspect of 
clinical risk was transferred from physicians’ mutual defence organizations to the NHS, and that, 
together with the increasing threat of clinical negligence claims, widened ownership of clinical 
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risk beyond physicians.TPF4FPT    While the legal status of general practitioners can be complex, those 
who are not NHS employees would be sued directly, as would physicians providing private 
treatment to patients.TPF5FPT  Physicians who are not the NHS’ responsibility obtain coverage for 
malpractice claims through participation in mutual defence organizations, which assume 
responsibility for representing their physician members in civil actions and other types of 
proceedings.TPF6FPT   
Funding and Managing Claims 
 Since 1995, any actions against the NHS Trusts for clinical negligence, including 
employees’ negligence, are dealt with on behalf of the NHS by the National Health Service 
Litigation Authority (NHSLA).TPF7FPT The NHSLA administers five “schemes”:  two main clinical 
schemes, the Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts (CNST) (post-April 1995 events), 
established to fund the costs of litigation through annual contributions by NHS bodies and the 
pooling of funds, and the Existing Liabilities Scheme, which covers claims against NHS bodies 
arising from events prior to April 1995, a third that covers a small number of claims remaining 
from a previous administrative structure, and two non-clinical schemes covering claims relating 
to liability to third parties and property expenses incurred post-April, 1999.TPF8FPT  The contributions 
that NHS Trusts make towards the costs of clinical negligence are determined by the NHSLA 
based on its assessment of the risk management standards in place and claims history in each 
Trust.TPF9FPT  From its inception, part of the NHSLA’s  remit was to improve the way that clinical 
negligence claims were handled in the NHS, and it has taken steps to do so, for instance by 
encouraging mediation, explanations and apologies, piloting a small “fast track” project for 
lower value claims (“Resolve”), controlling costs of its own solicitors, and other measures.TPF10FPT 
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 Turning to how plaintiffs fund litigation, clinical negligence claims are the only major 
area of personal injury claims for which legal aid is still available.  It is both means and merit 
tested, i.e. claimants must meet financial eligibility criteria, and the Legal Services Commission 
must be satisfied that the case justifies granting public funding, taking into account prospects of 
success and possible benefits of litigation.TPF11FPT  Solicitors representing legally aided clients in 
clinical negligence claims must have expertise in the area, ensuring assessments for the 
Commission and advice to clients are informed.  The Commission may direct lower value claims 
(less than £10,000) to the NHS complaints procedure.TPF12FPT  In his 2003 report, Making Amends, the 
Chief Medical Officer observed that: (1) nearly 90% of clinical negligence cases received Legal 
Aid; (2) while full funding was only available to those on Income Support, just under half the 
population was eligible on income grounds for some Legal Aid; (3) of the clinical negligence 
cases that concluded in 2001/2002, 53% of cases were not funded beyond initial investigation, 
but of those that proceeded to litigation, 57% were successful; and (4) the highest proportion of 
people pursuing a claim were in relatively high or low income households. TPF13FPT  In 2003/04, 6,064 
new legal aid certificates were issued for clinical negligence claims.TPF14FPT In 2004/05, results where 
certificates had been granted in clinical negligence cases were mixed:  in cases where 
proceedings were issued but the case concluded without a hearing, benefits to the client were 
reported in 58% of cases, while a beneficial outcome to clients was reported in 51% of cases that 
proceeded to a final hearing.TPF15FPT   
The introduction of conditional fee arrangements (CFA) in 1995 offered another 
alternative for funding litigation.  Under a CFA, the lawyer agrees not to charge if unsuccessful, 
but if successful, the client agrees to pay the lawyer’s fee plus a percentage markup (“success 
fee”).  If the client loses, she will be liable to pay the defendants’ costs, under the “costs follow 
the event” rule that applies in Canadian litigation as well.  To fund this liability, a claimant who 
does not have “before the event” insurance (sometimes available as an adjunct to other policies, 
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such as home insurance) can take out “after the event” insurance to cover the cost of losing.TPF16FPT  
Making Amends reported little take-up of either CFAs or after the event insurance in clinical 
negligence cases, because of both high cost and limited availability.TPF17FPT   
The Woolf  Report, Access to Justice  
There have been a number of reviews of the litigation process, sparked by concerns about 
how the legal system handles claims for compensation for personal injury in general, and clinical 
negligence in particular.  Lord Woolf’s review of the civil justice system, begun in 1994 and 
resulting in his 1996 report, Access to Justice, is of particular note, both for its analysis and 
because it resulted in significant procedural reform.TPF18FPT  Lord Woolf concluded that the current 
system was too expensive, too slow, too unequal as between litigants who were well-resourced 
and those who were not, too uncertain as to cost and time, too adversarial, and too fragmented, 
with unclear responsibility for the administration of civil justice, and inattention to the rules of 
court by the parties.TPF19FPT  He singled out medical negligence cases for particularly intensive 
examination, because it was “…obvious that it was in the area of medical negligence that the 
civil justice system was failing most conspicuously to meet the needs of litigants…”.TPF20FPT  He noted 
the following problems in particular: 
• Disproportionate costs in comparison with damages, especially in lower value cases; 
• Delay in resolving claims is more often unacceptable; 
• Unmeritorious claims were often pursued, and clear-cut claims defended, for too long; 
• Lower success rate than in other areas of personal injury litigation; 
• Heightened suspicion and less co-operation between parties than in many other areas 
of litigation. 
He observed that smaller medical malpractice claims can seldom be litigated because of cost, and 
that even larger claims can rarely be litigated without assistance from Legal Aid.TPF21FPT  The result 
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was that “…in the vast majority of cases, both sides are funded from the public purse”, money 
that could be better spent compensating victims or improving standards of care to avoid future 
injuries.TPF22FPT   
While noting that the substantive law of tort plays a role in the higher costs of these claims 
because the difficulty of proving causation and negligence is “more acute” in medical negligence 
cases, he concluded that the failure of the civil justice system in this area was fundamentally the 
result of the climate of mutual suspicion and defensiveness that prevailed in medical malpractice 
lawsuits.  Improved case management could go some way towards addressing problems 
identified, but it alone could not bring about the changes needed.  He called for a more 
conciliatory and co-operative approach, adding that in order to address patients’ mistrust,  
“…the medical profession and the NHS administration must demonstrate their 
commitment to patients’ wellbeing by adopting a constructive approach to claims 
handling.  It must be clearly accepted that patients are entitled to redress, and that 
professional solidarity or individual self-esteem are not sufficient reasons for resisting or 
obstructing valid claims”.TPF23FPT   
 
Patients should also be entitled to expect explanations and where appropriate, apologies.TPF24FPT  He 
made wide-ranging recommendations for reform applicable to both civil litigation generally, and 
clinical negligence cases in particular.  His underlying premises were that litigation should be a 
last resort and avoided wherever possible, and that the civil justice system should be fair to 
litigants, just in its results, understandable to those who use it, and have procedures and costs 
proportionate to the issues involved.TPF25FPT  
Civil Justice Reform 
Most of Lord Woolf’s proposals were accepted by government, and extensive civil justice 
reforms followed.  These included implementation of Pre-Action Protocols to provide a clear 
sequence of steps for both parties to follow beginning prior to the commencement of litigation 
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and backed by timelines and penalties, provisions for offers to settle, increased use of joint 
experts, strengthened case management powers for judges, and encouragement of alternative 
dispute resolution.TPF26FPT  One of the first protocols adopted dealt with clinical negligence.  It 
includes provision for substantive letters of claim and response prior to commencing 
proceedings, meetings of experts and other matters.TPF27FPT   
Other reforms have been implemented as well.  The Judicial Studies Board now develops 
guidelines to provide more standardized valuations for many injuries, to facilitate greater 
consistency in award levels.TPF28FPT  More recently, amendments to the Courts Act allow courts to 
order that damages be paid by periodical payments without requiring consent of the parties, 
meaning that the courts can impose structured settlements.TPF29FPT  Commentators agree that, while it 
is still early to assess the full impact of the Woolf Reforms, they appear to have had positive 
results.TPF30FPT 
An additional consideration in reforming the civil justice and tort systems in England is the 
effect of the Human Rights Act, 1998, which incorporates the requirements of the European 
Convention on Human Rights into English law, including Article 6, which ensures the right to a 
fair hearing.TPF31FPT  While not generally affecting the conduct of clinical negligence litigation, it 
would have to be taken into account in the formulation of alternative compensation regimes.   
Incidence of Adverse Events and Clinical Negligence Litigation 
 Comprehensive studies of the numbers of adverse events patients experience in hospitals 
or from health care generally in the United Kingdom are lacking.  In a small study, Vincent et al. 
found an overall rate of 11.7% of hospital patients experienced adverse events, with about half 
being judged preventable, and a third leading to moderate or great disability or death.TPF32FPT  Making 
Amends, extrapolating from American and English studies, accepted that 850,000 adverse events 
were occurring to hospital in-patients in England each year, in the context of an estimated 50 
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million clinical decisions for every million population in the NHS.TPF33FPT  In 2005, the National Audit 
Office, relying on Department of Health estimates, noted that the incidence of adverse events 
experienced by NHS patients admitted to hospital was one in ten, of which half were 
preventable.TPF34FPT  
These figures do not include the numbers of adverse events in non-hospital settings, such as 
primary care.  Research carried out as part of the Making Amends review found that of 8000 
people interviewed, approximately 400 considered they had suffered injury or other adverse 
effects as a direct result of medical care, and of these, 30% reported a permanent impact on their 
health.  Just over half of the adverse events occurred in NHS hospitals, and 25% in primary 
care.TPF35FPT  A 2005 comparison of the experiences of patients with health problems using the health 
care systems in six countries found that, of the 1770 people surveyed in the United Kingdom, 
17% reported that a medical mistake or medication error had been made in their treatment or 
care, causing a serious health problem for 42%, and 22% reported a medical, medication or 
laboratory error in their care in the last two years..TPF36FPT  For 67% of U.K. patients, the mistake or 
error in medication occurred outside the hospital.  72% had not been told about the error by 
physicians involved in their care.TPF37FPT  
Litigation Experience 
Not all adverse events, even those that are preventable, are the result of negligence.  Some, 
however, are.  Data on the incidence of clinical negligence litigation indicates that few people 
who have suffered even preventable adverse events sue.  At the same time, people may sue even 
though the care involved was entirely appropriate – i.e. there was no negligence involved.   
The NHSLA reported that in 2004-05, it received 5,609 claims of clinical negligence and 
3,766 claims of non-clinical negligence against NHS bodies.TPF38FPT  It noted that this continued a 
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downward trend in new claims evident over the last few years – for instance, in 2004-05, it 
received 439 CNST claims per month, compared to 481 claims per month under CNST in 2003-
04.TPF39FPT  An analysis of all clinical claims the NHSLA has handled since its inception in 1995 
shows that 38.01% were abandoned by the claimant, 43.1% settled out of court, 1.97% settled in 
court in favour of the patient (including court approval of settlements negotiated for children), 
0.5% settled in court in favour of the NHS, and 16.42% remain outstanding.TPF40FPT   
The average time taken to deal with a clinical claim under the CNST from the time when 
the NHSLA is notified of the claim to the time damages are paid or it is discontinued is 1.44 
years.TPF41FPT  Individual claims experience can vary widely; many do not proceed past preliminary 
stages and conclude quickly, while others take many years to resolve, especially if the extent of 
injury or causation is difficult to determine. 
Cost of Adverse Events 
Patient injuries are very costly, most obviously and acutely to the person concerned, but 
also to the health care system.  In 2005, the National Audit Office reported that patient safety 
incidents (the term preferred by the National Patient Safety Agency, rather than adverse event or 
clinical error) cost the NHS an estimated £2 billion a year in extra bed days; hospital acquired 
infections added an additional £1 billion to these costs.TPF42FPT  The NHSLA paid £502.9 million in 
connection with clinical negligence claims in 2004-05, including both damages paid to patients 
and the legal costs borne by the NHS.  This compares to £422.5 million paid in 2003-04.TPF43FPT  
Patients and their families bear substantial financial and non-financial costs when injured by 
health care whether they sue or not, meaning that the total direct and indirect costs of patient 
injury are far greater than these amounts.    
 
II. PATIENT SAFETY 
  The place of quality improvement and patient safety initiatives in England has changed 
substantially, becoming more prominent since the mid-1980’s.  The Bristol Inquiry was a 
                                                 
TP
39
PT  NHSLA Annual Report 2004-05 at 13, online at HTUhttp://www.nhsla.com/home.htmUTH (last accessed Jan. 2006). 
TP
40
PT  NHSLA, “About the NHSLA”, supra, n.38. 
TP
41
PT  Ibid. 
TP
42
PT NAO 2005, supra, n.34 at 1. 
TP
43
PT  NHSLA, “About the NHSLA”, supra, n.38.  The figures for non-clinical claims are £25.1 million for 2004-05, 
and £10.1 million for 2003-04. 
 125
particularly powerful catalyst.  Walshe and Shortell summarize the facts as follows:  “Between 
1990 and 1995, despite repeated warnings about poor surgical quality outcomes, cardiac 
surgeons at the hospital [the Bristol Royal Infirmary] continued to operate on newborns until the 
U.K. Department of Health forced them to stop.  A subsequent public inquiry concluded that 
thirty-five deaths had been avoidable.  Three doctors were disciplined by the General Medical 
Council [2 cardiac surgeons, and a radiologist who was the chief executive of the hospital at the 
time], and two … lost their licenses to practice medicine”.TPF44FPT The full public inquiry established 
by the Secretary of State and chaired by Sir Ian Kennedy began hearing evidence in October 
1998 and published its report with almost 200 recommendations in July, 2001.TPF45FPT   
The events at Bristol and their aftermath, including the Inquiry as well as the public and 
media outcry, had a huge impact.  It is said to have created “shockwaves”, and caused a “sea 
change in medical and wider British society attitudes to professional self-regulation, clinical 
competence, and healthcare quality improvement”.TPF46FPT  Commenting on events at Bristol, the 
Chief Medical Officer observed in Making Amends that it and other highly publicized failures in 
the standard of care in hospitals  
“…epitomized the gap which had opened up between the perception of the public and 
that of the medical profession in what was acceptable or unacceptable freedom in clinical 
decision-making…These events can be seen as a turning point in the development of a 
new culture and relationship between practitioner and patient based on partnership, 
communication and provision of information”.TPF47FPT  
 
Health care professionals and organizations became more willing to accept national standards of 
conduct and regulation in health care, and to recognize that professional self-regulation alone 
was not sufficient.TPF48FPT  At the same time, the series of medical scandals – Bristol, Shipman, Alder 
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Hey and Dr. Ledward – changed patients’ attitudes, making them more inquiring, more 
demanding, and less deferential.TPF49FPT  Strickland credits the loss of public confidence occasioned by 
the scandals in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s with marking the beginning of “greater public 
ownership of clinical risk”.TPF50FPT  As Kay Wheat has observed, whether the inquiries were about 
clinical negligence per se or not, the outcry over misconduct in the NHS was concerned with 
“…what the public might well perceive to be great swathes of ‘malpractice’”.TPF51FPT    
 Reports prepared for the government on the state of healthcare (two were particularly 
significant -- An Organization With a Memory, and Building a Safer NHS for PatientsTPF52FPT), as well 
as the inquiry reports highlighting serious failings in systems or clinical standards led the 
government to undertake a number of regulatory initiatives and create a series of agencies 
focused on health quality and safety. They are meant to improve the management of clinical risk 
and introduce best practice in care and management.TPF53FPT  The focus of this paper is on the 
interaction of the tort system and tort reform with patient safety initiatives.  Consequently, a 
detailed consideration of either the implications of the inquiries and the events that led up to 
them for quality and safety initiatives, or the many  quality and safety programs and agencies 
that were created is beyond the scope of this paper.  However, since they have implications for 
the tort system, and are also important to an understanding of how complicated and crowded the 
landscape of healthcare oversight has become (in addition to courts adjudicating negligence 
claims), I will outline the major initiatives briefly, and then review some of the ways that these 
developments may affect the conduct of litigation and vice versa.   
Patient Safety and Quality Agencies 
New organizations were created, and existing mandates revamped to emphasize 
responsibilities for safety and quality.  These include the National Patient Safety Agency, the 
Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection (replacing the Commission for Health 
Improvement), the National Institute for Clinical Excellence, new emphasis on the role of the 
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Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, National Audit Office review of clinical 
negligence and clinical governance, and others.  The self-regulating bodies of professions 
continue to govern the professional standards and practices of their members.TPF54FPT   They are now 
overseen by the Council for Regulatory Excellence, which was established in 2003 to ensure 
consistency and good practice among regulators – i.e. to monitor the monitors.TPF55FPT It can refer 
certain cases to the courts for disposition where it considers that regulators have been too 
lenient.TPF56FPT  The central management of litigation by the NHSLA was described previously.  The 
NHSLA also plays a role in setting risk management standards for NHS Trusts.   
National Patient Safety Agency 
The National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) was created in 2001 to coordinate the efforts 
of the NHS regarding patient safety.  Emphasizing systems analysis, it has developed a number 
of patient safety tools and a national reporting and learning system (a patient safety data 
collection system), and is proceeding with work on implementing “Being Open”, a program to 
encourage disclosure to patients/families when patients have suffered moderate or severe harm or 
death as a result of error, together with an apology, and explanation of steps that will be taken to 
prevent a recurrent.TPF57FPT   
National Audit Office 
The National Audit Office (NAO) has undertaken an extensive study of the handling of 
clinical negligence claims, as well as reporting on the implementation of clinical governance and 
results of patient safety initiatives.TPF58FPT 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) 
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 NICE is part of the NHS, and promotes clinical excellence and the effective use of 
resources by providing national guidance on treatments and care in the areas of technology 
appraisals, clinical guidelines, and interventional procedures.TPF59FPT 
Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection 
The Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection (Healthcare Commission) replaces 
the Commission for Health Improvement, and began operation in 2004.  Its statutory mandate 
includes duties to investigate and assess the performance of healthcare organizations, consider 
complaints about the NHS that cannot be resolved through internal complaints processes, report 
on the state of healthcare in England (NHS and private sector), rate performance in the NHS, 
regulate the independent healthcare sector through annual registration and inspection, publish 
surveys of patient and staff views, and coordinate reviews of healthcare by others.TPF60FPT 
Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman  
 The Parliamentary and Health Services Ombudsman (Health Service Ombudsman) is 
charged with undertaking independent investigations into complaints that government bodies, 
other public bodies and the NHS in England acted improperly or unfairly, or provided a poor 
service.TPF61FPT  It recently completed a review of the reformed NHS complaints procedures in 
England, concluding that fragmentation in complaints systems, combined with shortcomings in 
complaints handling capacity and leadership, and a failure to focus on patients’ needs, resulted in 
“just remedies not being secured for just complaints”.TPF62FPT  It added that overall, the system makes 
it difficult for patients to have things put right when they have gone wrong. TPF63FPT    
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Even this partial list of agencies and their responsibilities gives an indication of how 
complicated the monitoring and oversight of healthcare have become.  John Tingle points out the 
tremendous impact that the various accountability mechanisms have had, not just on patients’ 
experience, but on the NHS and the working lives of its staff:  NHS hospitals are answerable to 
many separate regulators with different missions, agendas and requirements, resulting in 
duplication and “…forcing them to spend millions of pounds on even more administrators to 
navigate their way through the system”.TPF64FPT  Recognizing this, some efforts are being made at 
streamlining and consolidation.TPF65FPT  For instance, the Healthcare Commission and the other main 
healthcare inspection, review and audit bodies have entered into an agreement, the Concordat, 
which commits each to minimize duplication and encourage joint inspections beginning in 
2005.TPF66FPT  Nonetheless, the interrelationships among the various initiatives and bodies are not 
always clear, and overlap and duplication remain. 
Reviewing progress to date, the National Audit Office concluded that, while much 
remains to be done, overall, the safety culture within NHS Trusts and encouragement for 
reporting and learning from mistakes have improved with the introduction of initiatives focused 
on clinical governance and patient safety, although it warned that feedback to institutions and 
providers must be improved, or people will stop reporting.  It also observed that trusts are still 
predominantly reactive in their response to patient safety issues, and a blame culture persists in 
parts of some organizations.TPF67FPT  This is evident in provider attitudes.  A survey of 2500 physicians 
found that only 15% reported colleagues’ serious errors (respondents were not asked about near 
misses). TPF68FPT  The great majority (97%) thought a reporting system would improve care, but 
believed it should be independently operated, because of past experience with blame and “witch 
hunts”.  Respondents were guardedly optimistic about the potential for the NPSA’s anonymous 
system for reporting.TPF69FPT 
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Clinical Governance and Clinical Negligence 
 The primary purpose of these reforms was to improve patient safety and quality of care.  
However, returning to the focus of this paper, their secondary effects, particularly their 
interaction with clinical negligence litigation, are significant as well.   
1.  The most obvious effect if the reforms achieve their aims would be a reduction in medical 
error and resulting harm to patients, in turn reducing the number of lawsuits.  As the Chief 
Medical Officer of Health noted in Making Amends, “…the relevance to medical litigation is 
obvious – if more of the healthcare risks that currently cause harm to patients are identified, 
anticipated and reduced, then the number of avoidable injuries to patients should be reduced.  So 
too should their severity.  This must be the primary aim”.TPF70FPT   
That is certainly the ultimate goal, but what of more immediate effects on litigation and vice 
versa?  Several have been suggested.   
2.  Protocols and guidelines can affect the standard of care in clinical negligence claims.  
With respect to determinations of negligence, if risk management processes such as those 
instituted by the safety and quality agencies lead to greater standardization through the adoption 
of protocols or the promulgation of clinical guidelines, then departing from those procedures 
might be characterized as carelessness.TPF71FPT  While unlikely to be considered conclusive on the 
issue of negligence, such evidence could be highly persuasive, giving the protocols more weight 
and providers and organizations greater incentive to follow them, resulting in enhanced safety. 
3.  Improved communication with patients is expected to reduce complaints and claims.  
Sometimes the crux of a claim is a failure to obtain informed consent prior to treatment (i.e. to 
tell the patient about the treatment and its risks in a careful and comprehensible way).  After an 
adverse event, some patients sue because they cannot find out what happened and why. TPF72FPT  
Explanation and dialogue can assist. 
4.  The NHSLA- instituted clinical risk management standards can reinforce incentives to 
improve care, in turn containing the incidence and costs of negligence.TPF73FPT  NHS Trusts pay a 
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contribution towards the costs of litigation annually, but can obtain a discount by complying with 
the Clinical Negligence Scheme for Trusts (CNST) risk management standards.TPF74FPT  There are 
three CNST levels trusts can reach, and a 10% discount for attaining each level, for a total 30% 
discount at level three.  Since each level presumably indicates a safer organization, one would 
expect improved quality of care, resulting in fewer injuries to patients and therefore, less 
litigation.  The flow-through of benefits may not be significant in practice, however.  Tingle has 
noted that many trusts remain at CNST level one, i.e. the basic level of a clinical risk 
management framework, so the anticipated improvement in standards and safe systems may not 
occur.TPF75FPT  
5.  Additional ways to have complaints resolved can better meet the needs of claimants.  
The multiplication of agencies concerned with safety and quality has been accompanied by a 
multiplication in the avenues for making complaints about care received.  Many people 
dissatisfied with their treatment do not seek compensation, but rather, want information, or an 
explanation and apology.  Litigation will not achieve those ends.  Conversely, lack of 
explanations does fuel lawsuits.TPF76FPT  More routes to different forms of redress, such as complaints 
processes responsive to the needs for apology and explanation, could divert claims away from 
litigation and better satisfy claimants. The Health Ombudsman’s recent review of the NHS 
complaints processes offers a caveat to this optimistic view, however.  She noted that a survey of 
complainants to her office revealed that few seek monetary compensation on beginning the 
complaints process, but that “…the process itself makes them more likely to ask for financial 
redress because of the time and effort they have expended in trying to get their complaint 
resolved”; additionally, when compensation is offered, a small amount can antagonize the 
complainant further.TPF77FPT  The complaints process, then, can make people more or less likely to sue.  
6.  Availability of additional routes to obtain financial redress could reduce the need to 
litigate, but would require further development.  The Healthcare Ombudsman is of the view 
that, although the existing NHS complaints system is silent about financial redress, NHS bodies 
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can make special payments where there has been financial loss as a result of the actions or 
omissions of an NHS body.  Her office has increasingly been securing financial redress from 
NHS bodies for complainants on this basis.  However, at present, “…other than by submitting a 
complaint to the Ombudsman, financial redress has generally only been available through legal 
action for medical negligence”, and complainants who indicated they were taking legal action 
were excluded from NHS complaints procedures.TP F78FPT  She recommended that regardless of 
whether negligence in the legal sense had been established, NHS bodies should be receptive to 
paying some recompense to complainants for their severe difficulties (whether only in carrying 
the complaint forward, or also in connection with healthcare received is unclear), and that all 
levels of complaints should be able to provide a full range of remedies, including financial 
compensation.TP F79FPT  The basis, conditions and terms for compensation appear undeveloped. 
7.  Civil litigation can discourage disclosure, and hence, can be counter-productive to the 
operation of patient safety programs, which rely on sharing information to identify mistakes and 
learn from errors. 
8.  Conversely, lawsuits can provide information that can be used to improve patient safety.  
The National Audit Office recommended that the Healthcare Commission make greater use of 
information from litigation and complaints as a learning resource, and work with the NHSLA 
and the NPSA to determine how best to share data.TPF80FPT  The NHSLA already alerts NHS Trusts to 
significant developments in judicial decisions with a view to improving clinical practice,TP F81FPT but it 
is unclear whether the cautions it issues are incorporated into NHS and clinician practice in 
systematic ways. The utility of data about clinical negligence claims is likely to be limited by the 
reality that most cases settle before a definitive determination of what occurred and why, and 
settlements are often subject to non-disclosure agreements. 
8.  Mediation and other forms of alternative dispute resolution can offer broader remedies 
than courts, and can also divert cases away from civil litigation.TPF82FPT  The Better Regulation Task 
                                                 
TP
78
PT Ibid., 14. 
TP
79
PT Ibid., 15-16. 
TP
80
PT NAO 2005, supra, n.34 at 10.  See also Vincent, C., Walshe, K., Davy, C., Esmail, A., “Learning from litigation:  
the role of claims analysis in patient safety”, in Walshe, K., Boaden, R., Patient safety.  Research into Practice 
(Maidenhead, Open U. Press, 2006), 144-160. 
TP
81
PT See eg., Jones, M., “A Risky Business”, (2005) 13 Tort L.Rev. 40 at 50. 
TP
82
PT Making Amends, supra, n.9 at 118. 
 133
Force recommended that the Pre-Action Protocols be strengthened to require parties to explain 
why they rejected mediation, and that this be a consideration in costs awards.TPF83FPT   
9.  No-Fault Compensation.  The most radical proposal to emerge from all of the activity aimed 
at improving the situation of injured patients and reducing the incidence of future harm was the 
Bristol Inquiry’s recommendation that the clinical negligence system be abolished and replaced 
with alternative systems for compensating patients and overseeing health care delivery and 
providers.  In Learning from Bristol, Sir Ian Kennedy, who chaired the inquiry, wrote:TPF84FPT 
The system [of clinical negligence litigation] is now out of alignment with other policy 
initiatives on quality and safety:  in fact it serves to undermine those policies and inhibits the 
safety of care received by patients…We believe that the way forward lies in the abolition of 
clinical negligence litigation, taking clinical error out of the courts and the tort system. 
 
He recommended that the system for compensating people who suffer harm from medical care 
be reviewed, with a view to introducing an administrative system that would respond promptly to 
patients’ needs in place of tort, and take account of other administrative systems for meeting the 
financial needs of the public.TPF85FPT  This was not the only such  proposal, and in response, in 2001 
the Department of Health initiated a review of the system for handling compensation claims and 
complaints in the NHS, chaired by the Chief Medical Officer.  His report, Making Amends:  A 
consultation paper setting out proposals for reforming the approach to clinical negligence in the 
NHS, was published in 2003. TPF86FPT  It was meant to address ways to improve patient safety, the 
difficulties injured patients face in obtaining redress, and the high costs of the tort system. TPF87FPT 
 
III.  MAKING AMENDS 
 The recommendations in Making Amends are concerned with improving standards and 
not just preventing litigation.  However, several commentators have noted that the measures 
recommended place at least equal importance on preventing litigation and containing costs to the 
NHS as on risk management and restoring trust in the NHS.TPF88FPT   The report concluded that even 
with recent reforms to personal injury litigation, the present system was still unsatisfactory 
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because it remained complex, unfair, slow, costly,  time-consuming, damaging to morale and 
public confidence, unsatisfactory to patients left without explanations, apologies or reassurance 
about improvements, and a barrier to learning from mistakes because of its encouragement of 
secrecy and defensiveness.TPF89FPT  It identified four options for reform:  (1) continue to reform the tort 
system; (2) introduce no-fault compensation; (3) introduce fixed tariffs for particular types of 
injury administered by a national tribunal; and (4) a composite package of reform.TPF90FPT   
While acknowledging that reforms undertaken previously and the work of the NHSLA had 
led to improvements, the CMO rejected change based solely on continued tort reform, because:TPF91FPT 
• Who can and cannot prove negligence remains a “lottery”; 
• There is little support for patients making complaints and claims; 
• The current legal system provides little or no incentive to report, learn from and reduce 
errors; 
• The adversarial system undermines the relationship between patients and healthcare 
professionals, reduces trust in the NHS, and diverts staff from clinical care; 
• A more entrenched “litigation culture” could result in greatly increased costs and 
increased defensive medicine, as in the United States; 
• Independent evaluation of a small claims pilot (Resolve) that had been supported by the 
Department of Health and the NHSLA found that even patients who receive 
compensation often remain dissatisfied if they do not also receive explanations, 
apologies, and reassurance about preventative action in the future;  
• While difficult to determine definitively, the tort system appears to have provided little 
incentive for the prevention of mistakes, or putting right mistakes that have been made. 
He concluded that further modifications to court-based processes without more could not  
resolve these issues. 
 Given the many shortcomings in the tort system as a means of compensation  identified 
in this report and others, and the advantages of no-fault compensation, no-fault seems an 
appealing alternative.  However, it, too, was rejected, principally because of expense.  Overall 
costs would be higher because of a lower threshold for claims (i.e. no need to prove negligence) 
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and a greater number of claims; compensation levels would be lower in order to keep the system 
affordable, leaving some patients with unmet needs; and difficulties would arise in distinguishing 
the effects of disease from those caused by health care.  The implications of the right to a fair 
hearing guaranteed by the Human Rights Act of 1998 were also a consideration. 
 A system of fixed tariffs administered through a national tribunal was also rejected, 
because of the generally low levels of awards under other such systems, their lack of relationship 
to victims’ actual losses, and the inflexibility in both awards and timing. TPF92FPT 
Making Amends recommended a composite package of compensation, with three parallel 
compensation schemes.  One would provide “NHS Redress” for low value claims, a second 
would provide redress for cases involving brain damaged babies, but on a much greater order of 
magnitude and with less exacting eligibility criteria, and all other claims would still be resolved 
through the tort system, although because of changes to the calculation of damages, at reduced 
cost to the NHS.  NHS Redress would include an investigation and explanation of adverse 
events, as well as information about action planned to prevent a recurrence, development and 
delivery of a package of care where needed (including remedial treatment or continuing care as 
necessary), and payments for the costs of care or treatment that the NHS could not provide, and 
for pain and suffering.TPF93FPT Accepting a package of compensation would preclude litigation.  Both 
of the first two compensation schemes are outlined in general terms, meaning that there are a 
number of uncertainties about how they would operate.   
The proposal for low value claims provides that eligibility for payment would depend on 
the harm having been avoidable, and “serious shortcomings” in the standards of care (also 
referred to as “seriously substandard NHS hospital care”).TPF94FPT  That standard seems to require that 
fault and causation be established, as in a claim for clinical negligence.  Difficulties in 
establishing causation and breach of the standard of care could be eased by provisions making 
the process less legalistic and more administrative, simplifying procedures and timing in 
straightforward cases, and defining the qualifying circumstances in a more expansive fashion 
than is the case in negligence claims. Nonetheless, some form of that determination would still 
have to be made.   
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Eligibility for compensation for babies who have suffered brain damage is not so limited; 
claimants need only establish the presence of severe neurological impairment, and that it is 
related to or resulting from the birth.TPF95FPT  Consequently, causation would be easier to establish.  It 
is estimated that under the tort system, claims on behalf of babies with brain damage currently 
account for approximately 60% of costs, and even then, many claims are unsuccessful.TPF96FPT  If 
adopted, this would be a true no-fault system.  
Finally, those who chose not to apply for or accept packages of compensation or who did 
not fit the criteria for either stream could still litigate, although the availability of redress could 
be taken into account in decisions about funding lower value claims.  Making Amends includes 
other recommendations about how the NHS should respond to patients who have been injured by 
an adverse event, and about the civil justice system.  Relative to the latter, it recommends that 
mediation should be seriously considered before litigation, and that the rule requiring that 
complaints be halted when there is a legal claim be rescinded, so that  regardless of financial 
compensation, patients can still obtain apologies, explanations, and information about plans to 
prevent future harm.TPF97FPT  It also proposed the introduction of a statutory “duty of candour” (Lord 
Woolf had suggested a similar duty already existed at common law).  Health care professionals 
and managers would be required to inform patients when they become aware of a possible 
negligent act or omission, with an exemption from disciplinary action for those who reported 
adverse events, unless the health professional had committed a criminal offence or it would be 
unsafe to allow the person to continue to treat patients.TPF98FPT  In order to reduce disincentives to 
reporting errors, it recommended that documents and information collected to identify adverse 
events be protected from disclosure in court, provided that full information on the event was also 
included in the medical records (and therefore, presumably, available to the patient).TPF99FPT   
Two additional recommendations are meant to reduce the cost to the NHS of 
compensating tort claims that remain outside the Redress schemes: first, that in paying damages 
for future care and losses, the expectation should be that periodical payments will be used, and 
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second, that the costs of future care should no longer reflect the costs of private treatment.TPF100FPT  
Michael Jones points out that the second of these is controversial, because “…there is no 
guarantee that the care claimants need will be provided by the NHS when it is needed”.TPF101FPT  The 
Better Regulation Task Force confirmed that despite the importance of rehabilitation, “a demand 
is being generated that cannot be met”; while the private sector has responded, the NHS is 
hampered by a lack of resources and competing priorities.TPF102FPT 
Given the persuasive critiques of the tort system set out in Making Amends,  and its 
conclusion that  
“…it is impossible to escape from the fact that tort sits so uncomfortably in an NHS with 
an ethos of equity and a wish to bring about the greatest good to the greatest numbers.  
Even a reformed tort system is unfair in compensating only the select few.  It offers no 
dynamic for higher quality and safer care for the large number of patients…It creates few 
incentives for providers of health care to reduce risk”,  
 
it is in some ways surprising that the Report nonetheless recommended retaining tort  
in clinical negligence cases.TPF103FPT  It situated its proposals as a way to “…move the role of  
tort from its current central position to the outer perimeter of the NHS”.TPF104FPT Even if fully 
implemented, that goal is still likely to be only partially realized.  Claims on behalf of brain-
damaged babies, which account for a majority of costs incurred in clinical negligence claims, 
would be resolved through a no-fault system.   Lower value claims and their disproportionate 
expenses would be moved to an alternate recovery system; although still requiring some proof of 
fault and causation, this would likely increase recovery in lower value cases, including some that 
cannot presently meet the legal definition of  negligence (although the rigor of the tests to be 
applied remains unclear and will affect recovery).  However, others who have suffered an injury 
from treatment or care would be limited to tort claims, with all the difficulties that the report 
itself identifies so clearly,  and with more limited entitlement to damages. In the end, the 
proposals are a pragmatic response to the CMO’s conclusion that a comprehensive no-fault 
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system that would provide levels of compensation acceptable to the public was simply 
unaffordable for the NHS.TPF105FPT 
 
IV.  THE NHS REDRESS BILL, 2005  
 In October, 2005, the government introduced the NHS Redress Bill.TPF106FPT  It is aimed at 
lower value claims; the government is not proceeding with reforms to the compensation system 
for babies who have suffered brain damage related to birth at this time, having decided to pursue 
measures to improve the standards of care for all children with disabilities, however incurred.  
The Bill is intended to reform the clinical negligence system, enabling patients with claims 
arising in connection with certain health services in England to receive redress without having to 
resort to the legal system.  It is expected to increase spending on compensation in the short term, 
because it will bring new claims into the system, but to realize savings in the longer term because 
of a reduction in expenditures on legal costs, with estimates of the Bill’s impact ranging from £7 
million in savings to £48 million in costs.TPF107FPT  It would be funded by contributions from scheme 
members (primarily NHS Trusts), supplemented with funding from the Department of Health.  It 
would be available for claims arising from hospital care and other listed qualifying services 
provided as part of the NHS. TPF108FPT  The initial upper limit on claims is expected to be £20,000.TPF109FPT   
Incidents will be investigated by patient redress investigators, who are to comply with 
rules of natural justice, and whose practice will be monitored by the Healthcare Commission.TPF110FPT 
It is anticipated that the NHSLA will be responsible for determining eligibility and managing 
financial compensation, although the scheme will be administered locally.TPF111FPT  In order to 
establish eligibility for redress, there must be “qualifying liability in tort” that is (1) consequent 
on personal injury or loss arising out of breach of a duty of care owed in connection with the 
diagnosis of illness, or the care or treatment of a patient; and (2) in consequence of an act or 
omission of a healthcare professional (whether regulated or unregulated).  At the same time, in a 
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somewhat contrary instruction, the NHS is expected to “put the problem right, regardless of 
fault”.TPF112FPT   Since it is enabling legislation, details of the redress scheme are scant, although it 
must provide for offers of compensation (financial and/or otherwise), as well as apologies and 
explanations.  Civil litigation is precluded if an offer of compensation is accepted.  The scheme 
can be triggered by claims by or on behalf of a patient, and by service providers identifying 
eligible cases.  Organizations and individuals investigating or reviewing care and the Health Care 
Commission can be required to consider whether there may be liability under the scheme, and 
respond accordingly.  The Health Service Commissioner will be authorized to investigate 
complaints arising from the administration of the scheme.TPF113FPT   
There is widespread support for the aim of the Bill, i.e. providing an alternative to 
lawsuits for clinical negligence.TPF114FPT  However, a number of patient and consumer groups have 
strongly criticized it because (1) the NHS itself would decide the merits of any case for redress, 
(2) patients would not have access to specialist medico-legal advice essential to influence 
decisions about their claims, and (3) robust mechanisms to ensure patient safety lessons are 
learnt are lacking.TPF115FPT    
In February, 2006, the government was narrowly defeated in the House of Lords   on an 
opposition amendment that introduced independence into investigations under the scheme (via 
patient redress investigators).  The Bill as amended will now be debated in the House of 
Commons. TPF116FPT   
While the qualifying criteria simply track the tort framework for establishing negligence 
and hence, require proof of both causation and fault, the extent to which the scheme will provide 
an effective response to concerns about unfairness in the clinical negligence system will be 
greatly affected by decisions about how and by whom these determinations will be made.  At this 
point, one cannot ascertain the extent to which the legislation will achieve its goal of not only 
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providing redress to patients, but also de-emphasizing blame (which by its terms the scheme 
seems to require), and replacing it with a focus on learning from mistakes, preventing harm and 
reducing risk. 
 
V.  REFLECTIONS ON TORT REFORM AND PATIENT SAFETY IN ENGLAND  
Despite cogent criticisms of tort, and even with the imminent introduction of one part of 
the Redress system for lower value claims, tort principles and the tort system show remarkable 
persistence.  While it is possible to remove some types of claim from the purview of clinical 
negligence, as was done in the United Kingdom with the Vaccine Damages Payment Act 1979, 
moves in that direction are cautious and partial.  Even that system requires proof of causation, 
i.e. a determination on the balance of probabilities that serious mental or physical disability was 
caused by the administration of specified vaccines.TPF117FPT  Replacing tort raises concerns about cost, 
equity (how to justify a special scheme for medical malpractice cases when people who are 
disabled or suffer personal injury from other causes, whether tortious or not, do not have access 
to an equivalent compensation system), and accountability (particularly in an environment where 
public trust in the NHS, regulatory agencies and government has been severely shaken by 
repeated public exposure of instances and patterns of seriously substandard clinical care, clinical 
and managerial governance, and oversight mechanisms). 
No-fault compensation systems, while appealing in theory, were rejected by the CMO in 
Making Amends, by the English government which has only gone as far as to propose a Redress 
scheme for lower value claims, and in Scotland, where it was considered that no-fault (1) did not 
encourage improvements in the quality of care, and (2) because vestiges of fault remain, required 
a bureaucratic system that still had to tackle complex issues of negligence and causation, but 
without legal expertise.TPF118FPT  Even one of the major English non-government organizations that 
provides advice and support to people affected by medical accidents and negligence, Action 
Against Medical Accidents (AvMA), while not enamoured of the tort system given the reality of 
its effects on people injured by health care, is hesitant to support a move to an entirely no-fault 
compensation system.  It is concerned that no-fault recovery would be arbitrarily limited.  
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Additionally, the pressures for positive change in organizational culture and safety that result 
from negligence claims and judgments (even if the focus is on preventing claims rather than 
preventing accidents) would be lost.  While AvMA sees considerable potential in the Redress 
schemes proposed in Making Amends, it believes emphasis should be on a fair and open system 
with proportionate repercussions for what has occurred, rather than an illusory and ultimately 
inappropriate wish for “no blame”.  Given that in important ways, the patient safety agenda arose 
from patients and from litigation, AvMA considers the tort system useful as a last resort to 
ensure accountability.TPF119FPT 
 Looking to the tort system as a means to compensate for personal injury resulting from 
treatment remains problematic.  Suggestions that groundless negligence claims are 
overwhelming the system are not founded, although the perception that there is a “culture of 
compensation” has its own dynamic and damaging effects.TPF120FPT  While there may be some need to 
control an attitude encouraging claimants to “have a go” at litigation, that problem is not 
widespread; it is more important to have systems in place that ensure people with legitimate 
claims can bring them forward and obtain redress. TPF121FPT  The introduction of enterprise fault 
liability with the NHS Indemnity Scheme, together with the increase in clinical negligence 
claims, the aftermath of the series of scandals that plagued the NHS, and extensive analyses of 
improvements needed in the health care system have all contributed to support broader efforts to 
address clinical risk.  Still, for more than a decade, reviews of the civil justice system have 
repeatedly criticized tort’s shortcomings, and faulted the operation of the clinical negligence 
system in particular for failing to achieve justice.  These criticisms gain force as more becomes 
known about the large number of adverse events patients suffer that could be prevented.  A 
smaller, but still significant portion of those would involve negligence, yet relatively few result 
in litigation or compensation.  Despite this, moving tort from the centre to the periphery, as the 
Chief Medical Officer envisaged, has not occurred, nor has it been entirely accepted as a policy 
goal.  
At the same time, many other entities now play a role in safety and quality efforts and are 
working to influence the actions of clinicians and administrators to improve care.  What is 
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particularly striking to an outsider analyzing developments in patient safety in England is the 
massive scale of the response on the administrative side -- there are new agencies, new 
mandates, new resources, new responsibilities, new studies, new evaluations, and new money.  
In that sense, tort’s central role may be overtaken or at least shared with other players, and 
perhaps sometimes upstaged.  While initial experience with the operation of these new agencies 
indicates a need to clarify, refine and simplify their mandates, reporting requirements and 
interrelationships, efforts are being made to lighten the load of compliance and simplify access 
for the public, while maintaining the momentum to ensure better, safer care.   
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CHAPTER 5.  AUSTRALIA 
 
Australia is of particular interest to this study because of the extent of activity on both the 
tort reform and patient safety fronts over the last several years. Governments across the country 
have enacted substantial changes to tort law. At the same time, many safety and quality programs 
were introduced, while at some hospitals, patterns of problematic care, patient injury and 
ineffectual responses triggered the concentrated scrutiny of public inquiries and reviews 
examining the operation of care delivery and safety and quality systems in practice.  The 
sweeping tort reforms have given rise to extensive analysis and commentary.  Numerous policy 
documents, inquiry reports and other reviews, as well as recent evaluations of the work of the 
national safety and quality organization provide a great deal of information about developments 
in patient safety and issues that remain outstanding.  Taken together, the two bodies of literature, 
on tort law and patient safety, provide a rich resource for this study.  Both are important to an 
understanding of the ways in which the civil liability system and patient safety initiatives affect 
each other.   
The first section of this chapter outlines the background, aims and outcomes of the recent 
tort reforms.  Section II reviews developments in patient safety initiatives and analyzes those 
most germane to civil liability.  The final section assesses the implications of tort reform for 
patient safety programs, and in turn, the import of patient safety initiatives for the civil liability 
system.   
 
I.  Tort Reform 
 The law of negligence is broadly similar in Canada (with the exception of Quebec) and 
Australia.TPF1FPT  Australia’s extensive reforms to tort law are significant to this study for several 
reasons.  First, one of the drivers of change was concern about the consequences of medical 
malpractice litigation, not just tort litigation in general.  Second, tort reform coincided with the 
implementation of many safety and quality initiatives, allowing examination of the interaction 
between the two.  Third, Australia is a federal jurisdiction and, like the provinces in Canada, the 
states and territories have power over and responsibility for the health care system, 
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administration of the court system, and many of the laws regulating civil liability, including tort.TPF2FPT  
While the tort reforms enacted were not entirely uniform, the state, territorial and 
Commonwealth governments did agree on a common approach to evaluating the law and the 
direction reform should take, and in broad terms, a common response.TPF3FPT  Whether or not one 
agrees with the solutions adopted, or even the initial analysis of the problem, analyzing the 
conditions for and implementation of common action on tort reform in a federal state with 
important similarities to ours in its constitutional division of powers can assist in determining 
lessons to be learned from this experience for Canada.   
 This Section outlines the factors that led to review of the law of negligence and the 
reforms recommended.  It summarizes the legislative responses, characterized by the 
Commonwealth government as “unmatched in the common law world for their breadth and 
scope”.TPF4FPT  While necessarily preliminary because the changes were implemented only recently, it 
assesses the likely effects of the aggressive programs of law reform undertaken. 
Factors Triggering Tort Reform 
 The immediate catalyst for action was a crisis in the insurance industry, which 
came to a head with the collapse of Australia’s largest public liability insurer (HIH) in 2001 and 
its largest medical indemnity organization (UMP) in 2002.TPF5FPT  Changes to the tort system were not 
prompted by a concern to improve patient safety or reduce medical error.  As the Commonwealth 
government noted: “These reforms were specifically designed to promote predictability to 
improve the cost and availability of liability classes of insurance and alleviate a crisis that had 
engulfed the Australian community”. TPF6FPT  Although  precipitated by the collapse of the two major 
insurers, the debate about what had caused things to come to this pass and how to respond had 
been brewing for some time.  
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There is considerable disagreement among Australian writers about the reasons for the 
insurers’ collapse.TPF7FPT  Various factors are cited: on the business side, mismanagement, lack of 
prudential regulation and commercial realities (insurers’ poor business practices, the cyclical 
nature of the insurance industry, falling stock markets worldwide reducing insurers’ return on 
investments, ripple effects following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and others).TPF8FPT  
As for the civil justice system, the litigation environment was increasingly characterized as too 
lenient and too generous (the Ipp Report summarized widely held views at the time: negligence 
law was considered to be unpredictable and unclear, cases were too easy for plaintiffs to win, and 
damages awards in personal injury cases were often too highTPF9FPT).  This type of criticism of the 
outcomes in negligence actions increasingly permeated public discourse.    
 An influential speech delivered by the Chief Justice of New South Wales in 2002, titled 
“Negligence:  The Last Outpost of the Welfare State”, captured a number of themes in the 
debate.TPF10FPT  Australian judges seem less circumspect than their Canadian counterparts about 
commenting publicly on legal developments, and this speech was no exception.  Spigelman, CJ, 
argued that negligence law had become too favourable to claimants, both as a result of what 
Patrick Atiyah had termed  “stretching the law”, and also, he suggested, because of a parallel 
trend in courts to “stretch the facts” in order to justify recovery. TPF11FPT  Unspoken assumptions about 
the background presence of insurance and (quoting a colleague) “...a compensation-conscious 
community [in which] citizens look for others to blame” had led to expansions in the scope of 
negligence law and the damages recoverable, to the point where judgments were out of step with 
public expectations and threatened to impose too heavy a burden on the community.TPF12FPT  While 
noting that the trend appeared to have been reversed in recent judgments, he was doubtful that 
legislators would “have enough patience to allow this development to work itself out”, 
particularly since the government had effectively “accepted the position of re-insurer of last 
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resort”, with the financial responsibilities that entailed.TPF13FPT  In his view, when the common law of 
negligence had been modified by statute previously, the changes had  reflected the interests of 
“...the persons driving the reform process...insurers or public instrumentalities with equivalent 
interests”, such that “...the primary source of ideas about what changes are required have come 
from the perspective of insurance underwriters seeking to limit claims (and therefore premiums), 
or their functional equivalents in a government backed scheme seeking to restrict the call on 
public funds...”.TPF14FPT  While he, too, favoured reform to restrict liability and damages and curtail 
“...the imperial march of the tort of negligence”, he argued that reforms that were principle 
driven would better achieve these goals than the prevailing “underwriter driven reform”.TPF15FPT This 
was strong language, and much quoted.TPF16FPT       
Whatever the precise combination of causes and the respective contribution of each, 
fallout from the collapse of the two insurers was significant: enforcement of existing claims by 
victims of wrongdoing became uncertain, public liability and medical indemnity insurance 
premiums increased substantially, community events were cancelled when insurance was 
unavailable or unaffordable, some physicians withdrew services, and the possibility of longer 
term unavailability of physician services in certain areas of the country loomed.TPF17FPT  Governments 
considered the situation had “the potential to cause major social disruption”.TPF18FPT  They responded 
to protect people who had existing claims, protect organizations and medical practitioners who 
faced claims from past events, and to ensure insurance would be available and affordable in the 
future.TPF19FPT  The shared sense of crisis galvanized politicians to deliver substantial change 
quickly.TPF20FPT   
The Ipp Report:  Review of the Law of Negligence 
The tort system was an obvious candidate for attention.  The civil liability system does 
affect insurance premiums, was being widely blamed as the chief culprit, and was a factor 
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governments could regulate.  Not surprisingly, that is where they focused their response. The 
Commonwealth, state and territorial governments established a “principles-based” review of the 
law of negligence, conducted by a judge, an academic torts scholar, a medical professional, and a 
member of a local authority, collectively known as the “Panel of Eminent Persons”.TPF21FPT  It began 
work in July, 2002, and was given two months to report initially, and three months to deliver a 
final report (the “Ipp Report”).TPF22FPT  The governments’ directions to the Panel were explicit: “The 
award of damages for personal injury has become unaffordable and unsustainable as the 
principal source of compensation for those injured through the fault of another.  It is desirable to 
examine a method for the reform of the common law with the objective of limiting liability and 
quantum of damages arising from personal injury and death”.TPF23FPT  The panel was to inquire into the 
common law of negligence, its underlying principles and operation in the case of personal injury 
or death, how to limit liability and quantum of damages (with particular reference to public 
authorities, non-profit organizations, and medical negligence), and how to harmonize recovery 
available under other statutes to ensure reform efforts were not stymied.TPF24FPT  The process was 
driven by the Treasury ministries, which influenced both the statement of the problem and the 
solutions.  As Peter Cane, one of the members of the panel, commented, “...the underlying 
problem was seen as being primarily economic rather than legal”.TPF25FPT  The crisis identified was the 
high costs of negligence claims, and not, for instance, an unacceptable incidence of medical 
error, or the disparity between the large numbers of patients injured by healthcare, and the 
relatively small numbers of patients compensated through the legal system.  The solutions 
developed aimed to lower and shift those costs, by reducing the scope of liability and the 
quantum of damages.  
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The panel recommended significant changes to the law of negligence, most of which 
governments adopted. Of the Ipp Report’s 61 recommendations, those most relevant to medical 
malpractice litigation are as follows:TPF26FPT 
• altered tests for foreseeability of a risk of harm, as well as the duty to take precautions 
with regard to obvious risks; 
• modification of test for standard of care to re-instate deference to expert medical opinion, 
unless “irrational”; 
• re-statement of test for causation, to require proof of (i) factual causation (i.e. that 
negligence played a part in bringing about the harm), falling within (ii) an appropriate 
scope of liability (a normative determination about allocating the cost of injury); 
• affirmation of subjective test to determine what a plaintiff would have done if the 
defendant had not been negligent, but excluding the plaintiff’s testimony on that issue 
(relevant to failure to warn / inform of risks of treatment); 
• equation of liability for breach of non-delegable duty of care with vicarious liability; 
• statutory restrictions on circumstances in which damages for pure mental harm can be 
awarded; 
• imposition of caps on damages for personal injury claims (past and future economic loss 
and non-economic loss), and additional restrictions on  recovery, such as for gratuitous 
services; 
• development of guidelines regarding quantum of damages; 
• establishment of thresholds (for general damages, “15% of a most extreme case”);TPF27FPT  
• introduction of mandatory mediation with a view to securing structured settlements; 
• retention of existing law regarding civil liability for wrongful acts and omissions done in 
good faith by Good Samaritans and volunteers;  
• imposition of standard, shorter limitation period, commencing from discoverability; 
• deduction of collateral benefits from damages awards on “like against like” basis; 
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• elimination of pre-judgment interest on damages for non-economic loss; 
• abolition of exemplary and punitive damages; 
• elimination and reduction of costs awards in smaller claims; 
• retention of existing law governing joint and several liability in cases of personal injury 
or death, rather than proportional liability. 
It recommended that the changes be incorporated in a single statute in each jurisdiction, 
applicable to claims for damages for personal injury or death, regardless of whether brought in 
tort, contract, equity, pursuant to statute or otherwise. While acknowledging that its 
recommendations would reduce or eliminate some compensation payable under the laws then in 
effect, thus shifting the costs of those injuries from injurers to injured parties, it left decisions 
about how to respond to that issue to governments. TPF28FPT  It also pointed out that, although beyond its 
mandate, reductions in the secondary costs of compensation – i.e. legal fees and insurers’ 
administrative costs incurred in delivering compensation – could significantly contribute to 
reducing the overall costs of compensation.TPF29FPT 
The Neave Report:  Responding to the Medical Indemnity Crisis 
 As the Ipp panel began work, the Australian Health Ministers Advisory Council (AHMAC) 
also appointed a group to develop recommendations for reforms to legal processes in health care 
claims.  Its objectives were to improve patient safety, reduce the need to litigate and encourage 
earlier finalization of claims; provide fair compensation, and ensure affordable and sustainable 
premiums so medical services could be maintained. TPF30FPT  The AHMAC Legal Process Reform 
Group was to develop proposals for governments’ consideration that would:TPF31FPT   
• Reduce the need for litigation, encourage early resolution of claims before litigation, and 
streamline litigation processes to reduce delay; 
• Improve handling of adverse events; and 
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• Assess reforms needed to medical negligence law to ensure a proper balance among the 
interests of health care consumers, doctors and the community.  
 It was headed by Marcia Neave, Chair of the Victorian Law Reform Commission, and included 
representatives from government, medicine, and the plaintiff and defense bar.  It, too, began 
work in July, 2002, and reported in August, 2002.   
Given that its remit was from the health ministries rather than Treasury, and the different 
emphasis in its mandate, the premise guiding its work differed as well: reforms must balance the 
public interest in fair compensation with the public interest in ensuring premiums are affordable 
and sustainable, so that appropriate medical service levels can be maintained.TPF32FPT  It was focused 
not just on litigation reform, but also on broader systems issues such as the handling of adverse 
events, and was more attentive to balancing the interests of those concerned, rather than just 
limiting liability and damages.  Some of its recommendations were similar to the Ipp Report’s, 
including capping certain heads of damage, improving use of expert witnesses, changing 
limitation periods, imposing thresholds for compensable injuries, and facilitating structured 
settlements.  Others differed, such as protecting apologies from constituting admissions of 
liability, enhancing alternatives such as ADR and conciliation by Health Care Complaints 
Commissions to divert claims from litigation, and addressing the need for a systematic response 
to long-term care costs.TPF33FPT  The Neave Report explicitly considered the links between patient 
safety and litigation, and recommended measures to both encourage openness and enhance 
abilities to monitor where needed.TPF34FPT  These included statutory protection from disclosure for risk 
management activities to facilitate greater openness about adverse events, support for open 
disclosure to patients to reduce the need to litigate simply to obtain information, and 
requirements to notify appropriate authorities when payments were made to resolve claims, to 
allow for investigation, if warranted.TPF35FPT   
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Both Reviews acknowledged being hampered in their work by the lack of good quality 
data on the incidence, causes and costs of medical litigation, and reliable and convincing 
empirical evidence about changes that should be made and their effects.TPF36FPT  
Statutory Reform 
The Ipp Report overshadowed the Neave Report in its immediate uptake, although more 
recently, attention has returned to issues such as legislative support for open disclosure and 
investigating adverse events.TPF37FPT  By November, 2002, governments had agreed to both a package 
of liability reforms based on key recommendations of the Ipp Report, and to work towards 
harmonizing the law of damages.TPF38FPT  Changes to the law were quickly implemented in two or 
three waves of statutory reform in the states, territories and Commonwealth.TPF39FPT  In terms of the 
distinction Spigelman, CJ had drawn between “underwriter driven” reform and “principle 
driven” reform, the statutory enactments included both.   
Although the Ipp Report’s recommendation for nationally uniform legislation did not 
prevail, legislation in the various jurisdictions shares important features.TPF40FPT  In some instances, 
reforms adopted went further than the Ipp Report had recommended, for instance by excluding 
“Good Samaritans” and volunteers from civil liability for wrongful acts and omissions done in 
good faith, and protecting apologies from constituting admissions of liability.TPF41FPT  Governments 
also set a higher discount rate than the Ipp Report recommended, despite the hardship that doing 
so would cause.  As Mr. Justice Ipp pointed out, setting an unrealistically high discount rate is 
“...an unfair and entirely arbitrary way of reducing damages”, that most disadvantages “... those 
who are the most in need – namely, the most seriously injured”. TPF42FPT  Some jurisdictions adopted 
additional measures aimed at reducing litigation further, such as restricting legal advertising, and 
requiring lawyers to certify that cases have a reasonable chance of success before acting for a 
client on a claim or defence.TPF43FPT  Federal legislation was passed in support, including amendments 
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to tax laws to remove barriers to structured settlements, and to trade practices law, to foreclose 
efforts to circumvent state law reform by relying on causes of action other than negligence.TPF44FPT  
Reports issued by the Commonwealth government post-reform summarize the extensive changes 
made in each jurisdiction. TPF45FPT   
Statutory reform has continued, although at a slower pace.  Some changes to civil 
procedure have been adopted in response to recommendations made by inquiries into deficient 
care and patient injury.TPF46FPT  They are meant to improve patient safety and reduce error by 
encouraging greater openness among health care providers about adverse events.   For instance, 
New South Wales recently extended statutory protection from compelled disclosure to teams 
engaged in root cause analysis and their work.  These changes are discussed in greater detail in 
Sections II and III of this chapter.  
Long-Term Care 
Meanwhile, discussion of a statutory long-term care scheme outside the tort system for 
people who have been catastrophically injured re-emerges periodically.  It was proposed (not for 
the first time) in the Neave Report;TPF47FPT more recently, the Australian Medical Association renewed 
its call for government support of such an initiative, arguing that it would both benefit people 
severely injured in accidents (including medical accidents), and make medical indemnity 
arrangements more certain and secure. TPF48FPT  If adopted, it would have the potential to significantly 
affect tort liability, but without additional information about benefit levels, scope, eligibility and 
funding, its effects cannot be predicted with certainty.    
The Medical Indemnity Support Scheme 
Concomitant with the sweeping legislative reforms, the Commonwealth government put 
in place a medical indemnity support scheme.  The cost of claims against public hospitals and 
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their employees, including physicians, were already borne by state and territory governments.TPF49FPT  
Fiona Tito-Wheatland has summarized the elements of the package:  (1) premium support 
(subsidizing physicians’ premiums); (2) high cost claims scheme (a subsidy to meet half of 
damages payable over $300,000); (3) run-off cover scheme (coverage after physicians die or 
leave the workforce); (4) exceptional claims scheme (all damages payable in excess of $20 
million); and (5) contribution by members of one insurer to its unfunded tail.TPF50FPT  The 
Commonwealth government estimated that the cost of its commitments was approximately $150 
million (Aus.) per year.TPF51FPT  The effectiveness of these provisions is currently under review. TPF52FPT 
The Litigation Landscape Prior to Tort Reform 
Any assessment of the effects of the reforms to tort law will require a comparison with 
what was replaced.  In that regard, questions have been raised about whether there actually was 
an unsustainable “litigation explosion” fueled by medical negligence claims, or an unprincipled 
“pro-plaintiff” tilt to results, necessitating the large and sudden increases in insurance premiums 
that occurred.TPF53FPT  A study by Wright and Melville reviewing empirical evidence about changes in 
rates of litigation in New South Wales concluded that there was no evidence of a general 
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litigation explosion during the relevant time period.TPF54FPT  Others strongly disagree.TPF55FPT  The two 
views are largely irreconcilable, given that they depend not only on evaluations of factual data 
about lawsuits, but importantly, on  different judgments about the aims of law, and who should 
bear responsibility for the costs of injury. 
Focusing on medical negligence claims, it is widely accepted that people injured by 
health care seldom sue.  Even when people have suffered significant disability as a result of 
highly preventable adverse events in the course of medical treatment, litigation is infrequent.TPF56FPT  
Conversely, not all lawsuits are evidence of negligence – there may have been no fault or injury 
at all.  While precise figures are difficult to ascertain, there is a significant disparity between the 
number of lawsuits claiming medical negligence and the much larger number of adverse events.  
The 1995 Professional Indemnity Review Report compared the estimated number of adverse 
events (in excess of 400,000, with 230,000 clearly preventable) with the estimated incidence of 
litigation (fewer than 2000 per year alleging negligence, of which few go to court, and many 
never result in payment). TPF57FPT  The 2002 Neave Report accepted that the volume and size of claims 
based on allegations of medical negligence had grown, but pointed out that a number of factors 
contributed to this development beyond simply an increase in the number of lawsuits, including 
growth in the number of services provided, medical developments, and medical advances 
resulting in decreased mortality from health care but increased periods of life with significant 
disability.TPF58FPT  
Recent Public Sector Litigation Claims Experience 
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Australia’s new Medical Indemnity National Data Collections for the public sector 
provide more recent data about levels of litigation and the size of claims.TPF59FPT  It includes both legal 
actions that are underway, and those considered sufficiently likely to materialize into a claim that 
a reserve has been set.  As at June, 2003, 2,394 current claims had been reported, and 272 claims 
had been finalized during the preceding six months.TPF60FPT  Most of these would have arisen from 
events and lawsuits that pre-dated the tort reforms.  Almost 45% of claims had a reserve range of 
$30,000 (Aus) or less; 5.6% of claims had a reserve range in excess of $500,000 (including 16% 
of obstetrics claims). TPF61FPT  While it is estimated that the first report included only 50% of claims 
within its scope because of initial difficulties coordinating information from disparate systems, 
that had increased to 80% of claims by its second report, and further improvements in reporting 
are expected.TP F62FPT   
The Second Indemnity Data Report indicates that 1641 new claims were received and 
827 claims finalized during the period July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2004.  The database included 
4956 claims in total during that time.  Of claims finalized, 40% (340 claims) were decided out of 
court (82% of those with a claim size in excess of $100,000 – 50 claims).  Overall, only 6% (48 
claims) were decided in court (16% of those with a claim size greater than $100,000). Almost 
half (43%) of finalized claims were discontinued; 56% of these (207 claims) had a total claim 
size of less than $10,000, and 33% (122 claims) resulted in no payment.  Of claims finalized 
through a court decision, almost half resulted in no payment.TPF63FPT  It is not yet clear whether the tort 
reforms, essentially making many smaller claims non-economic, will diminish insurers’ 
willingness to make some payment in order to settle, because the threat of litigation will often 
have been eliminated (although such payments would have been atypical of medical insurers in 
any event).   
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Data on private sector medical indemnity claims may eventually be included in these 
reports as well.TPF64FPT As the reports become more comprehensive, they will provide the data needed 
to analyze trends in medical indemnity claims and litigation. Even with current limitations, the 
picture is not one of rampant and uncontrolled medical malpractice litigation.  Further, the 
majority of claims are for smaller amounts, and the bulk of costs are associated with a relatively 
small number of large claims. 
The Effects of Tort Reform 
    It is too early to assess the full impact of the tort reforms.  Indications are that smaller 
claims have been significantly affected, a predictable result of the thresholds for damages, 
limitations on recovery of legal costs in smaller claims and other measures that were 
introduced.TPF65FPT  Chief Justice Spigelman has criticized the operation of the threshold for general 
damages in particular (15% of a most extreme case).TPF66FPT  He noted that general damages (i.e. non-
economic losses) used to comprise about half the total damages in claims up to $100,000, and 
that claims for non-economic loss in these cases had effectively been abolished, adding that 
while insurance companies might consider such payments small, “the matters are not small from 
the perspective of the injured person”.TPF67FPT  It is not clear whether and to what extent complaints-
based processes in the states and territories that have limited power to order payments will 
provide an alternative for claims where court is no longer an option.  Larger claims will also be 
seriously affected by capped damages, limitations on certain heads of damage, increases in the 
discount rate, and other restrictions on assessing damages.   
None of this is unexpected; reducing the risk of liability and size of judgments was, after 
all, the aim of the reforms.  There has been some speculation that the new restrictions may lead 
lawyers to look further afield for other types of claims or different defendants.TPF68FPT  The 
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Commonwealth government is certainly positive about the results. It reported that the insurance 
climate in Australia had “vastly improved” as a result of the reforms and government support, 
that capacity was returning to the insurance industry, price increases had stabilized, and 
international underwriters were interested in what was now considered an “attractively priced 
and profitable business”.TPF69FPT   
There are different views about how significantly statutory reforms will affect the 
substantive law of negligence.TPF70FPT  Commentators also differ on what direction the law will take – 
for instance, whether it will be more or less difficult for plaintiffs to establish causation.TPF71FPT  
Overall, as Mr. Justice Underwood and others have pointed out, the extent of changes to the law 
will depend on interpretation and application by the courts.TPF72FPT  However, in commenting on the 
legislative aftermath to the Ipp Report, Peter Cane, one of the members of the panel, argues that 
judges should follow the legislatures’ lead, since political processes of law reform are preferable 
to judicial as a mechanism for legalizing norms, “given the fact of genuine...disagreement about 
values and about the functions and effects of law”, and that “processes of legislative legalisation 
are more pluralistic and open”.TPF73FPT  
What The Law Reform Process Omitted 
Resolving the insurance crisis was the prime consideration in Australian tort reform.  It 
seems to have overwhelmed consideration for the interests of those to whom the financial costs 
of injury were shifted and the support they would require, i.e. the distributional consequences of 
these reforms.  The speed of its adoption also precluded   careful assessment of the terms of the 
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support package government provided to the insurance industry, and what opportunities 
government subvention presented for requiring reforms in clinical governance and practice that 
could advance other policy goals, such as enhancing patient safety.    
 
 II. Patient Safety 
  Improving patient safety has been an important focus in Australia as it has elsewhere, 
particularly after publication of the Quality in Australian Health Care Study  in 1995.TPF74FPT  It found 
an adverse event rate of 16.6% in hospitalized patients, later revised to 10.6% following a 
comparison of methods with a similar American study.TPF75FPT  Half were considered to be 
preventable.TPF76FPT   The magnitude of these findings was a significant driver of the numerous safety 
and quality programs that have been developed at all levels, from government to service 
providers. The focus of this paper is on the interaction of tort law and patient safety initiatives, 
and so it does not attempt to detail these.  Rather, the remainder of the chapter outlines the 
genesis and work of the first national organization established to lead and coordinate patient 
safety and quality of care efforts, the Australian Council on Safety and Quality in Health Care 
(the Council), reviews recent developments, and assesses the potential impact of the civil 
liability system and tort reform on patient safety initiatives and vice versa.  Two patient safety 
programs in particular, open disclosure and root cause analysis, have been heavily promoted in 
Australia, and because of their potential interaction with the civil liability system and each other, 
are considered in greater depth. Similar programs have been adopted in other countries – root 
cause analysis has become a mainstay of the patient safety toolkit. Australia’s experience is 
unique, however, because substantial changes were being made to both patient safety programs 
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and the tort system simultaneously (albeit for different reasons), and because of its early focus on 
developing formalized process for open disclosure . 
The Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care 
Spurred by the release of the Quality in Australian Health Care Study and on the 
recommendation of expert advisory groups, the Australian Health Ministers established the 
Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care in January, 2000, with a mandate to 
lead national efforts to improve the safety and quality of health care provision.TPF77FPT  It had a term of 
five years (later extended to June, 2006), a total funding allocation of $55 million (of which half 
was provided by the Commonwealth and half by the states and territories), and reported annually 
to the Australian Health Ministers’ Conference (AHMC).TPF78FPT  As the Council’s term drew to a 
close, the AHMC appointed a committee to review its work and develop proposals for the 
governance of safety and quality initiatives in the future, which reported in 2005 (the 
“Review”).TPF79FPT  Pursuant to the Review’s recommendation, the AHMC established a new, smaller 
body in place of the Council, the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care.TP 
F
80
FPT  Its term began January 1, 2006. TP PTIt, too, will be funded by all levels of government.  While 
enhancing patient safety in hospitals continues to be an important goal, the Commission’s 
mandate has been broadened to focus on quality improvement in the health care system more 
generally, including primary health care and the private sector.  It will also be responsible for 
publishing national reports on the state of safety and quality, recommending national standards 
and datasets, identifying issues and policy directions in health care safety and quality, and 
advising Health Ministers on “best practice” thinking.   
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 From its inception in 2000, the Council focused on safety.TPF81FPT  Like patient safety 
advocates in other countries, its fundamental premises were first, that a systems approach was 
essential to improving patient safety, and second, that the culture of health care delivery had to 
change, shifting away from blaming individual practitioners when things went wrong to 
recognizing and addressing the underlying systemic causes of adverse events, so that health care 
providers could learn from accidents and mistakes.TPF82FPT  Although the Council could only 
recommend and not require action, it was influential in gaining wider acceptance and 
understanding of that agenda across the country.  It played an important role as a policy advisory 
body; as its Chair, Bruce Barraclough, noted, it successfully influenced change through a 
“collaborative ‘third party broker’ approach, [while] also identifying, coordinating and funding 
action at all levels of the health care system”. TPF83FPT  Examples include work on developing national 
standards, system re-design such as medication safety programs, supporting health practitioners, 
in part through educational strategies for achieving safer systems and responding to error, 
funding local initiatives to improve health care safety, and promoting greater awareness and 
understanding of a systems-based approach.TPF84FPT  It also commissioned work assessing the 
implications of legal frameworks for particular patient safety initiatives, such as open disclosure 
and qualified privilege.  In the Review’s assessment, the Council’s successes included “...raising 
awareness of safety and quality issues and how to tackle them, particularly among clinicians and 
administrators involved in quality improvement activities”, as well as “elevat[ing] the 
importance of taking a systems approach to safety and quality improvement”.TPF85FPT   
It was hampered by limitations on its ability to implement change.  Some were the result 
of structures imposed on it.  As Barraclough noted, the Council had no way to require that 
initiatives be “entrenched and assured” within the health care system, as it had neither statutory 
authority nor operational capacity to do so, while responsibility and accountability for patient 
safety across the health system generally were often unclear, and capacity to take steps needed to 
achieve quality improvement was inadequate.TPF86FPT  Conversely, some limits resulted from the 
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structures it developed – the Review, for instance, concluded that it could have achieved greater 
uptake had it developed more extensive partnerships with stakeholders, including consumer 
networks.TPF87FPT  The Review also considered Council’s decision at the outset to emphasize safety 
rather than a broader quality agenda to have hindered its effectiveness.TPF88FPT  However, given the 
centrality of the Quality in Australian Health Care study to the Australian patient safety 
movement, with its startling revelations about the numbers of adverse events and harm to 
patients,TPF89FPT and given that safety is so clearly crucial to quality in health care, it is difficult to fault 
the Council for that decision. 
  I have outlined the Council’s mandate and operation briefly as background to a 
consideration of how legal frameworks, and the civil liability system in particular, may affect 
patient safety initiatives. I concentrate on two that the Council championed: open disclosure and 
root cause analysis. Both of these programs sparked concerns on the part of health care providers 
and institutions about their potential legal implications.  In response, the Council commissioned 
several papers to explore the issues and review their legal ramifications, as well as to consider 
ways in which law could be used as an incentive to encourage their implementation.    
Open Disclosure 
  Open disclosure is “... the process of open discussion of adverse events that result in 
unintended harm to a patient while receiving health care and the associated investigation and 
recommendations for improvement”. TPF90FPT  The elements of open disclosure are an expression of 
regret, a factual explanation of what happened, the potential consequences of the event, and the 
steps being taken to manage the event and prevent its recurrence.TPF91FPT  The Open Disclosure 
process is described in greater detail in Appendix A to this chapter.  In Council’s view, open, 
honest, and immediate communication, acknowledging that things had gone wrong and 
providing reassurance to patients and their carers that lessons learned will help prevent a 
recurrence, are key steps in improving patient safety, as well as being consistent with health care 
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providers’ ethical obligations, and reducing the likelihood of lawsuits.TPF92FPT It developed the Open 
Disclosure Standard, a National Standard for open communication in public and private 
hospitals (hereafter, the Standard), which was endorsed by the Ministers of Health as a national 
standard in 2003. TPF93FPT  
While communication is one theme of open disclosure, caution is the other.  Participants 
are instructed not to blame, to restrict themselves to facts not opinions, and to avoid singling 
individuals out.  For instance, the person responsible for preliminary follow-up with the patient 
“must not criticise others or comment on matters outside their own expertise”, although he or she 
should respond to patient queries and concerns.  This approach is consistent with the underlying 
premise that most adverse events in health care are the result of systems deficiencies and failures, 
and is also meant to assuage health care providers’ concerns about participating. Organizations 
are directed to develop policies and practices to ensure that the open disclosure process focuses 
on safety and not attributing blame, and avoids adverse findings against individual professionals. 
Policies and procedures should take patients’, carers’, and staff privacy and confidentiality into 
consideration.TPF94FPT  Issues relating to individuals are to be left to disciplinary processes where 
appropriate.TPF95FPT  Circumstances suitable for referral to disciplinary processes are limited to those 
where a patient may have been harmed by “a criminal or intentionally unsafe act”.TPF96FPT  This is 
narrower than statutory frameworks governing the discipline of doctors or nurses, and seems a 
conscious move meant to signal a new, less punitive approach.TP PT While urging that open 
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disclosure investigation be continued even when disciplinary processes are ongoing, since 
“useful information for system improvement may emerge”, the Standard recognizes the need to 
avoid conflict between disciplinary and open disclosure investigations, and to ensure that the 
rights of the person being investigated are respected.TPF97FPT   
The tensions inherent in introducing open disclosure into an existing landscape of 
complex legal relations, rights, obligations, regulation and liabilities will affect its chances of 
success.  It is difficult to see how the distinctions between fact and opinion, or between stating 
what occurred and why but not criticizing, however attractive in theory, can be sustained in 
practice. It will be especially difficult because of the often fraught nature of the encounter with a 
patient who has been injured, and the reality that disclosure will involve dialogue and not just a 
pre-scripted speech delivered by the health care provider.  Patients who have been harmed will 
want to know who did or failed to do what, and while systemic analysis will give a more 
complete and more sophisticated answer to the question of what went wrong, “who did it” is a 
part of the answer.    
Legal Ramifications of Open Disclosure  
The direction to avoid blame arises in part from Council’s underlying model of how 
adverse events occur – i.e. that causes are most often systemic, so blaming individuals misstates 
the problem and consequently, misdirects efforts to formulate changes needed to prevent a 
recurrence.  It is also shaped by a practical consideration – while most adverse events do not 
reflect negligence, there is an often repeated concern that open disclosure and expressions of 
regret are or may be inhibited by (1) fears of legal exposure, both actual and perceived, and/or 
(2) concerns about affecting insurance coverage.  While some of those fears are overstated, as 
the Legal Review commissioned by the Council’s Open Disclosure project noted (hereafter, the 
“Legal Review”), nonetheless, if open disclosure is to succeed, it must take into account 
stakeholders’ legal rights and substantive concerns.TPF98FPT  Consequently, the Standard emphasizes 
limiting disclosures to patients to facts and expressions of regret, but not venturing opinion or 
criticism, and cautions health care providers against admitting that they or anybody else are 
liable for harm caused to the patient.TPF99FPT 
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Will avoiding blame also mean not attributing responsibility, other than at a systems-
level?  While expressing support for root cause analysis, Commissioner Walker commented in 
his Final Report on the Special Inquiry into Camden and Campbelltown Hospitals:  “...I fail to 
see why the cause of an adverse event must be only a systems failure”.TPF100FPT  That unease is 
understandable; many questions remain unanswered.  What if there were individual 
shortcomings, with or without accompanying deficiencies in the system?  Ought those issues be 
left entirely to other processes such as professional discipline?  What assurance is there that they 
will be taken up in another forum?  If they are, there will be concerns that information gathered 
as part of the open disclosure process will be disclosed to authorities and lead to professional or 
employment repercussions, and conversely, concerns that it will not, leaving individuals’ 
problematic practices unaddressed. 
Using Law to Encourage Disclosure 
As for the ways in which law could be used to encourage disclosure, the Legal Review 
concluded that there are situations where providers and institutions may be legally obliged to 
disclose as part of the duties of care owed to patients or to comply with professional standards of 
practice.TPF101FPT   Additionally, if open disclosure were to be mandated by statute or regulation, health 
care providers’ and institutions’ incentives to comply would certainly be enhanced.   
More generally, regulatory scholars have considered how best to foster compliance with 
programs meant to abate or control risk.  Rejecting the traditional exclusive focus on deterrence, 
they have shifted to the study of the external and internal levers that may be used to foster 
compliance in organizations.  John Braithwaite has been a prominent proponent of this approach, 
advocating reliance on concepts of the regulatory pyramid and responsive regulation.TPF102FPT  Briefly, 
the base of the regulatory pyramid begins with education and persuasive strategies that 
encourage trust and discourage defensiveness.  Sanctions become progressively more onerous as 
one moves up the pyramid, with punitive sanctions reserved for situations where other strategies 
have clearly failed.  Responsive regulation begins from the premise that regulators should be 
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responsive to the conduct of those they seek to regulate when deciding whether a more or less 
interventionist approach is needed; one regulatory strategy will not be appropriate in all 
situations, and a corrective strategy cannot necessarily be determined in advance.   
The Council commissioned Braithwaite and colleagues to prepare a discussion paper to 
explore whether this approach could assist in improving patient safety and quality of care.TPF103FPT  
Braithwaite et al. suggest that (i) health care near-misses be addressed by means of “a no-blame 
approach that flows from a culture of learning”, (ii) where patients are hurt and ongoing 
underperformance attributable to an individual or systems failure can be identified, remedial 
action be taken, premised on a restorative justice approach to transcend blame, and (iii) where 
both of these have failed, response escalate to a legal accountability approach.TPF104FPT  They also 
recognize the importance of a continuing, although more limited role for traditional command 
and control regulation. It is not clear that such a shift would be feasible in the health sector, or 
that it would achieve either compliance or reduced risk and safer outcomes.  Recognizing this, 
Braithwaite et al. call for testing these hypotheses with empirical research in order to formulate 
the evidence base necessary to justify choices and combinations of regulatory strategies.  In-
depth assessment of the applicability of such an approach in the context of healthcare systems is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  It is interesting to note, however, that the authors suggest tort 
law and systems approaches to improving performance may be inherently incompatible.  
However, since their one reference is to a regime of economic incentives in a different context, 
querying whether it could co-exist with tort, their point that further research is needed on this 
question is an important caveat.TPF105FPT     
Root Cause Analysis 
Root cause analysis (RCA) is an incident investigation technique used to identify the 
causes of incidents and guide the development of preventive strategies.TPF106FPT  The Council defined 
it as a systematic process whereby the factors that contributed to an adverse event are 
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identified.TPF107FPT  The Australians adapted their version of RCA from the Americans.TPF108FPT  Its 
foundations are in systemic analysis focused on the fragility and fallibility of the system, rather 
than individuals.  Critics caution that it is problematic because of fallible memories, poor 
records, and investigators’ theoretical predilections, as well as the limitations inherent in 
strategizing change on the basis of single incidents.TPF109FPT  Regardless, it has become ubiquitous in 
patient safety practice. 
Council supported national workshops in 2003 to train a core of individuals who could 
lead root cause analysis training initiatives in their own jurisdictions.  Each state is teaching 
health care staff root cause analysis methodology. TPF110FPT Efforts to incorporate it into adverse event 
responses are underway.  For instance, in New South Wales, health services have been required 
to subject the most severe incidents to root cause analysis since 2003, and the state recently 
extended qualified privilege to RCA.TPF111FPT   
Implementation, however, is uneven.  Mandating root cause analysis of sentinel or 
serious events or similar processes does not mean that it always occurs.  A 2005 review of health 
care systems in Queensland noted that although root cause analysis of sentinel events was 
required, “...the effectiveness of the incident management policy has been variable...due to a 
range of business processes being used, no comprehensive information system for incident 
reporting, lack of tools for incident analysis, limited training for staff in analysis techniques, and 
limited resources and capacity to set up and maintain systems”.TPF112FPT  It added that some medical 
and nursing staff advised that they do not report incidents because they receive no feedback on 
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how the information is used.TP F113FPT  When reporting does not seem to make any discernable 
difference, it will be limited.  Drawing on experience in other sectors, Braithwaite et al. stress the 
importance of a non-defensive environment for accurate analysis, to avoid both over-servicing 
(“everything possible was done”), and scapegoating (senior personnel can be “very resourceful” 
in ensuring more junior personnel will be found at fault).TPF114FPT  
Restrictions on what can be taken into account in determining root causes have the 
potential to undermine confidence in the resulting analysis.  Some RCA frameworks specifically 
exclude consideration of financial resources.  The impetus to do so is understandable, because 
limited resources are a reality in health care, and it is often simply too easy to blame whatever 
has gone wrong on a lack of money, without in-depth examination of what can be done to make 
care better and safer within existing parameters.TPF115FPT  However, sometimes inadequate financial 
resources truly have been a factor contributing to unsafe systems. As a case in point, the 2005 
Report of the Queensland Public Hospitals Commission of Inquiry concluded that one of the root 
causes of unsafe conditions in the public hospitals examined was inadequate funding to provide 
the services promised.TPF116FPT  If RCA investigators cannot consider the role played by finances even 
though this affected patient outcomes, the risk is that the accuracy and comprehensiveness of 
their findings, utility of their recommendations, and respect for the integrity of the RCA process 
itself will be threatened.  Deciding when and how financial factors can be taken into account 
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King Edward Memorial Hospital was that it “understated the consequences of poor policy and regulation...[and 
included] little or no consideration of government responsibility for ensuring the adequacy of recurrent funding and 
allocation...”; see also Eagar. K., “Learning the Hard Way:  Quality, Safety and Scandal:  The Weakest Link?” Aust. 
Health Rev. 2004; 28(1): 7-12, online at 
http://www.aushealthreviewcom.au/publications/articles/issues/ahr_28_1_300904/ahr_2  on resource allocation: 
“All of us – clinical leaders, managers, academics, commentators and politicians – are guilty of simply accepting, 
and remaining silent about, the size of the pie and how fairly it is sliced”.  Although see Inquiry into Campbelltown 
and  Camden Hospitals Final Report supra, n.100, at 80, in which Commissioner Walker commented approvingly 
that the HCCC’s statutory mandate precludes recommendations that affect appropriation of resources, because in his 
view, these “...truly political issues should never become the preserve of so-called experts or independent 
regulators”.    
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calls for careful consideration of the forum, its mandate, and the expertise needed, rather than 
outright preclusion.   
Qualified Privilege   
 Health care professionals and institutions have used a variety of formal and informal 
means to review the safety and quality of care for a considerable period of time.  In Australia, 
some of those processes are protected from disclosure by qualified privilege legislation. 
Qualified privilege has the potential to encourage disclosure, and yet may also constitute another 
barrier to communication. 
  Statutorily shielding some quality assurance activities and information from disclosure 
to third parties is meant to allow unconstrained analysis of adverse events and outcomes and 
encourage health care provider participation without fear of legal repercussions. “Quality 
assurance” (QA) describes a range of activities aimed at identifying and influencing factors 
contributing to health care outcomes, from monitoring rates of occurrence of selected events to 
identifying and investigating specific incidents.  The availability, scope and extent of qualified 
privilege varies among states.  Since qualified privilege allows relevant information to be 
withheld from the courts, the patients concerned, and the public, the result can be that none have 
access to material that would assist in learning about and evaluating what occurred.  As the 
Council noted in its 2003 report, “Improving the Consistency of Approaches to Qualified 
Privilege Schemes”, the public interest in access to health care quality information is of primary 
concern, making it imperative that the case for the countervailing public interest in 
confidentiality be clearly demonstrated.TPF117FPT   
Judging how to balance the public interests at stake is not always clear.   In the Council’s 
view, protection from disclosure ought only be available “...to the extent necessary to ensure 
quality assurance activities are not hindered by health care professionals’ reasonable fear of 
unreasonable adverse professional consequences of disclosure of information”.TPF118FPT  On its face, 
this will be a difficult standard to apply with certainty or to monitor. Health care providers want 
to be sure that information they share as part of QA processes will not be disclosed further, and 
challenges to qualified privilege shake that confidence.  However, as the Legal Review noted, 
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qualified privilege may be too easily or improperly invoked:  “...It is also possible that the 
availability of qualified privilege protection will be identified by some health care providers as a 
legitimate strategy by which to avoid implementation of a fully open process of communication 
with patients and their carers when an adverse event has occurred”.TPF119FPT That concern is more than 
hypothetical.  The 2005 Commission of Inquiry into Queensland Hospitals found that privilege 
had been improperly claimed, and at the highest levels. Commissioner Davies concluded that 
successive state governments had followed a practice of concealment and suppression of elective 
surgery waiting lists and measured quality reports, and had used Cabinet to improperly shield 
information from disclosure following requests under the Freedom of Information Act, and that 
others had improperly refused disclosure as well.TPF120FPT  
Implementing Open Disclosure 
The number of units and health care staff participating in some form of open disclosure 
and root cause analysis, and consequently, reporting adverse events, is increasing. Given the 
ambivalence and concerns about legal repercussions noted previously, why is this occurring?  
Bruce Barraclough, former Chair of the Council, attributes it to two factors:  first, people will 
participate if they believe there is a commitment to act on the results of investigations, i.e. that 
their participation will lead to change for the better, and second, people are coming to believe 
that systems issues will be fixed without inappropriate blame.TP F121FPT With that understanding, the 
higher numbers of adverse events being reported are considered a positive development: they 
alert organizations and providers to what problems exist so that action can be taken to correct 
them and prevent harm.TPF122FPT   While variations of open disclosure have been implemented on a 
local or area basis, Council began a more systematic pilot program in 2004 at a number of sites 
nationally.  It was placed on hold later that year to resolve legal and liability issues and resource 
implications.TPF123FPT  In January 2005, the AHMC endorsed a revised plan to progressively 
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implement the open disclosure standard across all health facilities.  Pilot implementation guided 
by a national steering committee was to follow, with a report to AHMC in December 2006.TPF124FPT    
 The importance of open disclosure has been widely accepted across a broad spectrum of 
stakeholders.TPF125FPT  Acceptance in principle, however, has not always translated into action.  The 
2004 Report of the Inquiry, “Complaints Handling within NSW Health”, concluded: “Given the 
significant cultural barriers to openness about adverse events, the evidence to this inquiry 
indicates it is highly unlikely open disclosure is being practiced routinely in hospitals across the 
State”.TPF126FPT  Vis a vis error reporting, as the Queensland Health System Review observed in its 
2005 Report, medical and nursing staff in many areas advised that “...they do not report incidents 
(let alone near misses) because they receive no feedback on how the information is used”.TPF127FPT 
Implementation, then, remains partial, and still faces considerable resistance.   
Are Patient Safety Initiatives Effective? 
There have been questions about whether the many patient safety initiatives undertaken 
have resulted in safer care and reduced harm to patients.  Ross Wilson, one of the original 
authors of the Quality in Australian Health Care study, and Martin Van Der Weyden argue that 
ten years after that study, there is insufficient information at the state or national level to 
determine whether the many efforts over the preceding decade have actually increased safety in 
hospitals.TPF128FPT  In fairness, the absence of empirical studies does not mean that these programs are 
not having positive effects, but that they have not yet been assessed.  Wilson and Van Der 
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PT  Wilson, R., Van Der Weyden, M., “The safety of Australian health care: 10 years after QAHCA” MJA 2005; 
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 171
Weyden also contend that, despite its extensive work program, the Council had “limited 
relevance to or influence on the daily lives of health professionals”, and that its emphasis on 
policy and monitoring rather than “bottom up” activities “...can result in a considerable gap 
between what patient safety strategies are supposed to have been implemented in the workplace 
and what strategies are actually in place”.TPF129FPT   They raise additional issues about how systems –
for both delivering and overseeing health care -- actually respond when  patients have been 
harmed, and about how to change the underlying conditions that are repeatedly identified as 
contributing to environments that allow unsafe patterns and practices to develop and continue. 
The high-profile investigations into problematic care at a number of Australian hospitals over the 
last several years lend credence to their observations about the gaps between theory and practice.   
The reports of these inquiries highlight the need to consider the prospects for uptake of patient 
safety initiatives in light of broader social and institutional contexts.  Recent inquiries and their 
results are summarized in Appendix B to this chapter.  More general observations on the relation 
between inquiries and patient safety initiatives follow. 
Inquiries and Patient Safety Initiatives 
A review of the history underlying the public inquiries reveals a number of characteristics 
in common: compromised patient safety over considerable periods of time that was not detected 
or addressed by accreditation processes, sentinel event reporting, or other safety and quality 
processes; problematic clinical governance; and health care professionals, who, frustrated by 
inaction after internal reporting of adverse events, brought the matter to the attention of 
politicians.TPF130FPT  Targeted patient safety initiatives have a relatively short history, and 
implementation is still a work in progress.  However, it is apparent from these inquiries that 
existing programs either did not reveal the existence of the deficiencies and harm to patients, or 
if the problems were known, did not result in effective action to resolve them.TPF131FPT  
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After lengthy, grueling and costly public inquiries, the recommendations that result are 
strikingly similar too.  Broadly, in order to achieve safer health care, clinical governance 
structures need to be reformulated; systems implemented for reporting, investigating and 
analyzing adverse events; compliance and performance monitored through clinical audits and 
other means; and external oversight strengthened.  Sufficient financial resources are required to 
make care safer, and quality and safety programs more effective.TPF132FPT  Some of the inquiries urge 
greater protection for whistleblowers, because it was only through their persistence that the 
shortcomings in care came to light and were addressed.  All recognize the damage caused by a 
culture of concealment and blame, and strongly endorse the importance of openness, and reliable 
assurances to health care providers that they work in a just culture, or as one author put it, “...a 
reformed institutional ethos that encourages open transparency and respect for those committed 
to such processes, so that they will disclose what has gone wrong”. TPF133FPT With the exception of the 
Royal Melbourne Hospital Inquiry,TPF134FPT the events and responses in each were intensely 
politicized.  Finally, the tension between the traditional focus on individual professional 
accountability and the more recent emphasis on systemic analysis affected all of them, and in 
some (Campbelltown and Camden Hospitals in particularTPF135FPT), ended up driving the process.   
As Trebilcock and Austin note, the task of both investigating past acts and wrongdoings 
and formulating recommendations to prevent similar occurrences in the future magnifies the 
conflicts between “...lawyers’ values, shaped by concerns with civil liberties and due process”, 
and “policymakers’ values”.TPF136FPT  These tensions are inherent in an endeavour that looks backward 
to assess what has gone wrong in order to look forward to determine how to improve.  They are 
heightened because of the highly politicized and personal nature of health care.  Media, public 
and political demands for accountability are intense, and accountability is understood to mean 
individual accountability for past delinquencies, not just formulating plans for a better and safer 
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future.  Starting from the position that “no one is to blame” even before investigating what 
occurred has the potential to exacerbate distrust of the patient safety agenda, and reinforce 
suspicions that it is simply a way to insulate health care providers and organizations from 
accountability.  While patient safety advocates’ message calling for an end to individual blame 
has garnered some acceptance, where and how to draw the line between blameless and 
blameworthy behaviour is far from settled, and major disagreements remain about what the 
repercussions of each should be.TPF137FPT  Failure to resolve that conflict will affect uptake of the 
patient safety movement’s insights into how error and injury occur and can be reduced, not only 
by health care professionals, but more importantly, by the public. 
One of the more blunt discussions of the tension between a systemic focus and individual 
accountability (such as professional discipline proceedings, peer assessment or employment 
repercussions) is to be found in the Campbelltown and Camden Hospitals Special Inquiry Final 
Report.  Commissioner Walker explained his support for an approach that combined the two: TPF138FPT   
“...I well understand a fear of witchhunts, and empathize with the unpleasantness of officially 
finding fault in others.  But in my opinion, the willingness and capacity of the medical and 
nursing professions to insist on standards being attained and improved are essential to those 
professions acting in the public interest....  I was pressed with a deal of material urging a view 
that learning and encouragement to improve are more important than finding fault and punishing 
professionals.  At a suitably abstract level, that sounds like a truism, but is of little practical 
value.  In particular, it exhibits the same false dichotomy noted above – systemic learning and 
improvement and individual professional accountability are simply not mutually exclusive.  
Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that a patient care complaints system, in order to be 
respectful of the dignity and interests of the patients and families who make complaints or are 
involved in complaints, must respond to the complaint in a clear fashion.  In my opinion, it is not 
good enough for them to be told, as it were, that their comfort should be that the experience they 
found so awful has been an interesting or useful learning experience for the profession.  In many 
cases, the profession learning from error so as to avoid the repetition of tragedies or mishaps will 
be an outcome sought by complainants.  But vindication of legitimate personal grievance is also 
an outcome sought by complainants – and in my view is the primary one sought by them.   
None of these comments...should be taken as derogatory of systemic approaches to the 
maintenance and improvement of standards of care in our hospitals. To the contrary, the 
material...strongly endorses the great benefits reasonably to be hoped for from energetic 
development of such approaches... 
...it is high time the two camps [individual and systemic accountability] struck their separate 
tents and travelled together.” 
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 He went on to observe:TPF139FPT 
 “The chimera of no-fault in health care should be banished.  But the equal absurdity of 
expecting that all adverse outcomes – or even many of them at all – are due to some hapless 
doctor’s or nurse’s fault for which they should be blamed or condemned should also be 
exploded”. 
 
Walker’s prescription of peaceful co-existence, however, ignores the stubborn reality that 
systems to investigate adverse events need the support of health care providers to be effective, 
and experience has shown that current structures and incentive systems often work against that 
end.  No amount of exhortation or admonition will alter this, without other concrete changes.  
The nature of events giving rise to inquiries and the politicized environments in which they take 
place test providers’ faith that they will not be scapegoated for systemic shortcomings, and the 
public’s belief that any real accountability will result at all. 
Patient Safety and Health System Restructuring 
Safety and quality initiatives do not exist in a vacuum.  They are affected by wider public 
and political environments, by legal frameworks such as the tort system, and most immediately, 
by the complex and diverse health care systems in which they are situated.  Recent health system 
restructuring and reviews in Australia, although instituted in response to many different 
challenges, evidence a number of common themes.  A trend towards centralization of 
governance is prominent. Patient safety has been no exception,   particularly in the aftermath of 
public inquiries.  Dwyer attributes the trend towards more direct control of health care provision 
by governments not only to financial pressures associated with greater demand for services, but 
also to the increasing disclosure of safety and quality problems, and the renewed emphasis on 
accountability that has resulted.TPF140FPT  She notes that, although research indicates that “micro-
management from above” tends to stifle innovative solutions, this approach will likely 
increasingly characterize future developments, especially given the intense politicization of 
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health care.TPF141FPT  Consequently,  structural reforms may be significantly shaped by efforts to 
manage reputational risk to healthcare providers, administrators and government. TPF142FPT   
 
III. Interactions between Patient Safety Initiatives and Tort Reform  
  Negligence law is seldom high on any political agenda.  What crystallized the political 
will to undertake substantial tort reform in Australia?  It was not patient safety advocacy.  
Rather, what galvanized the state, territorial and Commonwealth governments to work together 
and implement sweeping changes to the common law framework governing negligence claims 
was a financial crisis reducing the availability of insurance that threatened to significantly affect 
the life of the community, coupled  with longstanding pressure for law reform by insurers and 
health professionals, and an environment in which public discourse increasingly held negligence 
law to blame for a wide variety of faults.  The aim of the reforms was to resolve the insurance 
crisis, not to improve patient safety.TPF143FPT      
Nonetheless, have the reforms to the civil justice system and negligence law affected 
patient safety initiatives, even indirectly?  On the whole, the far-reaching reforms to tort law 
have been largely incidental to work on patient safety and quality.TP F144FPT  Much can be 
accomplished to improve the safety and quality of health care with no need for law reform at 
all.TPF145FPT  Implementation of patient safety initiatives, such as open disclosure, is still a work in 
progress in Australia as elsewhere; it may be that additional statutory reforms will be needed so 
that these programs can operate effectively.  The legal incentives that may be of the most use, 
however, will not necessarily involve negligence law.  While there are some instances where 
legal reforms have been adopted in order to advance a patient safety agenda, they have been 
relatively minor.  
Apologies 
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Some jurisdictions now expressly provide that an apology is not evidence of fault in a 
civil lawsuit.TPF146FPT  While the exception was likely not strictly necessary, apologies are important 
for patients, and provider and insurer concerns had previously inhibited them. 
Statutory Protection of Root Cause Analysis 
Extensions of statutory privilege are meant to encourage disclosure, and root cause 
analysis is now being included within its purview.  New South Wales, for instance, requires root 
cause analysis of the most severe adverse events to determine how and why they occurred.  
Recent legislative amendments regularize the status of and procedures for root cause analysis 
and make it the subject of qualified privilege.  The legislation sets out the circumstances in 
which RCA must be undertaken, what RCA team reports must and must not contain, restricts 
disclosure of information acquired, outlines reporting responsibilities to health services 
organizations when there may have been unsatisfactory professional conduct, establishes a 
statutory privilege for RCA proceedings and results, and imposes conditions for eligibility.TPF147FPT  
Although espousing the goals of open disclosure, fair responses to human error, and a systems 
approach to understanding problems, NSW does not aim for an entirely blameless culture:  
personal responsibility is assigned “...where it is due, for example in cases of negligence or 
criminality”.TP F148FPT  This is a broader set of circumstances than the National Open Disclosure 
Standard identified as appropriate for referral to disciplinary processes. The disparity highlights 
once again the unresolved tensions between systems and individual accountability, and between 
preserving confidentiality and ensuring access to information. 
Qualified Privilege, Open Disclosure and Root Cause Analysis 
 Grafting open disclosure onto processes that follow an adverse event can introduce 
additional complications.  Communication with the patient about the adverse event and the 
results of the investigation are essential parts of open disclosure.  However, if information 
needed for the open disclosure process has been generated as part of a quality assurance 
investigation that is subject to qualified privilege, it can effectively become “trapped”, such that 
it cannot be revealed to the patient.TPF149FPT  This is not likely to occur frequently; many adverse 
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events that would be the subject of open disclosure will not trigger a QA activity that is protected 
by privilege, and most QA activities do not involve the detailed investigation of known 
individual adverse events that typifies open disclosure.  Nonetheless, the potential for conflict 
calls for careful management.  The Council suggested that a process to triage events to decide 
how best to investigate may be needed. TPF150FPT  As noted above, there is also potential for conflict 
with other legislation, such as that governing freedom of information, and more generally, with 
the public interest in access.  Different possibilities exist to control for such tendencies. The 
Final Report of the Special Inquiry into Campbelltown and Camden Hospitals recommended 
statutory protection for root cause analysis and other QA activities, but also that it be reviewed 
after a few years’ operation to evaluate effectiveness, because empirical evidence to justify the 
privilege was lacking.TPF151FPT  The Legal Review suggested that either open disclosure must be 
reconciled with existing (protected) processes, or that the original model of qualified privilege 
should be re-thought in light of increasing expectations of openness.TPF152FPT  
The Impact of Reducing the Incidence of Malpractice Litigation: 
a) More Monitoring and Oversight? 
As noted previously, the reforms to negligence law will mean fewer lawsuits and lower 
recoveries.  To the extent tort does function as a deterrent (one of its classic justifications, 
although often challenged), reduced litigation activity post-reform will attenuate its effectiveness 
in that role.  Other accountability mechanisms may need to be strengthened and expanded as a 
result. 
b)  More Disclosure? 
On the other hand, it is frequently argued that the reason physicians and other health care 
workers do not disclose adverse events and injury either to patients or in the workplace 
(hindering the development of effective responses) is because of fear of litigation.  This is cited 
as the major obstacle to disclosure to patients, colleagues and administrators.  If so, that fear 
should diminish post-reform, because the likelihood of being sued and the amount of damages 
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awarded will both be less.  The Final Report of the Special Commission of Inquiry into 
Campbelltown and Camden Hospitals made a similar point:  since the recent tort reforms “...are 
likely to reduce the circumstances in which clinicians are likely to be exposed to litigation”, and 
in any event, “...the level of apprehension and fear [by clinicians] is not matched by the empirical 
evidence”, they should be more willing to be open about medical errors, near- misses and 
adverse events.TPF153FPT  The Special Commissioner suggested clinicians and their insurers and 
medical associations just needed to be educated about this new reality for change to occur.  
However, providers’ and insurers’ reluctance to disclose errors and near misses is longstanding 
and not easily assuaged; the prospect of any lawsuit is seen as too many.  Doctors, nurses and 
health care workers typically overestimate the likelihood of being sued.  Their evaluations of risk 
are unlikely to become more realistic as a result of these reforms.  In any event, many factors in 
addition to the prospect of litigation inhibit health care providers’ willingness to be open when 
things have gone wrong and a patient has been hurt. 
Patient Safety Insights and the Analysis of Causation in the Law of Negligence 
The insights of patient safety advocates about the role that systemic causes play in error 
and patient injury, if incorporated into analysis of causation in negligence claims, could support a 
more sophisticated understanding of how injuries occur and where responsibility should lie, 
rather than simply concentrating on the individuals actually treating the patient.  If adopted, this 
approach would often suggest a finding of enterprise liability, with attendant incentives for the 
organization to remedy unsafe systems in order to avoid future liability. 
Missed Opportunities 
 Finally, part of the story of tort reform in Australia is what could have been.  Accepting 
the need for negligence law reform, the government missed opportunities to tie the substantial 
financial assistance it was providing to physicians and their insurers to requirements to provide 
more extensive reporting on patient safety incidents, more detailed information about claims 
experiences, more changes in providers’ practices and participation in clinical governance 
structures in order to advance patient safety.  Instead, it concentrated on requiring reporting to 
improve prudential regulation.  The two did not have to be mutually exclusive.  
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APPENDIX A  
THE PROCESS OF OPEN DISCLOSURE IN AUSTRALIA 
 Once an incident has been identified as an adverse event and its severity assessed to 
determine the appropriate level of investigation (root cause analysis or similar in-depth 
examinations being reserved for more serious cases), the Standard calls for preliminary 
discussions among those involved and a senior health care professional within the institution, 
preliminary disclosure to the patient and support person, investigation, determining changes 
needed, communication with those affected (from patients to management), and action to avoid 
repetition.  While those involved in the adverse event are consulted about what occurred, the 
investigation itself is conducted by a multi-disciplinary team led by an individual with 
“knowledge and status to make authoritative recommendations” (generally, a senior health care 
professional or manager who determines the scope of the investigation and issues raised). The 
investigation identifies the reasons for the adverse outcome and the underlying systems failures, 
and recommends improvement strategies.  It is to find the facts and root causes, and make 
recommendations to support systems changes to prevent recurrence.  There is follow-up with 
both the patient and the staff involved about what happened, and what changes will be made.  
Management is apprised of the results of the investigation and recommendations, must decide 
which to implement and allocate adequate resources to do so, and establish mechanisms to 
ensure changes are made and their outcomes.  Final communication to the patient is to set out the 
facts, summarize factors that contributed to the incident, express regret for what happened, and 
provide information on steps taken or proposed to avoid a repetition, and on how those changes 
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APPENDIX B 
PUBLIC INQUIRIES INTO PATIENT SAFETY IN HOSPITALS 
King Edward Memorial Hospital 
At King Edward Memorial Hospital in Western Australia, medical and nursing staff 
raised concerns with management throughout the 1990’s about high error rates and a culture 
among consultants that minimized accountability and supervision of junior staff, but without 
satisfactory response.  When efforts to implement change were repeatedly frustrated, the state 
Minister for Health established a formal inquiry.TPF155FPT  It took eighteen months, cost more than $7 
million (Aus.), and resulted in a 5 volume, 2500 page report.TPF156FPT  The state government undertook 
to implement all of its 237 recommendations for reform, and committed $25 million in additional 
funding for the hospital over 4 years:  $10 million to implement and sustain the Inquiry 
recommendations and $15 million redevelop key infrastructure.TPF157FPT  The report’s quality and 
safety recommendations included improved systems for reporting, reviewing and addressing 
adverse events,TPF158FPT the need for leadership in clinical governance to develop and support a culture 
of open disclosure and effective response, better staff performance management, ensuring 
hospital accreditation processes took real account of safety and quality, and improved staff 
credentialling systems.TPF159FPT  Council published key findings from the Inquiry in 2002, so that these 
would be more widely available.TPF160FPT  
  
Canberra Hospital   
In the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), a rehabilitation physician at Canberra 
Hospital, who had repeatedly been unable to have concerns about patient safety addressed 
satisfactorily internally, convinced the Health Minister to order the ACT Health Complaints 
Commissioner to conduct an inquiry into neurological services at the hospital in 2000.TPF161FPT  The 
report that resulted two years later, while critical of the standard of care, “acknowledged that the 
inquiry was so hampered by clinicians’ reluctance to provide evidence as to render impractical a 
finding on the issue”.TPF162FPT  Although not initially made public, the report was eventually tabled in 
the legislative assembly in late 2003, and raised sufficient concern to lead to a further external 
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investigation.TPF163FPT  Faunce et al. suggest one lesson from that inquiry is that recommendations of 
the type that are typically made -- reformulating clinical governance structures, early reporting of 
sentinel events, compulsory audits and so on -- will not succeed without a reformed institutional 
culture that supports not only  transparency, but also respect for those who participate and do 
report.TPF164FPT 
 
Royal Melbourne Hospital   
 Victoria’s Minister of Health requested the state Health Services Commissioner to 
conduct an inquiry into systems and procedures at the Royal Melbourne Hospital after serious 
allegations involving the administration of non-prescribed medications by two nurses became the 
subject of examinations by the Coroner and the Nurses Board of Victoria.TPF165FPT  The Inquiry met 
with staff and management, reviewed medical records, conducted individual and group 
structured interviews, and consulted with experts, but did not interview patients, families or 
carers.TPF166FPT  It focused on systems issues affecting the quality of patient care at the hospital, was 
completed at a cost of $55,000 within the 3 month time frame set by the Minister, and reported in 
2002. TPF167FPT  Examinations by the Coroner/Police and the Nurses’ Board were ongoing during and 
after its investigations.TPF168FPT  Recommendations included  structural changes, improving clinical 
governance, quality programs, systems for reporting adverse events and corporate and nursing 
leadership, clarifying standards and policies, and developing systems for staff support.TPF169FPT While 
in broad terms, its recommendations were similar to those made by other inquiries, their tone and 
the atmosphere in which it was conducted appear markedly different.  The hospital cooperated 
with the Commissioner, and the Commissioner, for her part, undertook to create an atmosphere 
that reduced fears of recrimination and blame, and attributed much of the success of the Inquiry 
to having done so.TP F170FPT  Indeed, in 2004, the Commissioner released a second report reflecting on 
how the Inquiry had been managed, since it had been a “successful, speedy and cost efficient 
investigation”, and analysis of its strengths and limitations could assist others.TPF171FPT  
 
Campbelltown and Camden Hospitals 
Several nurses triggered a series of inquiries with complaints to the New South Wales 
(NSW) Minister of Health in 2002, after their attempts to have concerns about patient care and 
safety at Campbelltown and Camden Hospitals in the Macarthur Health Service addressed 
internally were unsuccessful. The Minister first referred the matter to the state Health Care 
Complaints Commissioner (HCCC) in 2002.  In August 2003, NSW also appointed an Expert 
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Clinical Review Team to review systems of patient care in the Macarthur Health Service and 
identify opportunities for improvement.TPF172FPT  It  reported in October, 2003, identifying 
shortcomings in staffing, a supported safe reporting culture, area-wide planning, clinical and 
management leadership and other areas, and recommending changes.TP F173FPT  Additionally, a 
committee of the NSW Legislative Assembly launched an examination of complaints handling 
across the state health system.TPF174FPT  Other reviews were undertaken as well. In December, 2003, 
the HCCC submitted its report analyzing 47 clinical incidents at the two hospitals during the 
period 1999-2003. TPF175FPT  It found multiple systemic problems and made recommendations to 
address these.  
Public and media reaction was intense and outraged. The response from the Minister of 
Health was sweeping.  He dismissed the Health Care Complaints Commissioner, telling the 
media that, although the HCCC report had detailed clinical failures and deficiencies in 
management and supervision, it “...doesn’t go far enough in terms of finding anyone accountable 
for these failures”.TPF176FPT  Physicians were suspended, some were referred to the state Medical 
Board, a number of deaths were referred to the state coroner for investigation, disciplinary 
proceedings were commenced against administrators, the local health board was dissolved, 
legislation was amended, and $55 million in additional funds were committed over four years for 
improvements in patient safety and quality, as well as many millions more to improve health care 
in the region affected.TPF177FPT  The Minister appointed a Special Commission of Inquiry to re-
investigate and make recommendations, not only about further actions against individuals 
concerned, but also about how the HCCC had proceeded.TPF178FPT  The Special Commissioner 
delivered his final report in July, 2004.TPF179FPT  With respect to the HCCC, he concluded that, given 
its statutory mandate, it had inappropriately focused only on systemic issues, and incorrectly 
characterized the complaints as solely against the health service organization and not against 
individual health professionals.TPF180FPT  The result was a lack of procedural fairness and inadequate 
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process for individual health care providers, because they had not been notified or given an 
opportunity to respond when the HCCC was investigating and evaluating their actions.TPF181FPT  At the 
same time, the failure to focus on individuals meant that individual clinicians were not named or 
referred for possible disciplinary action when in his view, they should have been.  On the vexed 
subject of systemic versus individual accountability, Walker concluded the dichotomy posed was 
false, that both were essential and could co-exist, but that the HCCC’s statutory mandate 
precluded it from pursuing systemic analysis to the exclusion of investigating individuals when 
the circumstances called for it. 
The HCCC Inquiry and the events that followed highlight the difficulties and unresolved 
tensions in adopting systemic analysis and de-emphasizing individual fault-finding.  The firing 
of the Health Care Complaints Commissioner led the Health Complaints Commissioners of 
Australia and New Zealand to issue a joint statement calling for an independent inquiry into the 
implications for the independence of the office, and decrying the return to “blaming and 
shaming’”, extending now beyond health care providers and institutions to the office that had 
adopted a systemic approach to the investigation as a better way to improve patient safety.TPF182FPT  
 
Bundaberg Hospital  
In 2005, a hospital scandal in Queensland triggered two more major inquiries. A nurse at 
Bundaberg Hospital whose complaints about a surgeon’s care had been met with inaction and 
resistance internally and from health authorities, took her concerns to her Member of Parliament.  
In the result, a Commission of Inquiry was appointed to inquire into procedures for the oversight 
of foreign-trained physicians as well as to review how complaints about care by this physician 
and others at public hospitals were addressed (hereafter, the “Bundaberg Inquiry”).TPF183FPT  It reported 
in November, 2005.  Queensland also commissioned an independent review of the state health 
department’s administrative, workforce and performance management systems (the “Forster 
Review”), which reported in September, 2005.TPF184FPT   
On investigation, the Bundaberg Inquiry found that, unknown to the state medical board 
that approved the surgeon’s registration in 2003, he had previously been disciplined by two 
American state medical boards; it concluded that his credentials had not been checked with 
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sufficient care.  The Inquiry Report linked him to a number of patient deaths and injuries at 
Bundaberg Hospital and recommended criminal charges against him.  It also recommended 
administrative proceedings against two hospital administrators whom it concluded had failed to 
respond adequately to complaints about him. More broadly, it found that a failure to assess 
doctors and inadequate complaints handling procedures were major factors that allowed the 
surgeon to continue working at the hospital.  It identified deficiencies in five general areas at 
Bundaberg and other hospitals that had contributed to poor care: an inadequate budget 
defectively administered; defective administration of areas of need registration; absence of 
credentialling and privileging or any like method of assessment of doctors; failure to implement 
any adequate monitoring of performance or of complaints investigation; and a culture of 
concealment by government, Queensland Health administrators, and hospital administrators.TPF185FPT  
In the Inquiry’s view, conflicts between budgetary constraints and patient safety were too often 
resolved “...in favour of an economic rationalist view of budget management, sometimes with 
harmful effects on patient health and safety”.TPF186FPT  Commissioner Davies found that the culture of 
concealment had started from the top. In his words:  “The conduct of Cabinet, in successive 
governments...was inexcusable and an abuse of the Freedom of Information Act.  It involved a 
blatant exercise of secreting information from public gaze for no reason other than that the 
disclosure of the information might be embarrassing to Government.”.TPF187FPT  Government’s 
readiness to conceal information had set the tone for Queensland Health staff, with similar 
results.TPF188FPT  
The Forster Review of the Queensland Health System concluded that, although the 
workforce generally was dedicated and professional, there were negative features of 
organizational culture that severely impeded its ability to deliver the best care.  It proposed an 
expansive set of changes to improve the system, including shifting to clinician-led rather than 
centralized decision making, additional funding, implementing the National Open Disclosure 
Standard, re-organizing external governance mechanisms, expanding protection for 
whistleblowers, revamping clinical governance structures, analyzing serious and sentinel events 
and clarifying responsibility for follow-up (noting that despite mandated root cause analysis of 
sentinel events, implementation was lacking), enacting legislative protection for quality and 
safety assurance analysis (subject to a review to ensure effective sharing of information by 
clinicians for quality assurance programs results), and other measures to achieve the “just culture 
or workplace environment” considered an essential precondition to clinician support for open 
reporting.TPF189FPT  
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CHAPTER 6.  NEW ZEALAND 
 New Zealand is a common law country, but more than thirty years ago, it ended recovery 
through the tort system for people who had suffered personal injuries, and put in place an 
administrative system to compensate them instead.  Its long experience with a no-tort system can 
provide valuable information on a number of issues:  whether the tort system does function as a 
deterrent to behaviour that falls below the standard of care, whether being relieved of the 
prospect of civil liability for negligence makes health care providers less reluctant to disclose 
errors and adverse events, and how compensation and deterrence fare in the absence of tort. 
 
I.  COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTS 
 New Zealand did not eschew tort because of any concerns about a medical malpractice 
crisis or its effects on efforts to improve patient safety.  At the time the Accident Compensation 
Corporation was put in place in 1974 to operate the new compensation system, there had been 
very few medical malpractice lawsuits.TPF1FPT  Rather, its  decision followed on the recommendation 
of a Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury, which set out five 
principles for rehabilitation and compensation (community responsibility, comprehensive 
entitlement, complete rehabilitation, real compensation, and administrative efficiency), and vis a 
vis the fault-based liability system, concluded that it was too erratic and capricious in its 
operation for accident victims, who needed a secure source of support.TPF2FPT  No-tort compensation 
determined and administered by the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC), and an end to 
individuals’ right to sue for damages for personal injury covered by the scheme were the result. 
The accident compensation system as a whole is funded by premiums paid by employers 
and employees, government, and other sources.TPF3FPT  Costs of claims for injuries caused by health 
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care are shared, with 45% of the cost borne by persons who are earning, and 55 % by 
government.TPF4FPT  Doctors and other health care providers do not pay levies to support compensation 
for harm suffered in the course of treatment.  Administrative expenses account for approximately 
10% of the ACC’s expenditures.TPF5FPT 
 I refer to the New Zealand system as “no-tort” rather than “no-fault”, because until very 
recently, although claims were determined by an administrative system rather than in court, 
claimants injured in the course of medical treatment had to establish either fault (medical error) 
or that they had suffered a rare and serious complication of treatment (medical mishap) in order 
to be eligible for compensation.  That was not the case at the inception of the scheme, but it was 
a requirement from 1992 until 2005, and it affected both the operation of the compensation 
system, and health care providers’ willingness to participate in the claims determination process.  
No such requirement was imposed when injuries were incurred in the course of other types of 
activity, such as playing a sport.  A brief outline of the legislative history of coverage for medical 
claims in the accident compensation system follows. 
Eligibility for Accident Compensation Cover 
 As originally enacted, the accident compensation system provided compensation for 
victims of “personal injury by accident”, without further definition.  The scheme was  revised 
several times, but the 1992 reforms were particularly significant.  Stephen Todd explains that, 
after a series of expansive judicial decisions, government reacted by reining in judicial 
discretion:  “There was cover, as before, for personal injury caused by accident, by employment-
related disease or infection, by medical misadventure and by treatment for personal injury, and 
also for mental or nervous shock suffered by the victims of certain specified sexual 
offences…[but] they were now treated as separate categories and made subject to a series of 
detailed definitions”.TPF6FPT  The main types of personal injury not covered by the accident 
compensation system are mental harm that is not consequent on physical injury or commission of 
a sexual offence, and disease that is not related to employment. TPF7FPT 
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The 1992 Reforms:  Introducing Fault to Claims for Medical Misadventure 
Beginning in 1992, “medical misadventure”, which had been covered under the scheme 
from the outset but had not previously been defined, now had to fit within one of two categories: 
“medical error” or “medical mishap”.  Medical error was defined as the failure to observe a 
reasonable standard of care and skill – essentially, negligence. Medical mishap was defined as a 
rare (occurring in less than 1% of cases) and severe (disability or prolonged hospitalization) 
adverse consequence of properly administered treatment.TPF8FPT  Causation also had to be established – 
i.e. that the personal injury was the result of medical misadventure.  The fact that desired results 
were not achieved, or that in retrospect, a different decision might have produced better results, 
did not constitute medical error.  Further, delay or failure attributable solely to resource 
allocation did not amount to medical error.  Medical error could be committed by an 
organization, potentially allowing for systemic analysis of patient injury, but only if the ACC 
was not able to identify the individual(s) responsible.TPF9FPT   
Residual Scope for the Common Law 
 The 1992 amendments not only made it more difficult to establish eligibility for 
compensation, but reduced the compensation payable as well.  One change felt particularly 
keenly was the elimination of lump sum compensation and its replacement with a $40 per week 
“independence allowance”.TPF10FPT  These changes were especially harsh on certain classes of 
claimant, such as non-earners (largely women) and people who had only a short time to live 
(sometimes as a result of the medical misadventure).TPF11FPT  Duffy has pointed out the gendered 
effects of ending lump sum compensation for pain and suffering:  not only were the victims of 
some of the most egregious health crises in New Zealand at the time women, but because women 
are often not in paid employment, when compensation for pain and suffering was excluded, they 
were entitled to very little in the way of ACC benefits at all, even though they had suffered 
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substantial harm.TP F12FPT  Although lump sum compensation was reinstated in 2001, compensation for 
pain and suffering remained excluded; in Duffy’s view, amounts awarded are still largely 
targeted at compensating injuries that interfere with the ability to earn.TPF13FPT  
 The result of the diminution in the statutory compensation scheme was a substantial 
increase in efforts to sue and obtain damages at common law. TPF14FPT  A cause of action still exists at 
common law for injuries that are not covered by the accident compensation system, and Duffy 
recounts “enormous effort” by lawyers acting for victims who would not benefit from the ACC 
to avoid cover under the legislation.TPF15FPT  However, the definition of “personal injury caused by 
accident” was broad, and most such attempts were unsuccessful.TPF16FPT  Limited ability remains to 
sue for mental harm that is not associated with physical injury, and for exemplary damages.TPF17FPT  
While sympathizing with the reasons for trying to revive the common law in these 
circumstances, commentators have been hesitant to support one-off efforts to circumvent what is 
meant to be a comprehensive public system.TPF18FPT  
Accident Compensation Benefits 
 Although an individual cannot sue if there is coverage under the ACC scheme, he or she 
does have a right to compensation in accordance with the terms of the statute once cover is 
established.  Statutory entitlements fall into four categories:TP PT(1) treatment and rehabilitation 
(including aids and appliances, home help, child care, pharmaceuticals, home modifications and 
vocational training); (2) compensation for loss of earnings (80% of earnings at the time injured, 
to a set maximum, payable to claimants who cannot work because of the injury); (3) lump sum 
compensation for permanent impairment (maximum NZ $100,000; minimum threshold 10%); 
and (4) death benefits (funeral grant and grant for spouse and dependents). TPF19FPT   
The 2005 Reforms:  An End to Fault    
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 Ongoing dissatisfaction culminated in a government review, which concluded that both 
claimants and health professionals found the ACC’s criteria used to determine cover in medical 
claims unfair, confusing and arbitrary.  Coupled with the legislative requirement to find fault 
(and report findings of medical error to other authorities), the ACC’s medical misadventure 
decisions were considered slow and unfair.TPF20FPT  The governing legislation was amended as a result.   
The Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Amendment Act (No. 2) 2005, 
which came into force in July, 2005, repealed the sections of the Act dealing with medical 
misadventure, medical error and medical mishap.  Instead, claimants are entitled to 
compensation if they have suffered “personal injury caused by treatment”, i.e. a “treatment 
injury”.TPF21FPT  “Treatment” is defined broadly. TPF22FPT  There is no requirement that the injury meet any 
threshold of severity.  However, a causal link must still be established:  cover is available for 
personal injury suffered by a person seeking treatment from a registered health professional that 
is caused by treatment.  There are some specific exclusions:  injury caused by treatment does not 
include (a) personal injury caused by or attributable to the person’s underlying health condition 
(maintaining the distinction between accident and illness), (b) personal injury that is a necessary, 
anticipated part or ordinary consequence of treatment, TPF23FPT (c) personal injury solely attributable to 
resource allocation; or (d) personal injury that results when the person unreasonably withholds or 
delays consenting to treatment.  The fact that a treatment did not achieve a desired result does not 
in itself constitute a treatment injury.  
 With these amendments, New Zealand has harmonized the components of its accident 
compensation system, so that all forms of covered injury are compensable on a no fault basis.  
While it is too early to evaluate how the changes are operating in practice, the intent was 
certainly to simplify the law and streamline the claims process, so that claimants could establish 
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eligibility and receive compensation more quickly, and to entrench a “systems approach” to 
medical accidents.  Secondarily, the new approach was also meant to improve patient safety, 
because health care providers were expected to be less defensive about helping to identify what 
went wrong when they no longer faced the prospect of fault-finding as a necessary part of that 
process.  Changes in the ACC’s reporting requirements were also meant to assuage health care 
providers’ concerns about potential professional repercussions from participating the in the 
claims process; these had increased both the cost and time required for decisions about coverage.  
 
II.  ADVERSE EVENTS AND CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION  
A study of the occurrence and impact of adverse events in New Zealand public hospitals 
determined that the proportion of hospital admissions associated with an adverse event was 
12.9%, of which nearly one fifth had occurred outside a public hospital (i.e. in doctors’ offices, 
patient’s home, rest home or private hospital).TPF24FPT  Most adverse events had minor impact on the 
patient; less than 15% were associated with permanent disability or death.TPF25FPT   More than one 
third of the adverse events identified, and half of those that occurred in hospitals, were 
preventable.TPF26FPT  Overall, just over 5% of admissions to public hospitals in New Zealand were 
associated with a preventable adverse event of in-hospital origin.TPF27FPT  
 Turning to patients’ perspective on medical error, a 2005 six country review of patients 
with health problems found that in New Zealand, 14% of the 704 patients surveyed reported a 
medical mistake was made in their treatment or care, and 25% reported having experienced 
medical error, medication error, or lab error in the past two years.TPF28FPT  Medical errors and 
medication errors caused serious health problems for 54% of patients.  For 63%, the medical or 
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medication errors occurred outside a hospital.  61% of patients were not told about the medical 
mistake or medication error by their doctor.TPF29FPT 
Claims related to health care have historically made up .05% of all claims made to the 
ACC, with approximately 2000 such claims per year, from a population of four million.TPF30FPT  Prior 
to the 2005 reforms, the ACC paid about $47 million (NZ) per year for  medical misadventure 
claims; the new treatment injury provisions are expected to add  $8.6 million (NZ) to that 
figure.TPF31FPT  Only a small portion of preventable adverse events result in claims.  Davis et al. 
estimated the ratio of potentially compensable events to successful claims to be approximately 
thirty to one. TPF32FPT  It appears that even if entitled to compensation, most patients do not submit a 
claim and may not be aware they had suffered an adverse event. TPF33FPT  The extent of under-claiming 
for compensation even when entitled is surprising, given the existence of a simple, inexpensive, 
non-adversarial claims process.  Removing the need to sue in order to recover compensation has 
not been sufficient on its own to overcome barriers to claiming.  
 
III. PATIENT SAFETY AND THE LAW  
Health and Disability Commissioner 
 While there are many patient safety initiatives in New Zealand,TPF34FPT the main interface 
between law and patient safety initiatives is through the office of the Health and Disability 
Commissioner (HDC).  For that reason, although an evaluation of complaints systems is beyond 
the scope of this paper, I will briefly outline how the HDC functions. 
In the late 1980’s, a public scandal erupted when it became known that numerous women 
diagnosed with cervical carcinoma in situ had, without their knowledge and consent, been made 
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part of a research trial at a leading teaching hospital that withheld conventional treatment in 
order to study the course of the disease. The public inquiry appointed to investigate 
recommended, inter alia, that a Patients’ Code of Rights be developed, and that a health 
ombudsman be appointed to investigate patients’ complaints. TPF35FPT  Pursuant to those 
recommendations, the office of Health and Disability Commissioner was created in 1994, and in 
1996, the Code of Health and Disability Services Consumers’ Rights became law.TPF36FPT  The intent 
was to enable the HDC to take a broader focus in addition to resolving individual complaints, in 
order to promote quality improvement.  Ron Paterson, the current Health and Disability 
Commissioner, explains that the heart of the Code is the right to services of an appropriate 
standard, understood as including both the traditional duty of care and modern concepts of 
patient safety and care coordination.TPF37FPT  The main enforcement mechanism is through patient 
complaints, although the Commissioner does have the power to commence an investigation on 
his own initiative if a health care provider appears to be in breach of the Code. TPF38FPT 
 The Health and Disability Commissioner is the single point of entry for complaints.TPF39FPT  
After an initial assessment, the Commissioner can decide to take no action, or refer the matter to 
an advocate for low-level resolution, to the provider for resolution, for mediation, or make other 
referrals as appropriate.  In more complex or serious cases, the Commissioner can conduct an 
investigation and will then report to the parties and issue recommendations.TPF40FPT  If a breach of the 
Code is found, remedies can include an apology, censure, specified quality improvement steps, 
and other measures.TPF41FPT  In more serious cases still, the Commissioner can refer the matter to the 
Director of Proceedings, who decides whether disciplinary or human rights tribunal proceedings 
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are warranted.TPF42FPT  This is generally reserved for cases of major shortcomings in care or 
communication, sexual misconduct or unethical practice.TPF43FPT      
 The current Health and Disability Commissioner is firmly of the view that a culture of 
blame is counter-productive, that rehabilitation should be a hallmark of the complaints process, 
and that adverse events ought to be used as opportunities to learn, in order to improve health 
services – as Paterson notes, the Commissioner’s motto is “Resolution, not retribution; learning, 
not lynching”.TPF44FPT  In keeping with that philosophy, few practitioners are referred for consideration 
for discipline proceedings.  The focus is on resolving complaints at the lowest level that is 
appropriate.TPF45FPT  The HDC received 1124 new complaints in 2004-05; only 15% of complaints 
(172) proceeded to formal investigation of alleged individual or systemic failures.TPF46FPT  A breach of 
the Code was found in 41% of the cases investigated.  Fourteen (20%) of these were referred to 
the Director of Proceedings for potential disciplinary or human rights tribunal proceedings; of 
these, charges were upheld in 9 of 11 substantive hearings in 2004-05.TPF47FPT   
The HDC’s ability to widen the focus of investigation beyond an individual health care 
provider allows for identification of systemic shortcomings.  For instance, the HDC’s Gisborne 
Hospital Report found breaches not only by health care providers (in the re-use of syringes and 
failed quality control in PSA testing), but also breaches in care and co-ordination by the hospital, 
resulting in a series of recommendations related to incident reporting and complaints handling.TPF48FPT  
Corkill notes that, while lawsuits focus on the experiences of one individual, generally at the 
hands of one practitioner, inquiries allow for a more wide-ranging consideration of systemic 
issues and consequently, more accurate identification of improvements needed.TPF49FPT  
As the HDC acknowledges, there is no direct evidence that the method New Zealand has 
adopted of combining a complaints mechanism with a broader quality focus has been effective; 
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no outcomes-based data are available. TPF50FPT  However, he considers the decline in discipline referrals 
(consistent with his office’s rehabilitative focus), and the overall greater focus on patient safety 
to be positive signs.  A recent study by Bismark et al. found that only .4% of adverse events, and 
4% of serious preventable adverse events resulted in complaints to the HDC.TPF51FPT  The authors note 
that people who were more seriously injured were more likely to complain, but that patients who 
were elderly, socioeconomically deprived, or of Pacific ethnicity were least likely to complain.  
These findings raise concerns that very few of the preventable adverse events or harm to patients 
that occur will ever be reviewed. 
Disclosure 
Even in a no-tort system, disclosure remains an issue.  This is evident in a number of 
areas.  For instance, patients have a legal right under the Code of Health and Disability 
Consumers’ Rights to open disclosure when they have been harmed by medical care.TPF52FPT The 
Medical Council of New Zealand’s standard of practice is to the same effect.TPF53FPT Yet many 
patients are not told by their physicians that a mistake was made in their care and they were 
injured as a result.TPF54FPT 
Privilege for quality assurance (QA) activities is also an issue.  On application to the 
Minister of Health, quality assurance activities can be declared protected if it is in the public 
interest to do so. TPF55FPT  The rationale for the protection is familiar – that confidentiality will 
encourage open and constructive examination of practices, to improve quality of care.  However, 
the privilege also limits access to information and sharing of concerns about practitioners’ 
competence.  Once granted, with very limited exceptions, no one can be required to disclose the 
protected information or produce QA documents in any judicial proceeding or other 
investigation, including commissions of inquiry, police investigations, Health and Disability 
Commissioner investigations, and certain other inquiries.   
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Third, the HDC has a policy of not identifying practitioners involved in the complaints 
process, other than disciplinary cases.TPF56FPT  The rationale appears somewhat different – it is meant 
to avoid contributing to what is seen as a harmful trend towards “trial by media” before any 
determination in a case.  The HDC adheres to this policy even in the case of a breach report, 
although recognizing a public interest argument for disclosure exists at that point.   
A final example of the tension over disclosure is the change in ACC reporting 
requirements.  This was one of the most controversial issues when the legislation was amended, 
particularly given recent inquiry findings that failures in inter-agency reporting of competence 
concerns about a practitioner had allowed him to continue practice, and continue harming   
patients.TPF57FPT  Nonetheless, it was decided that in order to encourage greater cooperation by health 
professionals, the ACC’s reporting obligations would be limited.  The legislation now provides 
that, where the ACC believes from information collected during the claims process that there is a 
risk of harm to the public, it must report the risk to the person or authority responsible for patient 
safety (such as the registration authority) or the Director-General of Health.  It no longer has to 
report to the Health and Disability Commissioner.  However, since authorities are required to 
notify the Health and Disability Commissioner of practitioners believed to pose a risk to the 
public, that information should still reach the HDC, albeit after passing through an additional 
stage.TPF58FPT 
Howell points out that the New Zealand system is heavily reliant on effective monitoring 
and enforcement; she is doubtful that proper and sufficient incentives have been built in to 
ensure that it takes place. TPF59FPT  When separate silos of information are constructed to try to insulate 
information that one agency has from disclosure to another, the likelihood that cases of real 
concern will fall between the cracks and escape the attention of an agency with authority to take 
effective action increases. 
Health Professionals’ Perceptions and Participation 
Despite the HDC’s low-key approach to complaints resolution, health care professionals 
in New Zealand appear to feel almost as beleaguered as their counterparts in jurisdictions that 
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maintain tort regimes and liability for clinical negligence.  A number of factors seem to have 
contributed to this state of affairs.  The potential for multiple investigations into one incident, in 
each of which the practitioner could be called to account, has been a source of concern.TPF60FPT  While 
that should have been alleviated somewhat by passage of the Health Practitioners Competence 
Assurance Act 2003, which established a single, multi-disciplinary tribunal to replace various 
professional bodies that used to hear discipline proceedings, and separated responsibility for 
discipline and governance functions,TPF61FPT that too aroused professional opposition as an interference 
with professional freedom.TPF62FPT  Practitioners were also concerned about the possibility of criminal 
prosecution, in part because there had been an increase in criminal charges in the mid-1990’s, at 
a time when the threshold required for proof was low.  That trend ended with a change to the 
governing legislation.TPF63FPT  Coroner’s investigations that identified the practitioners involved were 
considered to lead to “…an early naming, blaming and shaming through media coverage”.TPF64FPT  The 
ACC’s reporting requirements under the former medical misadventure regime were another 
source of tension, as Rogers explains:  “…as a rule of thumb, if there is a question of 
professional incompetence or negligence [effectively, medical error], reporting is mandatory.  
Those reports at a minimum are made to the relevant professional body and to the Health and 
Disability Commissioner, with a view to disciplinary proceedings or prosecution.”.TPF65FPT  
Practitioners were reluctant to participate in ACC claims determinations as a result.   In a 2000 
study, 46% of specialists reported they were discouraged or not encouraged to report medical 
errors (a figure comparable to 44% of U.S. specialists, where litigation is a real threat).TPF66FPT  The 
Health and Disability Commissioner, commenting on the initial increase in complaints after his 
office was founded, noted the negative impact on health professionals, who “report a sense of 
‘being under siege’ and claim that the risk of complaint to an independent ombudsman is leading 
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to the practice of defensive medicine”.TPF67FPT  In 2002, the New Zealand Medical Association 
adopted a policy titled “Medico-Legal Peril”.  It began by stating:  “The New Zealand Medical 
Association is of the view that the medico-legal environment in New Zealand is a hostile one and 
constitutes a deterrent to good medical practice.  The ‘blame and shame’ culture acts as a 
disincentive to quality initiatives, early detection and reporting of medical error”.TPF68FPT   
The environment may have improved somewhat since the NZMA’s statement.  The 
Health and Disability Commissioner wrote in 2004 that only 43% of surgeons involved a lawyer 
in the complaints process, adding that he did not consider lawyers necessary because of the low 
risks to practitioners in the process.TPF69FPT  Still, problems persist.  Prior to the recent legislative 
amendments, the ACC’s claims determination processes in medical error cases continued to be 
slower and more costly because health professionals were uneasy about participating, and sought 
legal advice first.TPF70FPT  And in the 2005 Commonwealth Fund study referenced earlier, 61% of 
patients reported that their physicians had not told them that a medical mistake or medication 
error had been made in their care.TPF71FPT  The new “treatment injury” regime implemented in 2005 
(ending the requirement to find fault in order to establish a patient’s injury was the result of 
medical error) may ease tensions further, but law reform alone is unlikely to be sufficient to 
achieve that end. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
  New Zealand recently returned to a “no fault”, rather than a “no tort” system for 
compensating personal injury caused by health care.  As the preceding review has indicated, “no-
tort” and “no-fault” can mean many different things.  Criteria for eligibility can be made more or 
less strict, and benefit levels more or less adequate, affecting the overall fairness of the scheme.  
As with other no-fault administrative systems, such as workers’ compensation, entitlements are 
subject to political, economic and social pressure, the vagaries of the political process, and 
neglect. 
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However, it is certainly true that under the accident compensation system, claims can be 
made more easily, and are less costly, more certain, and more quickly resolved  than a lawsuit 
alleging clinical negligence.  However, as noted earlier, under-claiming for compensation is as 
much a feature of the New Zealand system as in countries with tort systems.  Those differences 
should be even more pronounced with the recent legislative changes ending the requirement to 
find fault in order to award compensation for medical error.  While there are ongoing concerns 
about the low levels of benefits and lack of coverage for some types of harm that the system just 
does not recognize, the accident compensation system as a whole has broad support.TPF72FPT   There is 
no movement to return to a tort system for personal injury claims. 
 Data about adverse events in New Zealand hospitals indicate an incidence in the same 
range as that found in other countries that do have a tort system.  It does not appear, then, that 
removing the threat of liability for clinical negligence has had a negative effect on the quality of 
care.  One of the classic justifications of tort law is that judgments in tort cases serve as a 
deterrent to future unsafe behaviour, but it seems that New Zealand hospitals do not have higher 
rates of unsafe care causing harm to patients than elsewhere. 
 Conversely, it also does not appear that New Zealand hospitals are safer than those in 
countries with tort systems. TPF73FPT  In the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia, 
health care providers’ reluctance to disclose errors to patients, or to colleagues so their 
experience can be used to develop safer systems is often blamed on  fear that the information 
will be used to fuel lawsuits.  In New Zealand, there is no such threat.  One would have hoped 
that practitioners would be more willing to share this type of information, and that quality 
assurance and quality improvement would be much advanced.  That does not seem to be the 
case.  Recent inquiries into substandard care reveal many of the same kinds of deficiencies in 
incident reporting, complaints handling, clinical governance and management as in other 
countries.TPF74FPT  Many patients are not told that a mistake was made in their care, or even that they 
suffered an adverse event. 
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The threat of legal liability for negligence is only one factor affecting practitioners’ 
willingness to disclose error.  They are also concerned about professional and employment 
repercussions, damage to reputation, their own self-image, and effects on their practice.  Further, 
as Rogers points out, “shame and blame” is as much a part of the medical profession as it is of 
the legal system.TPF75FPT  To an outsider, practitioners’ estimation of the risks of negative 
repercussions seems somewhat overblown, particularly since (i) they face no prospect of tort 
liability, (ii) they pay no levies to support the accident compensation system and so are not 
financially affected by an increase in successful claims, and (iii) the Health and Disability 
Commissioner is a staunch believer in a rehabilitative approach to complaints whenever possible.  
Their level of apprehension significantly exceeds what a realistic assessment of the empirical 
evidence would support.   
The principal tie-in between the law and patient safety initiatives in New Zealand is 
through the office of the Health and Disability Commissioner, the single entry point for 
complaints, and the gatekeeper for access to disciplinary and human rights review processes.  
With little other outlet for patients wishing to assert a claim against a practitioner, such as that 
provided (at least notionally) by the ability to sue, it is  especially important to have an effective 
system for complaints.   The HDC relies on patient complaints as the main enforcement 
mechanism, and while investigations are expanded to examine systemic issues where warranted, 
such a system is essentially reactive, with efforts after the fact to give HDC recommendations 
wider effect through education and advocacy.  This makes the gap between preventable adverse 
events and the much smaller number of complaints particularly troubling.   
The HDC has also expressed reservations about the complaints process and its effects.  
While still of the view that health complaints provide a “window of opportunity” to improve 
health services, he notes that “…emerging evidence shows that complaints are not necessarily 
the treasure trove of opportunity that quality improvement gurus would have us believe.  Instead 
of providing reconciliation and closure, complaints can have toxic effects on patients and 
doctors, and may perhaps more accurately be described as a ‘toxic treasure’”.TPF76FPT TP PT Resolution of 
concerns about the complaints process remains elusive.   
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 The hope for the 2005 amendments to the accident compensation system is that    patient 
safety will be enhanced as well.  The government proclaimed that, not only would accident 
compensation be fairer and simpler, but “…a learning environment would be fostered for health 
providers and organizations now that punitive fault-finding was gone from ACC’s processes”.TPF77FPT  
The impact on patient safety from the anticipated (but not assured) indirect effects on provider 
attitudes from this change to the law is likely overstated. Commentators have pointed out that 
much will turn on how the ACC interprets its reporting obligations.  Some argue it should adopt 
a high threshold before determining there may be a “risk to the public” requiring reporting, to 
avoid re-creating the “blame culture” that characterized the prior regime.TPF78FPT  Others would urge 
more robust monitoring by the ACC.TPF79FPT  While the legal environment is an important factor, 
major improvements in patient safety will require more than legal changes.   
 
                                                                                                                                                             
HDC services showed that only 46% were satisfied overall with the fairness of the process (in contrast to 80% of 
providers); this may be a product of the relatively low number of breach reports.  
TP
77
PT New Zealand.  “New ACC Treatment Injury law fairer and simpler”, Press Release, May 9, 2005, online at:  
HTUhttp://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/print..html?path=PA0505/S00198.htmUTH (last accessed July, 2005). 
TP
78
PT Coates, J., Smith, K., “Reform of ACC Medical Misadventure”, (2004) 117 NZJM, online at:  
HTUhttp://www.nzma.org.nz/journal/117-1201-1050UTH (last accessed Dec. 2005). 
TP
79
PT Howell, supra, n. 59. 
 201
CHAPTER 7.  DISSEMINATION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
 
Dissemination: 
Dissemination of preliminary results of the project began with a presentation to an 
international audience of health care professionals and administrators at the International Society 
for Quality in Healthcare conference in October, 2005.  Presentations to Canadian and American 
legal academic audiences are scheduled for conferences in June, 2006.  It is anticipated that 
additional presentations of the results of the research will be made at conferences and to 
professional, administrative, government and academic audiences, as well as to health care 
organizations.  The report will be made available on the Osgoode Hall Law School website.  
Individuals with whom I met in Canada and the other countries for assistance with this project 
will be advised of the availability of the Final Report through the internet.  In addition, papers 
will be prepared for publication based on the research, and the author plans to develop the study 
into a book-length manuscript for publication. 
 
Future Directions for Research 
1. Policy makers, stakeholders, academic analysts and the public are hampered by the lack of 
good quality data about the incidence, causes, costs and effects of medical liability litigation, and 
about the incidence of patient injury caused by negligence.  Research is required to address this 
gap. 
2. Similarly, domestic and international research is needed on what would be entailed in and 
what the effects would be of possible replacements for the tort system, such as a no-fault 
compensation system and/or administrative compensation mechanisms.   
2.  Research to gather empirical evidence on the effectiveness of patient safety initiatives and any 
unintended consequences (in the context of this report, particularly those that affect the operation 
of the civil justice system, such as qualified privilege for error reporting) is needed in order to 
assess whether the benefits of these provisions justify the cost of restricting access to 
information. 
3.  International and domestic research on models for and experience with more low-key, less 
adversarial alternatives for in-house and external complaints resolution mechanisms, including 
mediation. 
 202
4.  Theoretical and empirical research on ensuring and strengthening provider and institutional 
accountability that would address, among other matters, the tension between individual, 
organizational and systemic accountability, and the implications, enforcement, interaction and 
appropriate scope of each.   
5. Research on the appropriate role of professional regulation and how best to advance patient 
safety goals in ways that are consistent with regulators’ obligations to protect the public, and 
ensure practitioners provide safe, quality care.  This should include exploration of umbrella 
oversight of health professionals and institutions.  Systems operative in New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom and Australia could provide useful initial information, but wider international research 
would be helpful as well. 
6.  Research examining the potential in linking governmental subventions for liability coverage 
to targeted patient safety goals and otherwise strengthening ties between policy on liability 
coverage and health policy generally. 
7.  Research assessing current legal developments on medical liability on an ongoing basis, to 
assess implications for patient safety initiatives. 
 
